I happened to be there while this attack was in progress (ocotober 23). And all there systems were really offline, POS didnt work, wifi didn’t work, literally anything connected to a computer didnt work. What’s unfortunate is that they flagged this vulnerability in 2022 and planned to review it in 2024 ??? Does it usually take this long to identify impact of users? They mentioned they paid for identity protection for…
I work in a related field (cyber insurance response) - typically takes a few months to identify exfiltrated data and then analyse it to understand what is in it. This might seem simple but there are usually in the region of hundreds of thousands to millions of files, and that may contain spreadsheets with tens of thousands of rows. This all has to be analysed, filtered and reduced to the point you have a list of PII…
British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
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Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#42A lot of this sounds like they were under-resourced and the business increasingly adopted new technology with no ongoing support for their IT infrastructure. > These legacy systems will in many cases need to be migrated to new versions, substantially modified, or even rebuilt from the ground up, either because they are unsupported and therefore cannot be repurchased or restored, or because they simply will not operat…
I think it's part of a general trend where UK govt institutions have notoriously poor IT, usually consisting of semi-obsolete infrastructure, multiple legacy systems, sticking-plaster upgrades, one or two new state-of-the-art bits where budget is available, etc. Consider the NHS, the MOD, DVLA, etc.
Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#43So refreshing.
Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not keeping on top of basic IT security is the equivalent of driving drunk.
Good analogy. It is. People's livelihoods and even people's lives are at risk. But we've utterly normalised digital ignorance and built what Edward Snowden very rightly calls an "Insecurity Industry". I'd go further, we've turned a celebration of ignorance around cybersecurity and dismissive attitudes into virtuous slogans. "Don't make me think" - Krug "Move fast and break things" - Mark Zuckerberg "If you've nothing…
> "Don't make me think" - Krug
That quote has nothing to do with cybersecurity, it's the title of a book by Steve Krug about web usability.
I am unfortunately old enough to have read that book when it first came out, and it's exclusively around how to design front-end UIs on websites to reduce user complexity. There is no mention of infrastructure or security at all.
You're making a quote around how we should make websites more usable and understandable to users - so they can use them without thinking - into something it isn't.
Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#45Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#46Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#47I see a few comments indicating that connecting Microsoft (? not mentioned anywhere in the report??) t Terminal Services to the internet was a wholly bad idea.
Aside: is the report using "Terminal Services" generically, or do they mean that the server hasn't been updated since before 2009 (? when it seems Terminal Services became Remote Desktop Services (RDS))?
Is there something inherently insecure about remote desktops, or is MS software here known to be particularly insecure, or ...? RDP is default enabled on MS Windows installs (I always disable it), is that more of a problem than one might imagine?
Do they say anywhere where the access was from (maybe only GCHQ know that). Presumably the firewall would only allow known connections - did they report on analysis of all the remote clients?
Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
Good analogy. It is. People's livelihoods and even people's lives are at risk. But we've utterly normalised digital ignorance and built what Edward Snowden very rightly calls an "Insecurity Industry". I'd go further, we've turned a celebration of ignorance around cybersecurity and dismissive attitudes into virtuous slogans. "Don't make me think" - Krug "Move fast and break things" - Mark Zuckerberg "If you've nothing…
> I'd go further, we've turned a celebration of ignorance around cybersecurity and dismissive attitudes into virtuous slogans. > "Don't make me think" - Krug That quote has nothing to do with cybersecurity, it's the title of a book by Steve Krug about web usability. I am unfortunately old enough to have read that book when it first came out, and it's exclusively around how to design front-end UIs on websites to reduc…
It has everything to do with it.
I know exactly what the book is and I read it. It's actually an excellent book on UX and I expect Steve Krug picked the title because it sounds cool.
No disrespect to that author intended, but it (maybe unwittingly) expresses a sentiment that has grave implications about the position of technology in human affairs. To understand why, please look deeper into what we used to call Human Computer Interaction (HCI) or "Cognitive Ergonomics".
I think I recently mentioned it in this online chat [0]
Explicit cognition is the "thinking slow" part of our brains that uses so-called left-brain linear reasoning and logic. It sits high in the cognitive stack. But as people use devices today, in what McLuhan [4] or Innes [5] would call an "acoustic" (nothing much to do with actual sound) way, we drop down a cognitive level to a faster, visual-haptic loop that bypasses explicit reasoning.
Designing applications that bypass this has major effects on security. The work of B J Fogg will show you more about this [1].
Tristan Harris also has lots on it [2,3].
One of the disastrous effects of this "distracted" level of HCI is that people use more emotional cues, rote, colour, word association, implicit trust and other models that make them easy prey for phishing and other kinds magic and trickery.
If you're interested in a much broader understanding of cybersecurity I give you a sincere invitation to check us out here [6].
[0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYnOf4PWGpA
[1] https://behaviordesign.stanford.edu/people/bj-fogg
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUNErhONqCY
[3] https://www.wired.com/story/our-minds-have-been-hijacked-by-...
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_McLuhan
Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think it's part of a general trend where UK govt institutions have notoriously poor IT, usually consisting of semi-obsolete infrastructure, multiple legacy systems, sticking-plaster upgrades, one or two new state-of-the-art bits where budget is available, etc. Consider the NHS, the MOD, DVLA, etc.
I would be fully supportive of the GDS ( https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-digit... ) taking on additional responsibilities and providing support and assistance to other government agencies. gov.uk is almost universally praised by the general public and tech people.
Re: British Library cyber incident review [pdf]
#50A few naive questions: I see a few comments indicating that connecting Microsoft (? not mentioned anywhere in the report??) t Terminal Services to the internet was a wholly bad idea. Aside: is the report using "Terminal Services" generically, or do they mean that the server hasn't been updated since before 2009 (? when it seems Terminal Services became Remote Desktop Services (RDS))? Is there something inherently ins…
Exposing RDP to the Internet directly has been frowned-upon because of the attack surface being presented, there's no two factor "story" out-of-the-box, and you're opened up to brute force attempts on cruddy user passwords.
Older versions of the Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol had a much larger attack surface than current versions. The current versions with Network Level Authentication (starting in Windows Vista/Server 2008) present a smaller attacks surface. Older versions used "homegrown" Microsoft crypto, whereas current versions use TLS.
Disclosure: I made a FLOSS fail2ban-like tool for RDP many years ago[0]. I had a situation where I was forced to expose RDP to the Internet and I didn't like having it open w/o some protection against brute force attacks. This tool happens to still work in Server 2022 and will slow the velocity of brute force attacks. I still highly recommend not exposing RDP directly to the Internet anyway.
(The ts_block tool is missing some fairly essential functionality that I never got around to implementing. It works fine and is really easy to install but some things are sub-optimal.)