Earlier quoted context omitted.
> But if independent security audits with no major issues uncovered cannot make you claim something is secure, when can you claim something as secure? Nothing at all; it's a broken model. The server can at any time start serving malicious payloads [0]. The server hosts your mail but they also serve the webapp. The clientside decrypts the mail, but the server hosts the client code... It's a fundamentally flawed idea,…
Secure email is snake oil; no amount of cruft can make it both reasonable secure and useful (as in federated). Other protocols better fill that space because they were designed for security needs.
What is actually snake oil, and distressingly rarely realised as such, is first-party end-to-end encryption. That’s what sodality2 is actually talking about. And when you stop and consider it in this light, you realise that the significant majority of stuff that’s advertised as having E2EE is first-party and thus, to put it mildly, not robust.
In the context of email, here’s Fastmail’s take on it: https://fastmail.blog/advanced/why-we-dont-offer-pgp/.