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Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

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Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#41

Post by Novosell »

defrost wrote: post #32
mkl wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To be fair, I've never seen it used in prose like that, and had trouble understanding your comment at first. I did university boolean logic 30 years ago and have been on the internet in programming communities nearly as long.

Sure, different groups have different conventions. I've been commenting on internet forums, threads, and groups since pre WWW Usenet, using | as OR (though more often as { A | B | C }, seen others use the same convention and this is the very first time anyone has ever claimed it as a unique quirk.

Consider this the second time. ¿English motherfucker, do you write it?

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#42

Post by notpushkin »

StrLght wrote: post #27
commandersaki wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Tangential question: how are IP addresses in certificates validated? Cloudflare was subject to a BGP hijack of the 1.1.1/24 prefix, how does it prevent someone from running a malicious DNS server?

Technically it's possible to specify an IP address in a X.509 certificate. With OpenSSL you'd do something like that when issuing new certificate: subjectAltName=IP:192.168.1.1 And that's actually exactly what Google's 8.8.8.8 and Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 use in their certificates. Also both issuers use certificate transparency [0], so BGP hijack shouldn't affect this — sure, your system might try to connect to hijacked…

> sure, your system might try to connect to hijacked IP, but TLS connection will fail due to invalid certificate

I think the parent is asking if malicious actor can issue a certificate in case of BGP hijack. I think they could, but then it would be visible in the CT log.

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#43

Post by inkyoto »

defrost wrote: post #14

While the DNS Privacy Project has a good many suggestions and links it might be time to upgade their "stubby" project. https://dnsprivacy.org/ stubby is a localhost DNS proxy that can work for any app | browser | etc. on a network and use DoT or DoH to any of the common providers. Given the ease with which national ISPs can MiTM these | intercept calls to Cloudflare | Quad9 | AdGuard etc. it might be good to extend e…

There is a lot of confusion in this thread and in a separate thread discussing the Malaysian DNS redirect legislation where people confound privacy with resistance to censorship. Whilst both do possess a certain degree of overlap, resistance to censorship requires a fundamentally different approach that does not fit within constraints of the DNS framework.

DNS has a decentralised architecture designed to be resilient to failures.

DoT, DoH and similar address the privacy aspect of the unencrypted by default DNS traffic.

None of the existing DNS, DNS extensions, DoT, DoH can circumvent serious censorship attempts at scale due to name resolution requests being encapsulated in an IP packet that exposes enough metadata that (destination address and port number) to allow the packet to be altered, redirected, dropped or blackholed even if the packet is encrypted or obfuscated. Traffic bound to a specific IP address or to a specific TCP or UDP port is the easiest to curb, it does not even require the manual intervention and is widely used by intrusion detection systems to automatically block the detected in real time malicious traffic.

The censorship resistance requires a complete replacement of DNS that would be akin to the GNU Naming System[0], which fulfils all three objectives: it is a decentralised, privacy-preserving, censorship-resistant domain name resolution protocol.

Having gone through https://dnsprivacy.org/ (which is very disorganised, to be fair), I fail to see how stubby could be of any help due to still requiring a upstream DNS server of sorts somewhere, which will be blocked if not automatically then very quickly albeit manually anyway.

[0] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9498

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#44

Post by david38 »

doovd wrote: post #36
defrost wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because I've used it as an "or" symbol in a non unique common as muck manner since 1980 at least when I was taught Boolean logic in an undergraduate university mathematics class. It's one of many conventional symbols for OR, more common in the pure ASCII days due to a lack of ∧ , ∨ , ¬ et al. Which rock have you lived under that you've never seen it used an OR before? People imposing their limited experience of the w…

It'd make sense if you were writing out some Boolean expressions or trying to present something with formal logic. But you're writing English here so it seems inappropriate to a) ditch conventional grammar and b) pass off the criticism as "imposing their limited experience".

[flagged]

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#45

Post by jusepal »

I'm currently in Malaysia. TM, the biggest public facing ISP here goes a step further by also ssl mitm-ing Google dns and Cloudflare dns DoH endpoint. Their idea is to hijack and route all query intended for both to their own DoH server. Obviously browsers showed big red warning about the attack since users explicitly setup their browser to use Google or Cloudflare DoH but instead being hijacked and routed to TM's own DoH endpoint. The whole ordeal is so baffling, i wonder which senior network admin at TM give that a go, or whether TM actually got competent network admin at all.

With that single misstep, suddenly the people realized if they could (and did) mitm Google and Cloudflare dns endpoint, they could mitm Gmail, Outlook, Riotgames, Facebook, Tiktok or whatever too. Public outcry comes pouring in and the Minister of Comm backtracked.

