41–50 of 130 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do you know?
https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 >Passwords and Keychain (6): End-to-end
Earlier quoted context omitted.
They silently enable the option to store in the Cloud on OS update? They offer no option to delete your passwords from the Cloud once there? If that's indeed how they all/always work, we shouldn't just Stockholm-syndrome accept it!
> They offer no option to delete your passwords from the Cloud once there? Does it matter tho. Like in general internet, once something is posted, it will not disappear with certainty. We can never be certain that there is a copy of the encrypted password on some log file when we have no visibility into that sytem. Since it is encrypted, it passes the regulation checks. That is just a UI bug if passwords keep coming…
This is a pretty lame windmill to tilt at.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The whole OS is a blackbox. We trust that keyloggers are not everywhere. We need to trust completely or not at all. I think there is nothing between when the same vendor also supplying the underlying closed-source OS.
Agreed. But we are talking encryption and why there isn't open source algorithms for iCloud. I find it funny as when you submit iOS apps to the App Store they specifically require encryption standards and no "roll your own algos/cryptos" but at the same time all their crypto is a black box. I'm a happy Apple user, love the OS...just saying.
This is not true.
thats how cloud stored password managers work..
They silently enable the option to store in the Cloud on OS update? They offer no option to delete your passwords from the Cloud once there? If that's indeed how they all/always work, we shouldn't just Stockholm-syndrome accept it!
Has been this way for at least a decade.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> They offer no option to delete your passwords from the Cloud once there? Does it matter tho. Like in general internet, once something is posted, it will not disappear with certainty. We can never be certain that there is a copy of the encrypted password on some log file when we have no visibility into that sytem. Since it is encrypted, it passes the regulation checks. That is just a UI bug if passwords keep coming…
Your passwords are encrypted with keys stored only in the local on-device TPM. This is a pretty lame windmill to tilt at.
thats how cloud stored password managers work..
Normally you have to explicitly install and use a cloud stored password manager, automatically making the choice for you is a big no-no
The big question here is whether there’s a reproducible way that the opt-in changes. iCloud Keychain has robust end to end encryption but it still needs to inform the user.
Maybe someone can reverse engineer, attach a debugger and confirm, or analyze the traffic with a Transparent MITM Proxy on the new machine. Just grep for your password in the traffic captured, should be easy.
And then write a blog post about that. Let's see what happens.
thats how cloud stored password managers work..
Well, the real problem is iCloud Keychain is essentially a "black box" system. Apple does use AES encryption in various parts of their security architecture, as documented in their security white papers. But we can't confirm the specific implementation details for iCloud Keychain. And you should also know... Best practices for password storage use one-way hash functions (like bcrypt, Argon2, or PBKDF2).
https://support.apple.com/en-au/guide/security/secb0694df1a/...
It’s then stored in iCloud as a SQLite file and encrypted as it does for your other synced data.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> They offer no option to delete your passwords from the Cloud once there? Does it matter tho. Like in general internet, once something is posted, it will not disappear with certainty. We can never be certain that there is a copy of the encrypted password on some log file when we have no visibility into that sytem. Since it is encrypted, it passes the regulation checks. That is just a UI bug if passwords keep coming…
Your passwords are encrypted with keys stored only in the local on-device TPM. This is a pretty lame windmill to tilt at.
It is essentially about the trust. You either trust that they don't misuse the cloud-uploaded passwords or not. If you cannot trust that, you cannot trust the whole ecosystem as the same entity controls it and can misuse it in any imaginable way.
So essentially, the issue of deletion is just about the visibility in the UI, if we trust their claim about the end-to-end encryption.