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The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

writings.stephenwolfram.com

41–50 of 106 posts

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#41

I have a lot of background in programming language theory and mathematical foundations, which is sort of one half of the topic that's explored in this post. Two thoughts: 1. Rewriting systems are very useful tools. One of the things I learned from this post was about the existence of FullEquationalProof [1], which I think is pretty darn neat and super useful. 2. This post is imbued with a latent metaphysics that is s…

> I never got the "emergent properties have special aesthetic and nearly spiritual significance" or "everything is just an " cognitive confusion that so many mathematicians (especially formalists) seem to have.

People just like spiritual beliefs. There's a reason why a majority of human beings hold non-rational beliefs like religion or money having intrinsic value.

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#42
> When we do physics, the traditional approach has been to start from our basic sensory experience of the physical world, and of concepts like space, time and motion—and then to try to formalize our descriptions of these things, and build on these formalizations. And in its early development—for example by Euclid—mathematics took the same basic approach.

I don’t think Euclid started from “basic sensory experience”. Euclid based his mathematics on non-existent things, neither point nor line exist in this world as defined by Euclid: A point is that which has no part. A line is breadthless length.

Also, in physics “space” does not exist as a quantity, only distance exists. Space is an abstraction.

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#43
post #9

Is this ruliad the logos of philosophy? --- My own attempt at what Wolfram is doing resulted in: 1: f(a,a) 2: f(a,b) I call the former introspection and the latter is regular old composition. This seems to be a taxonomy of everything my discerning mind is capable of and hence the limit of what aspects of human experience I can peer review. The rest (the bulk) is mysticism and always-valid personal experience. --- “Wh…

I think that identifying the ruliad with the "logos" makes sense - the idea that there's some underlying abstract shape to the universe that makes rationality possible in the first place.

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#44

I have thought about this thing for some time and I think that the unifying idea of math, physics (quantum shit in particular), programming, type theory, probability etc is the idea of fixed points which is just ubiquitous. Fixed points are based on the idea of an adjoint (1-to-many relationship) and a norm (many-to-1 relationship). I have written up something about this https://github.com/adamnemecek/adjoint Jon Cla…

Is this the magic behind the kernel trick?

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#45
post #18

There is some interesting material here, yet at a basic level this sounds like it is all steeped in the kind of misunderstanding of mathematics that is common among physicists. In physics there are real tests and relations that have meaning so it makes sense to ask if String Theory is correct or useful. In mathematics there are complex structures built from axioms and sometimes these structures can be related to each…

> In physics there are real tests and relations that have meaning so it makes sense to ask if String Theory is correct or useful. In mathematics there are complex structures built from axioms and sometimes these structures can be related to each other in interesting ways. Will anything important ever come of String Theory? Maybe, but from a mathematical point of view no theory needs to correctly model what is real or have demonstrated application to be worthy of exploration and study.

You say this as if it contradicts some point that the author is trying to make or some key assumption that he holds.

Yet on the contrary, the author himself makes a similar point in the article:

> But the way we’ve modeled mathematics here has been much more about what statements can be derived (or entailed) than about any kind of abstract notion of what statements can be “tagged as true”. In other words, we’ve been more concerned with “structurally deriving” that “” than in saying that “1 + 1 = 2 is true”.

That is, math is not necessarily about truth or usefulness in some (meta)physical sense, it is about entailment from certain axioms via formal rules.

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#46
> that we call the ruliad—and that our physical laws arise in an inexorable way from the particular samples we take of this structure.

What is a physical law? To me a physical law is a proportionality, that is, an equality of ratios. When we find something that stays constant while something else is changing, we call this a law. But it is really a proportonality. So, mathematics and physics is tied by proportionality. They have proportionality in common.

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#47

I have a lot of background in programming language theory and mathematical foundations, which is sort of one half of the topic that's explored in this post. Two thoughts: 1. Rewriting systems are very useful tools. One of the things I learned from this post was about the existence of FullEquationalProof [1], which I think is pretty darn neat and super useful. 2. This post is imbued with a latent metaphysics that is s…

Note that "well-behaved" rewriting systems are usually confluent; the nLab wiki has a useful description of confluent categories[ https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/confluent%20category ]. In general, category theory has plenty to say about any mathematical structures where simple operations may be arbitrarily "composed" in sequence to build more complex ones, and rewrite systems seem to be one example of this (if perhaps…

That's certainly a description, but I'm not sure it's terribly useful for anyone who doesn't already know what confluence means in the context of a rewriting system.