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#46

Post by commandersaki »

notpushkin wrote: post #42
StrLght wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Technically it's possible to specify an IP address in a X.509 certificate. With OpenSSL you'd do something like that when issuing new certificate: subjectAltName=IP:192.168.1.1 And that's actually exactly what Google's 8.8.8.8 and Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 use in their certificates. Also both issuers use certificate transparency [0], so BGP hijack shouldn't affect this — sure, your system might try to connect to hijacked…

> sure, your system might try to connect to hijacked IP, but TLS connection will fail due to invalid certificate I think the parent is asking if malicious actor can issue a certificate in case of BGP hijack. I think they could, but then it would be visible in the CT log.

Nah StrLght set me straight. I really didn't know how an IP address was embedded in a certificate, and I was viewing the output of the certificate from the lens of openssl s_client -connect 1.1.1.1:443 which obscures the fact that there's more than CN=cloudflare-dns.com.

I think it'd be pretty hard to get a certificate for 1.1.1.1 after a BGP hijack, unless you had some control over a CA. I don't think LetsEncrypt issues certificates for IPs.

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#47

Post by sunaookami »

MonkeyClub wrote: post #5
aussieguy1234 wrote: post #3

While they've backtracked, every dictator in the world probably took notice and its only a matter of time.

Greece is already way ahead! When one tries to visit some sites like LibGen, DNS is redirected to a "no-no you shouldn't go there" page, which in turn redirects to this official finger-wagging page: https://opi.gr/edppi_block/edppi_block.html DNS hijacking was also used during the beginning of the Ukraine affair as part of an EU-wide censorship push, blocking sites like the Kremlin and Pravda, though without further…

As is Germany with the "CUII" where every relevant ISP DNS-blocks "copyright-violating" sites without a court decision. And of course EU-wide where f.e. RT is blocked (not vetoed by a court or parliament).

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#48

Post by defrost »

inkyoto wrote: post #43
defrost wrote: post #14

While the DNS Privacy Project has a good many suggestions and links it might be time to upgade their "stubby" project. https://dnsprivacy.org/ stubby is a localhost DNS proxy that can work for any app | browser | etc. on a network and use DoT or DoH to any of the common providers. Given the ease with which national ISPs can MiTM these | intercept calls to Cloudflare | Quad9 | AdGuard etc. it might be good to extend e…

There is a lot of confusion in this thread and in a separate thread discussing the Malaysian DNS redirect legislation where people confound privacy with resistance to censorship. Whilst both do possess a certain degree of overlap, resistance to censorship requires a fundamentally different approach that does not fit within constraints of the DNS framework. DNS has a decentralised architecture designed to be resilient…

> which is very disorganised, to be fair

> I fail to see how stubby could be of any help

I agree fully with the first, partially agree with the second; the DNSPrivacy site needs an overhaul and seems a few years out of date but it does cover most of the privacy related lurks.

As you said the "stubby" | "getdns" module is good enough for privacy, it's no more than a local service shim layer between anything local requiring DNS via a variety of means, all of which can be censored.

I did suggest it could use extension .. and a network of distributed peers to extend to.

It's a project for anyone minded to take it up .. create a secure obfuscated distributed stubby net that can try DoT DoH etc in situ and should they work provide that service to others else fallover to reaching out to others to find peers that can access authorised DNS.

The Windows Portmaster project is an interesting one; it provides a level of network inspection and control to advanced regular users, stubby-like getdns functionality that's a bit easier to use, and offers a VPN layer to subscribers for data.

If the Portmaster maintainers are true to their vision I can see them adding obfuscated distributed DNS to subscribers in the near to mid future depending how they allocate resources and who they onboard now they have funds for a new hire (last I checked, I could be out of date here).

Re: Malaysia backtracks on DNS redirection decision

#49

Post by 082349872349872 »

defrost wrote: post #32
mkl wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To be fair, I've never seen it used in prose like that, and had trouble understanding your comment at first. I did university boolean logic 30 years ago and have been on the internet in programming communities nearly as long.

Sure, different groups have different conventions. I've been commenting on internet forums, threads, and groups since pre WWW Usenet, using | as OR (though more often as { A | B | C }, seen others use the same convention and this is the very first time anyone has ever claimed it as a unique quirk.

I appreciate | as OR because (like its non-ascii cousin ∨) it uses an lr-symmetric glyph to denote a commutative operation.

EDIT: Backus uses the asymmetric overbarred "or" in 1959, but by 1963 the | we know and love has already taken its place (that ASCII standardisation didn't start until 1961 may have something to do with this?)

https://www.softwarepreservation.org/projects/ALGOL/paper/Ba...

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/366193.366201

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