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How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

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Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#41
post #24

So, what's the best weather app to use that's not going to sell my location?

Just don't give it access to your location. Not like I've widely sampled all of them, but Apple's weather app I do currently use does not require location services. I can simply tell it the zip code I care about knowing the weather for, which may or may not be where I am physically located at the time.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#42

Android lets you delete the advertising id that's mentioned in the article, as well as reset it. Does anybody who is in Adtech know what that does in terms of identifiability on brokers? Am I now "anon at location x,y", or am I "anon4321 at location x,y”?

Never underestimate the power of metadata. An expired ID that patterns quite similar to a new ID is quite easy to identify.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#45
One thing I've always been curious about, and have never been able to find a solid answer too, is what data is available to the various companies whose software I have on my phone?

What can AT&T/TMobile/etc... learn from my device as my carrier?

What can the apps I have installed decern from my device if I allow no access to anything settings?

How does this change if I use a vpn?

I have an idea of whats possible based on my career in tech, but I'd love a more solid answer. Happy to read any content answering the aforementioned.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#47
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ad serves up an image hosted by the advertiser. Phone makes an http get for the image and gives out its IP. You can also target ads by geography and do a lat/long box over your target area and show a specific ad so you know how many unique users are in that area.

Giving up the IP is against the GDPR.

All network requests give out your IP.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#48
post #6

>Working with Grindr data, Yeagley began drawing geofences—creating virtual boundaries in geographical data sets—around buildings belonging to government agencies that do national security work. Are you seriously telling me that government phones of national security employees allow for the installation of apps that track your location and/or these employees are allowed to bring personal cell phones into these buildi…

Personal phones, not government phones. Bringing your personal phone to Langley and leaving it in your car doesn't do much.
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