This argument is basically wrong because it supposes companies don't have market power when they do. "Market power" doesn't mean monopoly. It takes at least four and more often at least a dozen viable competitors before you have enough that there isn't an implicit cartel, and there are altogether too many markets where this is the case.
Nearly all specialty or line of business software, for example. These markets commonly have two or three providers and rarely have hundreds. Literally the intended purpose of copyright in this context is to give the authors market power.
And then the example given is the sympathetic one. The premise here is that there are the same number of customers willing to pay $40 as $10, and so the rational choice for a company not engaged in price discrimination is to charge $40 to everyone and price discrimination allows them to provide a "discount" to half of the customers.
Now suppose that only 10% of the customers would be willing to pay $40. The single-price profit-maximizing strategy is then to charge $10, because 100% x $10 is more than 10% x $40, and no customer benefits because all price discrimination does is allow them to overcharge the remaining 10%.
More to the point, in an actually competitive market, price discrimination isn't possible. If the marginal cost of providing the service is $7 and anyone is charging $40 to anyone, someone else could take those customers by charging $39, and someone else could take their customers by charging $25, until the market price is a thin margin over the underlying cost of providing the service. Because even the customers willing to pay $40 would prefer to pay $8, and the company that has 0.25% market share at $40 would rather have 10% market share at $8.
The better argument in favor of the "SSO tax" is the one from the comments: That SSO actually increases the cost of providing the service by raising support costs.