The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion? • Hacker News Board

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#41

Post by jakobnissen » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:34 AM UTC

danbruc wrote: post #27

jakobnissen wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The debate between "no free will" and "magical supernatural free will" is silly and pointless, and yes, it should have been settled long time ago. But it bugs me that so many people are eager so claim that because magical free will doesn't exist, that means no free will can exist. Compatibilism is not a new idea either. The usual argument is that compatibilists are moving the goal posts, but I simply don't understand…

The usual argument is that compatibilists are moving the goal posts, but I simply don't understand that argument. It is moving the goal post because it just changes the definition of free will into some triviality. I had a choice between apples and oranges and I picked the apple because I like apples more. Sure, you can call this free will if you want to but what is the point? The max function had a choice between 1…

Do you really think the difference between someone coerced and someone free is "trivial"?

Or between someone who is free to make a choice because they are informed versus one who can't make it because they don't know of it? Or between someone who is capable of understanding the consequences of their actions and someone who is not?

These differences are - obviously, I might add - very important. And they have nothing to do with magical free will.

By the way, the difference between internal and external factors is not the critical thing. There are several ways to restrict people's free will with internal factors - like for example, a person who doesn't know X exists cannot make a free choice to do X.

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#42

Post by tremon » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:37 AM UTC

usgroup wrote: post #32

I think self consciousness is the sticking point for a mechanical or probabilistic universe. It exists. It eludes quantifiable definition. It makes no sense in a mechanism. It is central to free will.

What if self-consciousness is merely awareness of the choices your clockwork body makes?

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#43

Post by _y5hn » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:38 AM UTC

AstralStorm wrote: post #30

_y5hn wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's like saying higher frames of references can't exist, so they don't exist. The logic fails to prove or disprove unknowns. Virus don't contemplate their hosts. Mature minds handle unknowns properly.

However, is properly exactly the same as deterministically? Injecting non-determinism makes the question of free will rather funny, in that the standard argument "you would not choose differently" does not work as the act of traveling back in time injects further nondeterministic results... Under non-determinism, free will would be something like changing location of probability wells for actions. Our brains do that…

Philosophy is one way to try to grok the world. It is deceiving when it claims the universe is finite, bounded and fully quantifiable, without proof.

Determinism in an infinite interconnected quantum universe ceases to have pragmatic meaning. There is order, but we can't measure everything exactly. It's playing out right here with us, but we fail to grasp it all.

The possibility of higher frames of references invalidates absolutism to mind-games. Which is what hypotheticals are, until new actions are made.

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#44

Post by jakobnissen » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:40 AM UTC

dlkf wrote: post #28

jakobnissen wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The debate between "no free will" and "magical supernatural free will" is silly and pointless, and yes, it should have been settled long time ago. But it bugs me that so many people are eager so claim that because magical free will doesn't exist, that means no free will can exist. Compatibilism is not a new idea either. The usual argument is that compatibilists are moving the goal posts, but I simply don't understand…

The point of disagreement here probably boils down to the perceived significance of what you're calling "free will" in your final sentence (as opposed to "magical supernatural free will"). On my view it is literally nothing. It's the tautological observation that agents with desires, uninhibited, can and will seek to satisfy those desires. It gives us no grounds for responsibility, punishment, etc etc. (Those are all…

That's interesting! In my view, nothing important hinges on magical free will. How could it, when people can't even articulate what it is?

In my view, everything we associate with free will: Responsibility, punishment, "do better next time" et cetera, are not only recovered when you reach for a serious answer to what free will is. It's actually better recovered than with magical free will!

For example, everyone agrees that children are not as morally responsible as adults. Even though children supposedly are as magically free as adults. How can that be? That _only_ makes sense in the compatibilist view.

Suppose someone invents a completely deterministically programmed robot that has general intelligence and understands the world, and people well. Would you sign a contract with it? Would you punish it if it broke it? Would you hold it responsible? Would you be outraged if it decided to lie to you? I definitely would.

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#45

Post by tremon » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:42 AM UTC

unknown_apostle wrote: post #38

I personally find it highly likely that the decision mechanism emerges from physical computation in the brain. However, when we talk about decision mechanisms, we inevitably introduce the question of whether this decision mechanism can work better or worse. “Free will” may be seen as a computational notion of “health” for this decision mechanism, similar to how we use the term health for our physical bodies. A free w…

I personally find it highly likely that the decision mechanism emerges from physical computation in the brain.

