Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
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Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#42"Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious, yet conscious time of nothingness. I did not know that I knew aught, or that I lived or acted or desired. I had neither will nor intellect. I was carried along to objects and acts by a certain blind natural impetus. I had a mind which caused me to feel anger, satisfaction, desire. These two facts led those about me to suppose that I willed and thought. I can remember all this, not because I knew that it was so, but because I have tactual memory. It enables me to remember that I never contracted my forehead in the act of thinking. I never viewed anything beforehand or chose it. I also recall tactually the fact that never in a start of the body or a heart-beat did I feel that I loved or cared for anything. My inner life, then, was a blank without past, present, or future, without hope or anticipation, without wonder or joy or faith.
It was not night—it was not day.
. . . . .
But vacancy absorbing space, And fixedness, without a place; There were no stars—no earth—no time— No check—no change—no good—no crime.
My dormant being had no idea of God or immortality, no fear of death.
I remember, also through touch, that I had a power of association. I felt tactual jars like the stamp of a foot, the opening of a window or its closing, the slam of a door. After repeatedly smelling rain and feeling the discomfort of wetness, I acted like those about me: I ran to shut the window. But that was not thought in any sense. It was the same kind of association that makes animals take shelter from the rain. From the same instinct of aping others, I folded the clothes that came from the laundry, and put mine away, fed the turkeys, sewed bead-eyes on my doll's face, and did many other things of which I have the tactual remembrance. When I wanted anything I liked,—ice-cream, for instance, of which I was very fond,—I had a delicious taste on my tongue (which, by the way, I never have now), and in my hand I felt the turning of the freezer. I made the sign, and my mother knew I wanted ice-cream. I "thought" and desired in my fingers. If I had made a man, I should certainly have put the brain and soul in his finger-tips. From reminiscences like these I conclude that it is the opening of the two faculties, freedom of will, or choice, and rationality, or the power of thinking from one thing to another, which makes it possible to come into being first as a child, afterwards as a man.
Since I had no power of thought, I did not compare one mental state with another. So I was not conscious of any change or process going on in my brain when my teacher began to instruct me. I merely felt keen delight in obtaining more easily what I wanted by means of the finger motions she taught me. I thought only of objects, and only objects I wanted. It was the turning of the freezer on a larger scale. When I learned the meaning of "I" and "me" and found that I was something, I began to think. Then consciousness first existed for me. Thus it was not the sense of touch that brought me knowledge. It was the awakening of my soul that first rendered my senses their value, their cognizance of objects, names, qualities, and properties. Thought made me conscious of love, joy, and all the emotions. I was eager to know, then to understand, afterward to reflect on what I knew and understood, and the blind impetus, which had before driven me hither and thither at the dictates of my sensations, vanished forever.
I cannot represent more clearly than any one else the gradual and subtle changes from first impressions to abstract ideas. But I know that my physical ideas, that is, ideas derived from material objects, appear to me first an idea similar to those of touch. Instantly they pass into intellectual meanings. Afterward the meaning finds expression in what is called "inner speech." When I was a child, my inner speech was inner spelling. Although I am even now frequently caught spelling to myself on my fingers, yet I talk to myself, too, with my lips, and it is true that when I first learned to speak, my mind discarded the finger-symbols and began to articulate. However, when I try to recall what some one has said to me, I am conscious of a hand spelling into mine.
It has often been asked what were my earliest impressions of the world in which I found myself. But one who thinks at all of his first impressions knows what a riddle this is. Our impressions grow and change unnoticed, so that what we suppose we thought as children may be quite different from what we actually experienced in our childhood. I only know that after my education began the world which came within my reach was all alive. I spelled to my blocks and my dogs. I sympathized with plants when the flowers were picked, because I thought it hurt them, and that they grieved for their lost blossoms. It was two years before I could be made to believe that my dogs did not understand what I said, and I always apologized to them when I ran into or stepped on them.
As my experiences broadened and deepened, the indeterminate, poetic feelings of childhood began to fix themselves in definite thoughts. Nature—the world I could touch—was folded and filled with myself. I am inclined to believe those philosophers who declare that we know nothing but our own feelings and ideas. With a little ingenious reasoning one may see in the material world simply a mirror, an image of permanent mental sensations. In either sphere self-knowledge is the condition and the limit of our consciousness. That is why, perhaps, many people know so little about what is beyond their short range of experience. They look within themselves—and find nothing! Therefore they conclude that there is nothing outside themselves, either.
However that may be, I came later to look for an image of my emotions and sensations in others. I had to learn the outward signs of inward feelings. The start of fear, the suppressed, controlled tensity of pain, the beat of happy muscles in others, had to be perceived and compared with my own experiences before I could trace them back to the intangible soul of another. Groping, uncertain, I at last found my identity, and after seeing my thoughts and feelings repeated in others, I gradually constructed my world of men and of God. As I read and study, I find that this is what the rest of the race has done. Man looks within himself and in time finds the measure and the meaning of the universe."
Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#43Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#44As always, barely anyone reads the actual claims in the article and we're left with people opining on the title. The claims here are exceptionally limited. You don't need spoken language to do well on cognitive tests, but that has never been a subject of debate. Obviously the deaf get on fine without spoken language. People suffering from aphasia, but still capable of communication via other mechanisms, still do well…
I think this may have been partially substantiated through experiments in decoding thoughts with machine sensors.
If this turns out to-not- to be true it would have huge implications for AI research.
Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can you count without using a "language"? Try it now: Tap your hand on the desk randomly. Can you recall how many times you did it without "saying" a sequence in your head like "1, 2, 3" or "A, B, C" etc? If yes, how far can you count? With a language it's effectively infinite. You could theoretically go up to "1 million 5 hundred 43 thousand, 2 hundred and 10" and effortlessly know what comes next.
Interestingly, I feel like I can "feel" small numbers (up to 4 or 5) easier than than thinking about them as objects in a language.
https://www.sciencealert.com/theres-a-big-difference-in-how-...
Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#46For those who can’t and don’t think in words this is unsurprising.
I remember back in school, a language teacher once was trying to convey the importance of language. One of his main arguments was that we needed words and languages in order to think. I still recall my disbelief. I spent the next few days trying to understand how that process worked. I would force myself to think in words and sentences. It was incredibly limiting! So slow and lacking in images, in abstract relationsh…
Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#47Several factors contribute to the unfalsifiability of this claim:
Subjectivity of Thought: Thought processes are inherently internal and subjective. There is no direct method to observe or measure another being's thoughts without imposing interpretative frameworks influenced by social and material contexts.
Defining Language and Thought: Language is not merely a collection of spoken or written symbols; it is a system of signs embedded within social relations and power structures. If we broaden the definition of language to include any form of symbolic representation or communication—such as gestures, images, or neural patterns—then the notion of thought occurring without language becomes conceptually incoherent. Thought is mediated through these symbols, which are products of historical and material developments.
Animal Cognition and Symbolic Systems: Observations of animals like chimpanzees engaging in strategic gameplay or crows crafting tools demonstrate complex behaviors. Interpreting these actions as evidence of thought devoid of language overlooks the possibility that animals utilize their own symbolic systems. These behaviors reflect interactions with their environment mediated by innate or socially learned symbols—a rudimentary form of language shaped by their material conditions.
Limitations of Empirical Testing: To empirically verify that thought can occur without any form of language would require accessing cognitive processes entirely free from symbolic mediation. Given the current state of scientific methodologies—and considering that all cognitive processes are influenced by material and social factors—this is unattainable.
Because of these factors, Stix's claim cannot be empirically tested in a way that could potentially falsify it. It resides outside the parameters of verifiable inquiry, highlighting the importance of recognizing the interplay between language, thought, and material conditions.
Cognitive processes and language are deeply intertwined. Language arises from collective practice; it both shapes and is shaped by the material conditions of the environment. Thought is mediated through language, carrying the cognitive imprints of the material base. Even in non-human animals, the cognitive abilities we observe may be underpinned by forms of symbolic interaction with their environment—a reflection of their material engagement with the world.
Asserting that language is not essential for thought overlooks the fundamental role that social and material conditions play in shaping both language and cognition. It fails to account for how symbolic systems—integral to language—are embedded in and arise from material realities.
Certain forms of thought might appear to occur without human language, but this perspective neglects the intrinsic connection between cognition, language, and environmental conditiond. Reasoning itself can be viewed as a form of internalized language—a symbolic system rooted in social and material contexts. Recognizing this interdependence is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the nature of thought and the pivotal role language plays within it.
Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#48The actual paper [1] says that functional MRI (which is measuring which parts of the brain are active by sensing blood flow) indicates that different brain hardware is used for non-language and language functions. This has been suspected for years, but now there's an experimental result.
What this tells us for AI is that we need something else besides LLMs. It's not clear what that something else is. But, as the paper mentions, the low-end mammals and the corvids lack language but have some substantial problem-solving capability. That's seen down at squirrel and crow size, where the brains are tiny. So if someone figures out to do this, it will probably take less hardware than an LLM.
This is the next big piece we need for AI. No idea how to do this, but it's the right question to work on.
[1] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-07522-w.epdf?shar...
Re: Language is not essential for the cognitive processes that underlie thought
#49As always, barely anyone reads the actual claims in the article and we're left with people opining on the title. The claims here are exceptionally limited. You don't need spoken language to do well on cognitive tests, but that has never been a subject of debate. Obviously the deaf get on fine without spoken language. People suffering from aphasia, but still capable of communication via other mechanisms, still do well…
We'd better hope that is true, because if we didn't have non-linguistic mastery of the cognitive processes underlying thought it's hard to see how we could even acquire language in the first place.