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MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

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Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#41

Post by gillesjacobs »

guardiangod wrote: post #19
fsckboy wrote: post #10

could somebody ELI5 the threat vector here? I'm not skeptical, I just don't know what to imagine. backdoor implies somebody can "get in" to my rfid, but rfid's spend most of their time "off the grid". So when my rfid powers up, does the "host" who powered it up also need to be insecure or on an insecure/compromised net? then... what capabilities would suddenly become possible; unlocking the door is already unlocked,…

Most RFID card systems in the world uses MIFARE Classic due to its cost and long history. MIFARE (not just the Classic family) have a UID (32 bits) and x blocks of encrypted data (12 for Classic). Each block is protected by a A key and a B key. The earliest card system only uses UID for authentication ie. if the card says the right UID the card passes authentication. Obviously, anyone can forge a card with said UID,…

This is also why chip implants from eg Dangerous Things with MIFARE were desirable: you could clone old MIFARE chips this way using some tools.

Sadly, neither my gym or work access card were cloneable even though they are MIFARE Classic. So I did not end up getting an implant.

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#42

Post by bobnarizes »

This news about RFID vulnerabilities really highlights the importance of rethinking how we secure access to critical systems, especially in industrial environments. At Siemens, we’ve been working on a solution that addresses these exact concerns.

I’ve developed Unified Air, a new technology that allows factory workers to authenticate to production machines using the biometric sensors on their mobile devices—eliminating the need for insecure RFID cards altogether. Not only does this method enhance security by leveraging unique biometric data, but it also streamlines the authentication process, making it both faster and more reliable for operators.

If you’re interested in a more secure and user-friendly alternative to RFID, you can check out more details about Unified Air here: https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109827772/d...

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#43

Post by jtriangle »

noddingham wrote: post #35

I've been involved with carding for 10+ years and issues with MIFARE Classic cards have been around and known for at least that long. Anyone in the carding industry will (should at the very least) tell you not to use them and move on to DESFire or some other newer safer chips. The introduction even says as much "By 2024, we all know MIFARE Classic is badly broken." If you're still deploying MIFARE Classic cards you r…

"carding" is also colloquially used to refer to people involved in credit card fraud online. Just FYI in case you get weird looks when you say that.

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#44

Post by astrobe_ »

noddingham wrote: post #35

I've been involved with carding for 10+ years and issues with MIFARE Classic cards have been around and known for at least that long. Anyone in the carding industry will (should at the very least) tell you not to use them and move on to DESFire or some other newer safer chips. The introduction even says as much "By 2024, we all know MIFARE Classic is badly broken." If you're still deploying MIFARE Classic cards you r…

Yes, and more generally I've been baffled by the fact that manufacturers - including ARM-based SoCs with SecureBoot (or similar); you know, those PDF spec docuements that disable copy-paste and a nice "confidential" watermark - put their cyber-security stuff under NDA. As if it security-by-obscurity was still a thing.

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#45

Post by aragonite »

janice1999 wrote: post #4
dave_universetf wrote: post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The paper reports that the same backdoor seems to be present in some NXP and Infineon SKUs as well, including some manufactured in Europe.

They could have licensed the IP from the same company.

They found the exact same backdoor key present on old NXP and Infineon cards produced as early as 1996. See p.11:

> But, quite surprisingly, some other cards, aside from the Fudan ones, accept the same backdoor authentication commands using the same key as for the FM11RF08!

> ...

> - Infineon SLE66R35 possibly produced at least during a period 1996-20136 ;

> - NXP MF1ICS5003 produced at least between 1998 and 2000 ;

> - NXP MF1ICS5004 produced at least in 2001.

> ...

> Additionally, what are we to make of the fact that old NXP and Infineon cards share the very same backdoor key?

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#46

Post by nativeit »

borski wrote: post #20
ethbr1 wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Super curious to know how many common access control solutions flag unbalanced entries/exits. E.g. if "John" badges in... and then 10 minutes later "John" badges in again... Will most systems complain?

Great question; not to my knowledge. There would be many false positives, especially as people bring in guests. Sometimes guests get a temp badge; at many companies, they get a sticker to put on their shirt and get tapped in by their host, who is responsible for them. Rather than building a SOC to look at logs and flag unbalanced entries or similar (which would be very expensive), companies tend to rely on their empl…

I suppose the expense, and the risk in relying on employees, is gonna be quite relative to the organization and its priorities. I wouldn’t imagine setting up a log monitor with some basic monitoring should be that expensive. As someone above mentioned, it’s kind of odd that these systems are so utterly disconnected to the broader IT protocols in so many places. I use a few different RMM solutions that could almost certainly handle the log collection, analysis, and real-time monitoring with alerts and I don’t think it’d take much time/effort to set up. The most critical point would simply be maintaining healthy access controls and avoiding the potential for new potential vulnerabilities.

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#47

Post by closeparen »

0cf8612b2e1e wrote: post #17
ethbr1 wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Super curious to know how many common access control solutions flag unbalanced entries/exits. E.g. if "John" badges in... and then 10 minutes later "John" badges in again... Will most systems complain?

That would be a terrible user experience. Most places are not diligent about ensuring each employee separately badges past a barrier. Common to hold the door for Bob while he is juggling a coffee. Boom, missed badge swipe and now things are forever imbalanced.

If you care about this at all you’d use a turnstile.

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#48

Post by minkles »

noddingham wrote: post #35

I've been involved with carding for 10+ years and issues with MIFARE Classic cards have been around and known for at least that long. Anyone in the carding industry will (should at the very least) tell you not to use them and move on to DESFire or some other newer safer chips. The introduction even says as much "By 2024, we all know MIFARE Classic is badly broken." If you're still deploying MIFARE Classic cards you r…

Yeah TFL killed them off starting 2010 in London due to this. I'm surprised this is even a thing now.

Re: MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant [pdf]

#49

Post by closeparen »

jeffbee wrote: post #2

"Should we buy a Chinese knockoff of MIFARE Classic" strikes me as a self-answering question, but I guess that's why I still haven't been promoted to CISO.

Does a CISO even make this decision? Probably like a contractor hired by the building manager of an anonymous commercial real estate holding company.
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