What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it? • Hacker News Board

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#41

Post by Ellipse0934 » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:19 PM UTC

dman wrote: post #9

As a user I find this section very intriguing. ************************* "Can WhatsApp work with law enforcement without traceability? WhatsApp respects the important work law enforcement does to keep people safe. Our dedicated team reviews and responds to valid law enforcement requests. We respond to valid requests by providing the limited categories of information available to us, consistent with applicable law and…

> So my question here is that in a hypothetical scenario where terrorists are using whatsapp to coordinate an evil plot, which to most people would fit a scenario where Facebook can and should help the government - what is it that Facebook can do to help a government?

This logic has been used to justify mass-surveillance and degrade encryption for national security and "protecting the children" narrative. The problem is that governments also use this as a way to suppress civil liberties.

What if the government declares a journalist uncovering a multi-billion arms deal scam or some human-rights violations as a terrorist ? In the eyes of the law this qualifies the government to acquire private messages. Why should the government have this power ? The hardcore terrorists and journalists know about encryption and will setup their public keys for encrypted communication. It's the common man who is affected by such stupid legislation.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#42

Post by yawaworht1978 » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:25 PM UTC

Indeed, if you have something to hide, do not use a mobile phone. E2E chat will only help to keep the messaging hidden.

If you have a keylogger on the device, you have lost. In other words, whether or not WhatsApp opposes traceability or not does not matter an iota.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#43

Post by dman » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:34 PM UTC

bidirectional wrote: post #15

dman wrote: post #9

As a user I find this section very intriguing. ************************* "Can WhatsApp work with law enforcement without traceability? WhatsApp respects the important work law enforcement does to keep people safe. Our dedicated team reviews and responds to valid law enforcement requests. We respond to valid requests by providing the limited categories of information available to us, consistent with applicable law and…

Metadata I imagine? e.g. who is person X communicating with, when are they active, etc. Could be extremely useful if you discover someone unreachable abroad is coordinating with people within your jurisdiction.

I wish Facebook was a lot more clear about what it shares and when. People need to be aware of what information exposure they have to digital platforms.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#44

Post by unyttigfjelltol » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:36 PM UTC

dt3ft wrote: post #39

elzbardico wrote: post #36

Gonna start using plain old letters. At least the government needs a court order to open it.

Don't be so sure they even have to open it... ( https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/scientists-read-300-year-l... )

That's akin to x-raying a package. If they could instead just sniff the contents, you might, or might not, be onto something.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#45

Post by paxys » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:36 PM UTC

nicoburns wrote: post #11

It's such a shame that Facebook was allowed to buy WhatsApp (and Instagram). WhatsApp itself seems truly pro-privacy, but that counts for diddly-squat when it's owned by Facebook.

WhatsApp wouldn't exist today (at least not at the current scale) had Facebook not bought it. They have operated for over a decade now, serve 2 billion users, and have made close to zero revenue the entire time.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#46

Post by nicoburns » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:40 PM UTC

paxys wrote: post #45

nicoburns wrote: post #11

It's such a shame that Facebook was allowed to buy WhatsApp (and Instagram). WhatsApp itself seems truly pro-privacy, but that counts for diddly-squat when it's owned by Facebook.

WhatsApp wouldn't exist today (at least not at the current scale) had Facebook not bought it. They have operated for over a decade now, serve 2 billion users, and have made close to zero revenue the entire time.

That's not true. They were charging $1/user/year (possibly only on Android and in some countries) before their acquisition. And their costs were low. I'm pretty sure they were profitable.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#47

Post by dman » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:40 PM UTC

Cantinflas wrote: post #12

dman wrote: post #9

As a user I find this section very intriguing. ************************* "Can WhatsApp work with law enforcement without traceability? WhatsApp respects the important work law enforcement does to keep people safe. Our dedicated team reviews and responds to valid law enforcement requests. We respond to valid requests by providing the limited categories of information available to us, consistent with applicable law and…

No need to break end to end encryption, they already control both ends. And the unencrypted backups

The backups are an interesting thing that you bring up. The cynic in me cant help thinking that even as companies posture about being pro privacy, they do design features in a way where they can subvert privacy with plausible deniability.

For instance the move away from screen passwords to biometric things like fingerprints had me thinking about the fact that from a police pov - if they have a suspect in custody, forcing the suspect to put their thumb on the phone is probably a lot easier than getting them to reveal their password.

Phrased another way, I find it hard to imagine that big companies are able to tell the state to take a hike and get away with it.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#48

Post by kryogen1c » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:41 PM UTC

swiley wrote: post #19

Cantinflas wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No need to break end to end encryption, they already control both ends. And the unencrypted backups

This is something people are just not talking about for some reason. WhatsApp/signal style apps cannot be secure to this sort of attack. You would think now that a public mass attack has been successfully carried out (encrochat) people would get it. I don't know if it's submarine marketing or what but people think the current situation is just fine.

> WhatsApp/signal style apps cannot be secure to this sort of attack.

isnt this not true?

e2e keys are not known to signal server like they are on whatsapp. also there are no serverside signal backups.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#49

Post by vinay_ys » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:45 PM UTC

dman wrote: post #9

As a user I find this section very intriguing. ************************* "Can WhatsApp work with law enforcement without traceability? WhatsApp respects the important work law enforcement does to keep people safe. Our dedicated team reviews and responds to valid law enforcement requests. We respond to valid requests by providing the limited categories of information available to us, consistent with applicable law and…

Their argument is tracing persons vs tracing content.

If law enforcement comes with a warrant against a specific person of interest, then WhatsApp presumably has ways and means to pull all metadata associated with that person's account (which presumably includes all contacts, metadata about all messages sent/received - timestamp & other-party contact details, along with app metrics – IP addresses, mobile device/network information etc).

It would be same as a telephone network except for the actual content itself.

If they also have a way to eavesdrop on content by breaking end to end encryption (and users don't care when WhatsApp on their device says the other parties signature changed), there's that possibility that they could be under gag order to not acknowledge that.

Re: What is traceability and why does WhatsApp oppose it?

#50

Post by swiley » Tue, Jun 01, 2021, 4:48 PM UTC

kryogen1c wrote: post #48

swiley wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is something people are just not talking about for some reason. WhatsApp/signal style apps cannot be secure to this sort of attack. You would think now that a public mass attack has been successfully carried out (encrochat) people would get it. I don't know if it's submarine marketing or what but people think the current situation is just fine.

> WhatsApp/signal style apps cannot be secure to this sort of attack. isnt this not true? e2e keys are not known to signal server like they are on whatsapp. also there are no serverside signal backups.

Your contacts weren't known to the WhatsApp server, now they are. There's no reason the next automatic update for signal can't contain code to send your keys to the server, and it wouldn't be the first centralized E2EE app to do that.