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More details about the October 4 outage

engineering.fb.com

41–50 of 306 posts

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#41
> The backbone is the network Facebook has built to connect all our computing facilities together, which consists of tens of thousands of miles of fiber-optic cables crossing the globe and linking all our data centers.

This makes it sound like Facebook has physically laid "tens of thousands of miles of fiber-optic cables crossing the globe and linking all our data centers". Is this in fact true?

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#43
post #17
post #4

Interesting bit on recovery w.r.t. the electrical grid > flipping our services back on all at once could potentially cause a new round of crashes due to a surge in traffic. Individual data centers were reporting dips in power usage in the range of tens of megawatts, and suddenly reversing such a dip in power consumption could put everything from electrical systems ... I wish there was a bit more detail in here. What'…

Brownouts is probably the most proximate concern - a sudden increase in demand will draw down the system frequency in the vicinity, and if there aren't generation units close enough or with enough dispatchable capacity there's a small chance they would trip a protective breaker. A person I know on the power grid side said at one data center there were step functions when FB went down and then when it came up, equal t…

But don't their datacenters all have backup generators? So worst case in a brownout, they fail over to generator power, then can start to flip back to utility power slowly.

Or do they forgo backup generators and count on shifting traffic to a new datacenter if there's a regional power outage?

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#44
post #9

> One of the jobs performed by our smaller facilities is to respond to DNS queries. DNS is the address book of the internet, enabling the simple web names we type into browsers to be translated into specific server IP addresses. What is the target audience of this post? It is too technical for non-technical people, but also it is dumbed down to try to include people that does not know how the internet works. I feel l…

Huh? I would hardly describe this as technical. Someone with a high school education can read it and get the gist. It's actually somewhat impressive how it toes the line between accessibility and 'just detailed enough'.

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#45
post #30

Was this a way to delete a lot of evidence before shit really hit the fan?' After reading this, I can't help but feel this was a calculated move. It gives FB a chance to hijack media attention from the whistleblower. It gives them a chance to show the average peson, 'hey, we make mistakes and we have a review process to improve our systems'. The timing is too perfect if you ask me.

I'm not usually that cynical, but the timing of it combined with facebook's lengthy abusive relationship with customers' privacy (and what kind of company morals that implies) makes me think that it's definitely a possibility.

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#46
DNS seems to be a massive point of failure everywhere, even taking out the tools to help deal with outages themselves. The same thing happened to Azure multiple times in the past, causing complete service outages. Surely there must be some way to better mitigate DNS misconfiguration by now, given the exceptional importance of DNS?

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#48

> Our primary and out-of-band network access was down Don't create circular dependencies.

With something as fundamental as the network, no way around it.

- Okay, we'll set up a separate maintenance network in case we can't get to the regular network.

- Wait, but we need a maintenance network for the maintenance network...

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#49
post #34
post #18

Google had a comparable outage several years ago. https://status.cloud.google.com/incident/cloud-networking/19... This event left a lot of scar tissue across all of Technical Infrastructure, and the next few months were not a fun time (e.g. a mandatory training where leadership read out emails from customers telling us how we let them down and lost their trust). I'd be curious to see what systemic changes happen at F…

To expand on why this made me think of the Google outage: It was a global backbone isolation, caused by configuration changes (as they all are...). It was detected fairly early on, but recovery was difficult because internal tools / debugging workflows were also impacted, and even after the problem was identified, it still took time to back out the change. "But wait, a global backbone isolation? Google wasn't totally…

But the FB outage was not a configuration change.

> a command was issued with the intention to assess the availability of global backbone capacity, which unintentionally took down all the connections in our backbone network

Re: More details about the October 4 outage

#50
post #4

Interesting bit on recovery w.r.t. the electrical grid > flipping our services back on all at once could potentially cause a new round of crashes due to a surge in traffic. Individual data centers were reporting dips in power usage in the range of tens of megawatts, and suddenly reversing such a dip in power consumption could put everything from electrical systems ... I wish there was a bit more detail in here. What'…

Likely tripping breakers or overload protection on UPSes? Often PDUs used in a rack can be configured to start servers up in a staggered pattern to avoid a surge in demand for these reasons. I'd imagine there's more complications when you're doing an entire DC vs just a single rack, though.

I don't see how suddenly running more traffic is going to trip datacenter breakers -- I could see how flipping on power to an entire datacenter's worth of servers could cause a spike in electrical demand that the power infrastructure can't handle, but if suddently running CPU's at 100% trips breakers, then it seems like that power infrastructure is undersized? This isn't a case where servers were powered off, they were idle because they had no traffic.

Do large providers like Facebook really provision less power than their servers would require at 100% utilization? Seems like they could just use fewer servers with power sized at 100% if their power system going to constrain utilization anyway?

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