Earlier quoted context omitted.
Right... I may have wrongly named Arch in my comment. Thanks for the correction. I'm curious about Arch's claim that "the build script was configured to only inject the bad code in Debian/Fedora based package build environments". Were Debian and Fedora specifically targetted, and the other distros who also got affected just happened to use similar packaging routines, or is this claim a guess?
Me too, especially since many packages on Arch begin by downloading the official .deb/.rpm
16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
41–50 of 68 posts
Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#42Earlier quoted context omitted.
I did this, kind of. I was interviewing for a financial company that went to some effort to hide their location for operational security, met them at a local cafe where we talked about physical security, and then casually mentioned that I was staying at an airbnb across the road from their office and we could walk back together. It took a couple of calls to find someone who happily told me their registered address. T…
Wouldn't their registered address be public information? I understand that corporations may use agents/lawyers for that kind of thing, with layers of shell companies, but in theory this kind of info is able to be discovered and deduced from tax records, incorporation documents, and for publicly traded companies, SEC filings, etc. Cool story! I'm glad you got the job! Anything else about your sleuthing you'd care to a…
Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
Me too, especially since many packages on Arch begin by downloading the official .deb/.rpm
Does this happen for official packages or just the AUR? I was pretty sure that when possible they build the packages from source themselves rather than bundling pre-existing binaries, and I'd assume that they wouldn't likely have the sources in the final package. IIRC Debian doesn't even like to bundle the headers in with libraries in preference of splitting them off into a separate file, so I'd be kind of shocked if…
Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#44I love this case, because every time someone cites it as a reason packagers shouldn't patch upstream software I get to point out that they had to go back over a decade to find an example of it going bad. Soon it's going to be two decades.
This one was special because it lead to a massive security issue, rather than just annoyed users who had bugs only because of packaging patches.
Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#45Every day, Ted Unangst is vindicated more and more[1] for his work forking OpenSSL. If you do a little digging, you'll see that there was no real technical reason why your distro of choice has abandoned implementing LibreSSL[2][3], or just never implemented it at all[4]. They just somehow wanted to keep using the faulty software with exploit mitigation countermeasures[5][6]. Totally organic. 1. https://flak.tedunangs…
I don't think that has anything to with this, though.
Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
This isn't about systemd. OpenSSH is one of the most (if not the most) security-critical program in the distribution. Many systems run with just ssh enabled. That's why you don't mess with it. Which library pulled the vulnerability in is mostly irrelevant.
When the init system won't reliably start openssh, and insists the only fix is to patch, then blame the horrible init system. And that was what happened with systemd.
Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#47Earlier quoted context omitted.
Wouldn't their registered address be public information? I understand that corporations may use agents/lawyers for that kind of thing, with layers of shell companies, but in theory this kind of info is able to be discovered and deduced from tax records, incorporation documents, and for publicly traded companies, SEC filings, etc. Cool story! I'm glad you got the job! Anything else about your sleuthing you'd care to a…
A business needs a registered address, but it doesn't need to be the address of their main offices. It's quite common to have a registered address which is just a forwarding agency.
You could maybe even skip the mailing step and just watch the registered address and trace the movements of everyone who visits that location.
Do you have any other methods you can think of?
Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
DMARC only requires one of SPF or DKIM to pass. DKIM passing and SPF failing won't deter DMARC; the message will land in the inbox.
That is a common DMARC configuration but not the only one. The failure tolerance is configurable.
How do you configure DMARC to require both of DKIM and SPF?
The RFC says:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7489#section-4.2
A message satisfies the DMARC checks if at least one of the supported
authentication mechanisms:
1. produces a "pass" result, and
2. produces that result based on an identifier that is in alignment,
as defined in Section 3.Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#49Re: 16 years of CVE-2008-0166 – Debian OpenSSL Bug
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
A business needs a registered address, but it doesn't need to be the address of their main offices. It's quite common to have a registered address which is just a forwarding agency.
I guess you could mail a cellphone or AirTag to their registered address, then even if they find it and don’t forward it, you could follow the person(s) who fetch or deliver the mail to the company location. You could maybe even skip the mailing step and just watch the registered address and trace the movements of everyone who visits that location. Do you have any other methods you can think of?
Also forwarding agencies probably don’t visit the clients locations often.