Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thats right, we should blame the victim for trusting the tool. Password managers are increasingly mandated by organisations, and Lastpass is a very common recommendation. Even in the minority of technical users that use this kind of tool I expect small mistakes - like accidentally pasting a password in a URL. A good tool doesn't let you shoot yourself in the foot by escalting that to a non-obvious leak. The password…
There are only three meaningfully "correct" recommendations for password managers as of today, depending on the use case: 1Password, Bitwarden, or KeepassXC. 1Password is fantastic, but expensive and closed source. Bitwarden is open source, but lacks certain auditing, team and sync features useful for enterprise. KeepassXC is excellent and open source, but with zero collaboration features is only suitable for self us…
Security Issues with LastPass on Android
41–50 of 64 posts
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#42why can't people just use keepass and be done with it?
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#43I'm more and more worried about a supply chain attack on LastPass/KeePass. To the point that I'm skittish about upgrading them. It feels to me like we need someone with huge resources, like Microsoft/Gooogle/Apple... to buy them and apply their methods against this attack. For example, where are the binaries built? Who controls the accounts used to upload the installers? Do they regularly pay security teams to try to…
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#44why can't people just use keepass and be done with it?
"Multiple users can log into the same database with the same password" isn't multi-user support. It's important to keep several passwords synchronized between family members and very useful to be able to securely share individual passwords with friends on occasion. Without ACLs and user accounts, this is impossible.
There's no official mobile app, which means I have to trust some random developer or live without basic quality of life features such as autofill.
It doesn't support U2F, instead requiring plugins to use a one-time password form of 2FA.
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#45I use algorithmic passwords. I have an algorithm that takes in several parameters and generates a unique password per service. For example, my algorithm `f` might be: f(domain, secret_word, secret_sentence, rules) = UPPER(KEY_TO_RIGHT(domain[0:3])) + secret_word + secret_sentence[LENGTH(domain)] + LENGTH(domain) + PAD_TO_20("X") So if my secret word were "bottleneck" and my secret sentence were "It is a truth univers…
If the worry is losing your phone, some of the popular services such as Bitwarden can also be accessed via a web interface, without installing the app.
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#46After lastpass's recent policy changes around free multi-device use, I finally decided to switch password management services. I don't really mind spending like $10/year for password management but lastpass was slow/buggy/frustrating enough that I didn't want to pay for it. The whole process took probably three minutes front-to-back. Lastpass lets you export your passwords in a CSV, which you then upload to any other…
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#47I use algorithmic passwords. I have an algorithm that takes in several parameters and generates a unique password per service. For example, my algorithm `f` might be: f(domain, secret_word, secret_sentence, rules) = UPPER(KEY_TO_RIGHT(domain[0:3])) + secret_word + secret_sentence[LENGTH(domain)] + LENGTH(domain) + PAD_TO_20("X") So if my secret word were "bottleneck" and my secret sentence were "It is a truth univers…
I'm not a big fan of the algorithmic password systems. In practice you need to remember some bits of state for each separate website, because of different password rules or because you had to reset the password. This results in either needing to memorize a lot of information or writing it all down somewhere. The former has the same problems as memorizing passwords without assistance. And if we need to write it down,…
If BitWarden can be accessed from a browser it means all my passwords are on their servers, whereas with an algorithmic password generator the passwords are in my brain alone
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#48These aren't really novel security vulnerabilities or anything, just some common sense things to be aware of so you don't shoot yourself in the foot: generated pronounceable passwords might not strictly follow the length that you set, don't paste your passwords into the address bar of a web view, and don't set a weak master password.
Thats right, we should blame the victim for trusting the tool. Password managers are increasingly mandated by organisations, and Lastpass is a very common recommendation. Even in the minority of technical users that use this kind of tool I expect small mistakes - like accidentally pasting a password in a URL. A good tool doesn't let you shoot yourself in the foot by escalting that to a non-obvious leak. The password…
Mainly driven by the combination of price increases, no improvements (and possibly getting worse) at things like the auto-fill buttons conflicting or not working with many apps I was using, the duplicate entries it would create, failure to match Android apps and web logins, and the constant battle to try to get it to work with several internal apps and test systems (same top-level domain, where I have a mix of unique and common logins) while also working on the web generally.
Bitwarden has per-domain selection of match type (full host, base domain, or regex), and a non-interfering UI. I can't think of a single thing LastPass does better.
Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most people realize they can hurt themselves if they use a hammer wrong. If someone can be expected to put four years of their life into a degree or prepatory trade training they can be held accountable for not caring enough to spend 10 minutes reading about effective use of their password manager.
That's not the reality though. The current wisdom in security seems to be to follow reality. To eliminate shooting foots by both users and developers. See NaCl crypto library, libsodium, Noise protocol, Signal app, Tarsnap and restic, Brian Warner's magic-wormhole, Signify/Minisign, Filippo Valsorda's 'age', WireGuard. Are there more?
std::atomic n = 0;
n++;
Rust has atomics but they don't work that way. let n = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0);
n.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
Hmm. Why doesn't Rust's "AtomicU32" just implement AddAssign? If it implemented the AddAssign trait then you could at least write: n += 1
.. and that looks much nicer, it elides all that stuff about memory models, consistency, and... oh...In the C++ code, the programmer thinks this variable n "is" atomic. It's an atomic integer right? But that's not a thing. C++ is mapping atomic integer operations, which are a thing, onto the type, and not making the integer itself magically atomic, it's just an ordinary (aligned) integer.
So if we tweak both examples to do some slightly trickier arithmetic...
std::atomic n = 0;
std::atomic m = 0;
n++;
m= m + n;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering};
let n = AtomicU32::new(0);
let m = AtomicU32::new(0);
n.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
m.fetch_add(n.load(Ordering::SeqCst), Ordering::SeqCst);
Once again, Rust seems much more verbose, but, wait, actually this isn't the same as the C++. This is probably what the C++ programmer intended but what they actually wrote means this: use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering};
let n = AtomicU32::new(0);
let m = AtomicU32::new(0);
n.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
m.store(m.load(Ordering::SeqCst) + n.load(Ordering::SeqCst), Ordering::SeqCst);
Well that's just crazy. Now m can change between when we load from it, and when we add n to it, and then we store back this out-dated value. We definitely didn't want that. But it looked sane because C++ fools us into believing "Atomic integers" are a thing, which they actually aren't.Re: Security Issues with LastPass on Android
#50I'm more and more worried about a supply chain attack on LastPass/KeePass. To the point that I'm skittish about upgrading them. It feels to me like we need someone with huge resources, like Microsoft/Gooogle/Apple... to buy them and apply their methods against this attack. For example, where are the binaries built? Who controls the accounts used to upload the installers? Do they regularly pay security teams to try to…
But you are right, securing the code base and the CI is a big part of making sure a software is secure.