iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
41–50 of 177 posts
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#42Apple needs to make it possible for users to choose other ways of sending and receiving messages and listening to music, or of choosing not to do either of those things if they don't want to. Obviously, you can currently install and use other applications that provide the same functionality, but you cannot uninstall or disable defaults. The most shocking experience to me in trying to evaluate the Mac ecosystem when t…
I also have bluetooth headphones I use with a mac, and that’s never happened to me. Is it a new thing with the M1 machines or something?
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#43Time for a cyber security focused smartphone?
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#44Apple needs to make it possible for users to choose other ways of sending and receiving messages and listening to music, or of choosing not to do either of those things if they don't want to. Obviously, you can currently install and use other applications that provide the same functionality, but you cannot uninstall or disable defaults. The most shocking experience to me in trying to evaluate the Mac ecosystem when t…
I also have bluetooth headphones I use with a mac, and that’s never happened to me. Is it a new thing with the M1 machines or something?
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#45I dated a journalist once. She used some random free app for phone calls because recording calls isn't built into iOS and she needed to record calls. I suggested a small device for her to plug her headphones through, but she declined. I'm sure there's a few journalists out there that take cybersecurity seriously, but I'd wager the vast majority are pretty trivially monitored.
But it also depends on what kind of journalism they're doing, right? Not all report on criminal activity, or on investigating the government. It's kinda like threat-models, no need to be super secure if your work brings no risks to you, your organisation, or those you come in contact with.
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#46Time for a cyber security focused smartphone?
That's a little silly. The iPhone is a "cyber security focused smartphone" and Apple has billions in R&D money going into its phone. That's a nice thing to say but it doesn't really mean much unless you have some way to achieve that in a way that Apple's vast resources can't.
And you don't need Apple's resources to make something better, just a more secure phone would have much worse UX. Just some examples for a much more secure phone, where you dont need Apple's budget:
- Runs some barebones Linux with minimal packages. An SMS app is an SMS app, not something that makes HTTP requests.
- app store is very heavily vetted
- forced updates, you can't dismiss update notifications.
- minimal attack interface, no smart connection features or accessories.
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#47Time for a cyber security focused smartphone?
That's a little silly. The iPhone is a "cyber security focused smartphone" and Apple has billions in R&D money going into its phone. That's a nice thing to say but it doesn't really mean much unless you have some way to achieve that in a way that Apple's vast resources can't.
I think "can't" here runs up against "choose not to". So far as we can tell opsec tends to be a pain in the ass in ways that are fundamental, not a problem with tools. Apple, like any other consumer focused company, doesn't lose focus of this.
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#48Time for a cyber security focused smartphone?
Would it actually have more resources that say Apple? I think if Apple can not do it, I am unsure if anyone else could. All supposedly secure smart phones are not, but they are at least obscure. I think that one should probably buy an Apple (at least they control everything rather than the cobbled together android clones) and disable basically everything except exactly what is needed. At least that reduces the surfac…
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
Then you could just as well get a iPod touch or iPad mini.
Neither of those has a vibrate motor to let me know about notifications. They also can't be used to pair to an Apple Watch. I know this because I used to carry an iPad Mini in my pants pocket.
Re: iMessage, Apple Music used by NSO Pegasus to attack journalist iPhones
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's a little silly. The iPhone is a "cyber security focused smartphone" and Apple has billions in R&D money going into its phone. That's a nice thing to say but it doesn't really mean much unless you have some way to achieve that in a way that Apple's vast resources can't.
The silly thing is that Apple advertises their phone as something cyber security focused, when it can be totally pwned in so many ways. And you don't need Apple's resources to make something better, just a more secure phone would have much worse UX. Just some examples for a much more secure phone, where you dont need Apple's budget: - Runs some barebones Linux with minimal packages. An SMS app is an SMS app, not some…
- Forced Updates? The FBI takes over the update server, forcibly sends out an update that sends all messages to the FBI immediately, and there's no way to stop it. That suggestion is idiotic. Or even better, install Pegasus on all the phones, have them be quietly reporting back to home for a few weeks, with journalists having no way to prevent updating.
- You forgot Hardware Root of Trust and Secure Enclave, like on an iPhone. Otherwise, the FBI can install a tool which just guesses PINs over and over while resetting the PIN attempts counter. It is not possible to build this protection in software only. You need chip-level hardware, and only iPhones in Fall 2020 and later have the Enclave set up to block repeated PIN attempts even if Apple-signed code is loaded. No other phone is safe from their own manufacturer like that.