For the casual programmer who's seen a lambda calculus at some point and is interested in understanding confluence in some detail, I recommend https://www.cs.cornell.edu/~kozen/Papers/ChurchRosser.pdf

If that work is too dense, all you need to know is the first paragraph. If that's all greek to you, it can be expanded as follows: Suppose you have a program e and an interpreter that executes e by applying a big set of rules that rewrite e until e becomes a value (such as a number, string, function, etc.).

So, for example, (function add(x) { x+x }; add(5)) -> 5+5 -> 6+4 -> 7+3 -> ... -> 10.

Here, "->" is thedefined by a big set of rules that basically pattern match on the syntax of the left-hand term and produce a corresponding right-hand term. So, for example, we have rules like:

(function F(x) { B[x] }; F(y) -> B[y]

and

n+m -> (increment of n) + (decrement of m)

and

n+0 -> n

where n,m are defined to be non-negative natural numbers.

Your interpreter is just a big set of these sorts of rewriting rules, and there's no "ordering" on the rules. Any rule that is applicable to the left-hand side could be used at any point where it's applicable.

Imagine, now, that you define your rewrite rules and then notice that at some points more than one rule might be applicable to the left hand side!

That could be bad if a single program could compute different values depending on which rule was chosen!

In general: Suppose there are some rewrite rules such that that e -> ... -> e1. (Which we sometimes write as e ->^* e1 for readability.) Suppose there are also some rules such that e -> ... -> e2, where e1 and e2 are different and might not be values (ie there's still more rules applicable to e2 and e3).

Your system is confluent -- i.e., not bad in the above sense -- if whenever the above happens there are also some rules such that e1 -> ... -> e3 and e2 -> ... -> e3. Then you know "there are many possible executions of the interpreter but at the end of the day the interpreter always spits out the same value"

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#48
Here’s something I don’t get about Wolfram and insisting on a computation-like underbelly of the universe.

Computation is built on the idea of Turing machine. But what is reading the tape in Turing’s analogy? A human! The tape and Turing machine are designed so that every human agrees upon its formal validity.

It’s not a statement about mental states or computation based “reality”. More than all of those and first, it is a about how society can use social rule-following and basic step-by-step processes (using language) to create formal systems.

A human reading the tape or even a human with pencil and paper. That is the main analogy.

So why do so many like Wolfram think computation is reality? It seems from the get go he is headed down the wrong track.

You and I are computers and computers can think according to Turing. But TM’s came about to develop formal systems.

To me Wolfram and the Churchlands seem to have completely unjustified claims.

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#49
post #10

Wolfram is a famous crackpot. I wish a peer review before I start reading his essay. No doubt he is again advertising his Wolfram* products, New kind of science, etc. No?

It seems to me that 'crackpot' is a bit strong. Even if one thinks Wolfram's foundations of physics project will never bare useful fruit, it's undeniable that he has made progress in other fields that are of interest to many people.

A simple case in point: the study of logic has been a interesting human endeavor for thousands of years, since at least the time of the Greek and Vedic schools. After thousands of years of study, a major breakthrough was made with the first formalization of propositional logic (as Boolean algebra) by George Boole in 1854. Since then, there has been a search for the simplest foundational formal axioms from which all of propositional logic could be derived. This project ended in 2000 with Wolfram's discovery of, and proof that, [1] is the shortest possible single axiom that can be used as a foundation for all of propositional logic.

[1] ((a⁍b)⁍c)⁍(a⁍((a⁍c)⁍a)=c, where ⁍ is NAND

Re: The physicalization of metamathematics and the implications for its foundations

#50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Any species could prove the same theorems given the same axioms, but (besides the fact that they might not choose the same axioms) I'm not sure if they would prove the same subset of theorems that we have proven/will prove. Perhaps they'd have different ideas about what is interesting.

Human mathematicians are already fanning out into other systems of deduction (constructive mathematics being a great example), and given enough time the mathematicians of each galaxy will eventually discover the other galaxy's mathematics, even if it perhaps happens in a different order.

Surely intergalactic mathematicians already know that the only time is now? =)

> As Prigogine explains, determinism is fundamentally a denial of the arrow of time. With no arrow of time, there is no longer a privileged moment known as the "present," which follows a determined "past" and precedes an undetermined "future." All of time is simply given, with the future as determined or as undetermined as the past. With irreversibility, the arrow of time is reintroduced to physics.

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