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Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

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41–50 of 323 posts

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#41
post #21
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> most of them should be able to build their own service. Isn't the hard prt the connectivity bit i.e. negotiating with the various telcos? I once saw a telco use a third party SMS vendor for messaging their own customers for an app - because setting it up internally was too much of a hassle.

So you say, that for Google, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, which are among those costumers, it is too hard to negotiate with the various teclos?

Not in the US at least for those companies, but the world is a big place and this other comment https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40935323 mentioned places like Gambia and Burkina Faso... It just makes sense to outsource local delivery to companies that are better connected locally.

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#42
A family friend of ours recently fell victim to a phishing attack perpetrated by an attacker who paid for Google Ads for a search term like "BANKNAME login". The site was an immaculate knock off, with a replay attack in the background. She entered her 2fa code from the app on her phone but the interface rejected the code and asked her for another one. In the background, this 2nd code was actually to authorise the addition of a new "pay anyone" payee, and with that her money was gone[0].

I have accounts with 2 banks, one uses SMS 2fa and the other uses an app which generates a token. I had thought that the app was by default a better choice because of the inherent lack of security in SMS as a protcol BUT in the above attack the bank that sends the SMS would have been better because they send a different message when you're doing a transfer to a new payee than when you're logging in.

So really the ideal is not just having an app that generates a token but one that generates a specific type of token depending on what type of transaction you're performing and won't accept, for example, a login token when adding a new payee. I haven't seen any bank with that level of 2fa yet, has anyone else?

I guess perhaps passkeys make this obsolete anyway since it establishes a local physical connection to a piece of hardware.

[0] Ron Howard voice: "she eventually got it back"

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#43
post #42

A family friend of ours recently fell victim to a phishing attack perpetrated by an attacker who paid for Google Ads for a search term like "BANKNAME login". The site was an immaculate knock off, with a replay attack in the background. She entered her 2fa code from the app on her phone but the interface rejected the code and asked her for another one. In the background, this 2nd code was actually to authorise the add…

Another lesson here is to bookmark/ memorize the url of your bank, and don’t trust search engines to take you to your bank

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#44
post #33
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have zero clue as to what you're talking about. And what card am I getting from my bank?

A bank card to pay stuff, witch is a smart card, NFC capable, you can use (as is common in various EU countries) to authenticate yourself on your internet banking. Similarly various countries offers eIDs (some I know Estonia, Belgium, Italy, Germany, France) witch are NFC ISO 14443A/B who are used to authenticate the Citizen on various public services. Many universities and some high school as well offer an NFC badge…

My Visa card definitely doesn't work for any online bank authentication in Finland. It's strictly for payments. For authentication, it's user ID + PIN with a paper two-factor, or user ID + phone authenticator. Some banks also have physical two-factor hardware.

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#45
post #42

A family friend of ours recently fell victim to a phishing attack perpetrated by an attacker who paid for Google Ads for a search term like "BANKNAME login". The site was an immaculate knock off, with a replay attack in the background. She entered her 2fa code from the app on her phone but the interface rejected the code and asked her for another one. In the background, this 2nd code was actually to authorise the add…

> So really the ideal is not just having an app that generates a token but one that generates a specific type of token depending on what type of transaction you're performing and won't accept, for example, a login token when adding a new payee.

My understanding of EU regulation is that it effectively requires this by requiring the 2FA to validate not just the identity but also the transaction (such as an amount, or destination account).

Unfortunately it means that all banks use SMS. We did have card reader 2FA that also did this but it's falling out of use because users don't like having to carry a card reader around.

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#46
post #43
post #42

A family friend of ours recently fell victim to a phishing attack perpetrated by an attacker who paid for Google Ads for a search term like "BANKNAME login". The site was an immaculate knock off, with a replay attack in the background. She entered her 2fa code from the app on her phone but the interface rejected the code and asked her for another one. In the background, this 2nd code was actually to authorise the add…

Another lesson here is to bookmark/ memorize the url of your bank, and don’t trust search engines to take you to your bank

Also that Google, as a search engine that is also the world's biggest advertising company really should be able to manage not to sell ads to phishing scammers!

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#47
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have zero clue as to what you're talking about. And what card am I getting from my bank?

I assume your bank gives you a debit card. And many government IDs have NFC chips nowadays.

Pretty sure that neither my Visa Credit/Debit or my passport works for any kind of digital authentication. I think you can specifically get an ID that works as a smart card, but since you don't need just the specific ID card, but also a reader + faffing about, adaptation is super low.

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#48
post #42

A family friend of ours recently fell victim to a phishing attack perpetrated by an attacker who paid for Google Ads for a search term like "BANKNAME login". The site was an immaculate knock off, with a replay attack in the background. She entered her 2fa code from the app on her phone but the interface rejected the code and asked her for another one. In the background, this 2nd code was actually to authorise the add…

We have it: FIDO U2F. you could even treat it like the new password less manager, with a computer/phone specific store.

My gut? It actually works, and people didn't like that. Users and orgs like authentication slightly broken so they can work around systems.

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#49
post #46
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Another lesson here is to bookmark/ memorize the url of your bank, and don’t trust search engines to take you to your bank

Also that Google, as a search engine that is also the world's biggest advertising company really should be able to manage not to sell ads to phishing scammers!

Maybe if platform is large enough it should be criminally liable for phishing attacks. I see no reason why Google should not be responsible in vetting each and every link they advertise at top of their search results.

Re: Second factor SMS: Worse than its reputation

#50
post #42

A family friend of ours recently fell victim to a phishing attack perpetrated by an attacker who paid for Google Ads for a search term like "BANKNAME login". The site was an immaculate knock off, with a replay attack in the background. She entered her 2fa code from the app on her phone but the interface rejected the code and asked her for another one. In the background, this 2nd code was actually to authorise the add…

> the ideal is not just having an app that generates a token but one that generates a specific type of token depending on what type of transaction you're performing and won't accept, for example, a login token when adding a new payee.

I think at least some UK banks will do this. When I've done it using a card + card reader, you select the option to choose which type of operation you're trying to do. And if you're just trying to login it just displays a rolling code, but for authorisation of particular events it will take the form of a challenge/response, i.e. you have to select the operation on the card reader + enter a code provided from the site. This should I think prevent _simple_ replay attacks.

I even think for some transactions such as transfers over a certain amount, you have to enter the amount into the reader as part of the code generation.

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