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Security Issues with LastPass on Android

abhyudaya.dev

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Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thats right, we should blame the victim for trusting the tool. Password managers are increasingly mandated by organisations, and Lastpass is a very common recommendation. Even in the minority of technical users that use this kind of tool I expect small mistakes - like accidentally pasting a password in a URL. A good tool doesn't let you shoot yourself in the foot by escalting that to a non-obvious leak. The password…

There are only three meaningfully "correct" recommendations for password managers as of today, depending on the use case: 1Password, Bitwarden, or KeepassXC. 1Password is fantastic, but expensive and closed source. Bitwarden is open source, but lacks certain auditing, team and sync features useful for enterprise. KeepassXC is excellent and open source, but with zero collaboration features is only suitable for self us…

There's also 'pass', created by Jason Donenfield, who also created WireGuard. But I think it's not for laypeople.

https://www.passwordstore.org/

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#43

I'm more and more worried about a supply chain attack on LastPass/KeePass. To the point that I'm skittish about upgrading them. It feels to me like we need someone with huge resources, like Microsoft/Gooogle/Apple... to buy them and apply their methods against this attack. For example, where are the binaries built? Who controls the accounts used to upload the installers? Do they regularly pay security teams to try to…

Won't enabling 2FA through TOTP or Yubikeys make your worry go away?

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#44

why can't people just use keepass and be done with it?

Keepass has no multi-user support. Their site admits as much: https://keepass.info/help/base/multiuser.html

"Multiple users can log into the same database with the same password" isn't multi-user support. It's important to keep several passwords synchronized between family members and very useful to be able to securely share individual passwords with friends on occasion. Without ACLs and user accounts, this is impossible.

There's no official mobile app, which means I have to trust some random developer or live without basic quality of life features such as autofill.

It doesn't support U2F, instead requiring plugins to use a one-time password form of 2FA.

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#45
post #37

I use algorithmic passwords. I have an algorithm that takes in several parameters and generates a unique password per service. For example, my algorithm `f` might be: f(domain, secret_word, secret_sentence, rules) = UPPER(KEY_TO_RIGHT(domain[0:3])) + secret_word + secret_sentence[LENGTH(domain)] + LENGTH(domain) + PAD_TO_20("X") So if my secret word were "bottleneck" and my secret sentence were "It is a truth univers…

I'm not a big fan of the algorithmic password systems. In practice you need to remember some bits of state for each separate website, because of different password rules or because you had to reset the password. This results in either needing to memorize a lot of information or writing it all down somewhere. The former has the same problems as memorizing passwords without assistance. And if we need to write it down, then we might as well write down a long and totally random password for each website.

If the worry is losing your phone, some of the popular services such as Bitwarden can also be accessed via a web interface, without installing the app.

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#46
post #25

After lastpass's recent policy changes around free multi-device use, I finally decided to switch password management services. I don't really mind spending like $10/year for password management but lastpass was slow/buggy/frustrating enough that I didn't want to pay for it. The whole process took probably three minutes front-to-back. Lastpass lets you export your passwords in a CSV, which you then upload to any other…

It doesn't export attached files if you have those. Didn't tell me that either (though it was over a year ago now).

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#47
post #45
post #37

I use algorithmic passwords. I have an algorithm that takes in several parameters and generates a unique password per service. For example, my algorithm `f` might be: f(domain, secret_word, secret_sentence, rules) = UPPER(KEY_TO_RIGHT(domain[0:3])) + secret_word + secret_sentence[LENGTH(domain)] + LENGTH(domain) + PAD_TO_20("X") So if my secret word were "bottleneck" and my secret sentence were "It is a truth univers…

I'm not a big fan of the algorithmic password systems. In practice you need to remember some bits of state for each separate website, because of different password rules or because you had to reset the password. This results in either needing to memorize a lot of information or writing it all down somewhere. The former has the same problems as memorizing passwords without assistance. And if we need to write it down,…

Writing down website rules (ie which websites have length requirements, etc) is not the same as writing down passwords. The former is already public information. I keep track of website rules in a Google doc for reference and if compromised it does not give an attacker any information that isn't already public.

