> Leibniz challenged “humanity to participate in the work of striving toward perfection,” > Because the world is the creation of a perfect being, it can achieve only the “best possible” state short of divine perfection. That's a lot of presumptions: That the creator is perfect, there is even a perfect, what I (Leibniz) call perfect is the god's/gods' perfect, ... while not giving a frame of reference. I find this a c…
The real question is, would a perfect Being create an imperfect creation? While I don't proffer any, I think there are valid reasons to do so.
'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
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Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#42Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
> My question has rather been that, if suffering is required and a child getting bone cancer and dying at five is the best of all possible worlds, maybe the whole project should have been scrapped at the planning phase. Is that better? it would also require not having all the good things from creation.
I can’t see the good being contingent on a five year old getting bone cancer.
The argument seems similar - not exactly, but similar - to the question "if global warming is real, why is it snowing here". A function describing the maximum global integration over happiness could very well contain many local minima.
Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#44> In such a way, Leibniz, to cite Milton, dared to “justify the ways of God to men.” Voltaire responded with a snarky misreading that exploited the undeniable empirical fact that evil was not balanced by good in the lives of every discreet individual. But Leibniz made no such claim. The best world was optimized as a whole, containing just as much good and evil as was required for the totality of creation. I like this…
This is an argument made by one of the Dostoevsky characters, a famous "tear of a child" argument.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fyodor_Dostoevsky
"Their first child, Sofya, had been conceived in Baden-Baden, and was born in Geneva on 5 March 1868. The baby died of pneumonia three months later, and Anna recalled how Dostoevsky "wept and sobbed like a woman in despair"."
So Dostoevsky suffered the pain of losing a child.
Despite that, an argument about "tear of child" was put into antagonist's mouth.
Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#45> Leibniz challenged “humanity to participate in the work of striving toward perfection,” > Because the world is the creation of a perfect being, it can achieve only the “best possible” state short of divine perfection. That's a lot of presumptions: That the creator is perfect, there is even a perfect, what I (Leibniz) call perfect is the god's/gods' perfect, ... while not giving a frame of reference. I find this a c…
It is formally proven that an entity that encompass all qualities of a God must exist.
Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
I can’t see the good being contingent on a five year old getting bone cancer.
You don't know that the child wouldn't have grown up Hitler. The argument seems similar - not exactly, but similar - to the question "if global warming is real, why is it snowing here". A function describing the maximum global integration over happiness could very well contain many local minima.
Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#47My understanding was that Leibnitz was a pivotal figure in the ideas behind early computing. Didn't see that mentioned in the article so much.
In the collection of papers, it's picked because of its ideas later formalized in Boolean logic, and logic programming in general.
[1]: https://direct.mit.edu/books/edited-volume/5003/Ideas-That-C...
[2]: https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/624726/3/The%20true%20method.pdf
Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#48> In such a way, Leibniz, to cite Milton, dared to “justify the ways of God to men.” Voltaire responded with a snarky misreading that exploited the undeniable empirical fact that evil was not balanced by good in the lives of every discreet individual. But Leibniz made no such claim. The best world was optimized as a whole, containing just as much good and evil as was required for the totality of creation. I like this…
> My question has rather been that, if suffering is required and a child getting bone cancer and dying at five is the best of all possible worlds, maybe the whole project should have been scrapped at the planning phase. I assume God was not forced to create a world? It is not really possible to answer these questions when one does not know the spiritual infrastructure. Eg, say reincarnation of the soul is real, and i…
Maybe the 5-year-old who died of bone cancer was just playing Roy on the hardest difficulty.
However, this shiftiness also undermines every religious platitude as well. God loves you, everything happens for a reason, etc. etc. etc. -- maybe, or maybe God is trapped in a human coma patient and Loki is just fucking with us. If you have degrees of freedom over this "spiritual infrastructure" then it's completely impossible to reach any conclusion.
Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
You don't know that the child wouldn't have grown up Hitler. The argument seems similar - not exactly, but similar - to the question "if global warming is real, why is it snowing here". A function describing the maximum global integration over happiness could very well contain many local minima.
Yes, but an omnipotent God could presumably just make Hitlers not exist. The argument rests on the assumption that there are hidden dependencies in the laws of the universe, such that it was logically necessary that Hitler (or insert whatever other evil here) had to exist to make the best possible world. That's hard to swallow.
Re: 'The Best of All Possible Worlds' Review: Leibniz Lives Again
#50> In such a way, Leibniz, to cite Milton, dared to “justify the ways of God to men.” Voltaire responded with a snarky misreading that exploited the undeniable empirical fact that evil was not balanced by good in the lives of every discreet individual. But Leibniz made no such claim. The best world was optimized as a whole, containing just as much good and evil as was required for the totality of creation. I like this…
(With the collorary that logic is pretty useless in moral philosophy if it's only used to find contrived justification for the status quo.)