If BitWarden can be accessed from a browser it means all my passwords are on their servers, whereas with an algorithmic password generator the passwords are in my brain alone

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#48
post #4

These aren't really novel security vulnerabilities or anything, just some common sense things to be aware of so you don't shoot yourself in the foot: generated pronounceable passwords might not strictly follow the length that you set, don't paste your passwords into the address bar of a web view, and don't set a weak master password.

Thats right, we should blame the victim for trusting the tool. Password managers are increasingly mandated by organisations, and Lastpass is a very common recommendation. Even in the minority of technical users that use this kind of tool I expect small mistakes - like accidentally pasting a password in a URL. A good tool doesn't let you shoot yourself in the foot by escalting that to a non-obvious leak. The password…

I used LastPass for a few years, but switched to bitwarden over a year ago.

Mainly driven by the combination of price increases, no improvements (and possibly getting worse) at things like the auto-fill buttons conflicting or not working with many apps I was using, the duplicate entries it would create, failure to match Android apps and web logins, and the constant battle to try to get it to work with several internal apps and test systems (same top-level domain, where I have a mix of unique and common logins) while also working on the web generally.

Bitwarden has per-domain selection of match type (full host, base domain, or regex), and a non-interfering UI. I can't think of a single thing LastPass does better.

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most people realize they can hurt themselves if they use a hammer wrong. If someone can be expected to put four years of their life into a degree or prepatory trade training they can be held accountable for not caring enough to spend 10 minutes reading about effective use of their password manager.

That's not the reality though. The current wisdom in security seems to be to follow reality. To eliminate shooting foots by both users and developers. See NaCl crypto library, libsodium, Noise protocol, Signal app, Tarsnap and restic, Brian Warner's magic-wormhole, Signify/Minisign, Filippo Valsorda's 'age', WireGuard. Are there more?

It's not just security. This applies generally where people will shoot at their own feet. In C++ I can apparently have an atomic integer and increment it:

  std::atomic n = 0;
  n++;
Rust has atomics but they don't work that way.

  let n = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0);
  n.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
Hmm. Why doesn't Rust's "AtomicU32" just implement AddAssign? If it implemented the AddAssign trait then you could at least write:

  n += 1
.. and that looks much nicer, it elides all that stuff about memory models, consistency, and... oh...

In the C++ code, the programmer thinks this variable n "is" atomic. It's an atomic integer right? But that's not a thing. C++ is mapping atomic integer operations, which are a thing, onto the type, and not making the integer itself magically atomic, it's just an ordinary (aligned) integer.

So if we tweak both examples to do some slightly trickier arithmetic...

  std::atomic n = 0;
  std::atomic m = 0;
  n++;
  m= m + n;

  use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering};
  let n = AtomicU32::new(0);
  let m = AtomicU32::new(0);
  n.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
  m.fetch_add(n.load(Ordering::SeqCst), Ordering::SeqCst);
Once again, Rust seems much more verbose, but, wait, actually this isn't the same as the C++. This is probably what the C++ programmer intended but what they actually wrote means this:

  use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering};
  let n = AtomicU32::new(0);
  let m = AtomicU32::new(0);
  n.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
  m.store(m.load(Ordering::SeqCst) + n.load(Ordering::SeqCst), Ordering::SeqCst);
Well that's just crazy. Now m can change between when we load from it, and when we add n to it, and then we store back this out-dated value. We definitely didn't want that. But it looked sane because C++ fools us into believing "Atomic integers" are a thing, which they actually aren't.

Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android

#50

I'm more and more worried about a supply chain attack on LastPass/KeePass. To the point that I'm skittish about upgrading them. It feels to me like we need someone with huge resources, like Microsoft/Gooogle/Apple... to buy them and apply their methods against this attack. For example, where are the binaries built? Who controls the accounts used to upload the installers? Do they regularly pay security teams to try to…

(I work for another password manager company). Your questions are fair but not specific to password managers. All software can be victim of this kind of attacks. People tend to think it's worse when their password manager is compromised rather than another software, but the truth is that a troyan in (say) your text editor can very well be used to compromise your device and steal all your passwords.

But you are right, securing the code base and the CI is a big part of making sure a software is secure.

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