I think it's more likely that the decision mechanism emerges from a race condition between multiple competing signals. We choose the one that arrives first, even if it takes time to be consciously aware of the choice.

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#46

Post by dlkf » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:44 AM UTC

jakobnissen wrote: post #41

danbruc wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The usual argument is that compatibilists are moving the goal posts, but I simply don't understand that argument. It is moving the goal post because it just changes the definition of free will into some triviality. I had a choice between apples and oranges and I picked the apple because I like apples more. Sure, you can call this free will if you want to but what is the point? The max function had a choice between 1…

Do you really think the difference between someone coerced and someone free is "trivial"? Or between someone who is free to make a choice because they are informed versus one who can't make it because they don't know of it? Or between someone who is capable of understanding the consequences of their actions and someone who is not? These differences are - obviously, I might add - very important. And they have nothing…

> These differences are - obviously, I might add - very important. And they have nothing to do with magical free will.

So why continue to use an unrelated term that has so much baggage? Why not just tackle these issues individually, on their own terms, in language that isn't laundering outmoded intuitions about some magic grounds for responsibility?

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#47

Post by dlkf » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:46 AM UTC

jakobnissen wrote: post #44

dlkf wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The point of disagreement here probably boils down to the perceived significance of what you're calling "free will" in your final sentence (as opposed to "magical supernatural free will"). On my view it is literally nothing. It's the tautological observation that agents with desires, uninhibited, can and will seek to satisfy those desires. It gives us no grounds for responsibility, punishment, etc etc. (Those are all…

That's interesting! In my view, nothing important hinges on magical free will. How could it, when people can't even articulate what it is? In my view, everything we associate with free will: Responsibility, punishment, "do better next time" et cetera, are not only recovered when you reach for a serious answer to what free will is. It's actually better recovered than with magical free will! For example, everyone agree…

> Responsibility, punishment, "do better next time" et cetera, are not only recovered when you reach for a serious answer to what free will is. It's actually better recovered than with magical free will!

And we've found the point of disagreement. I simply think they're not. I believe they have to be justified independently, in terms of the degree to which they tend our lives and our society in a desired direction.

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#48

Post by danbruc » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:53 AM UTC

jakobnissen wrote: post #41

danbruc wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The usual argument is that compatibilists are moving the goal posts, but I simply don't understand that argument. It is moving the goal post because it just changes the definition of free will into some triviality. I had a choice between apples and oranges and I picked the apple because I like apples more. Sure, you can call this free will if you want to but what is the point? The max function had a choice between 1…

Do you really think the difference between someone coerced and someone free is "trivial"? Or between someone who is free to make a choice because they are informed versus one who can't make it because they don't know of it? Or between someone who is capable of understanding the consequences of their actions and someone who is not? These differences are - obviously, I might add - very important. And they have nothing…

They are trivial in the sense that you can easily reason about them. Sure, you can construct wildly complex scenarios where available knowledge, resulting consequences, existing constraints, and what not make it non-obvious what can or cannot or should or should not be done but that this will only be a consequence of the complexity of the situation. This is in contrast to [magical] free will where you have fundamental problems of even defining the meaning of your concepts and arguably you are destined to fail because the concept is logical inconsistent to begin with.

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#49

Post by jakobnissen » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:55 AM UTC

dlkf wrote: post #46

jakobnissen wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Do you really think the difference between someone coerced and someone free is "trivial"? Or between someone who is free to make a choice because they are informed versus one who can't make it because they don't know of it? Or between someone who is capable of understanding the consequences of their actions and someone who is not? These differences are - obviously, I might add - very important. And they have nothing…

> These differences are - obviously, I might add - very important. And they have nothing to do with magical free will. So why continue to use an unrelated term that has so much baggage? Why not just tackle these issues individually, on their own terms, in language that isn't laundering outmoded intuitions about some magic grounds for responsibility?

Because they _do_ have something to do with _actual_ free will. When you drill down at what "free will" could plausibly and coherently mean, you inevitably end up focusing on these important differences.

And then you can _actually_ begin to articulate why someone is culpable and another person isn't. A magical free will believer can't really make sense of that, because if free will is something indescribable and magic, there is no reason to believe a person does not have free will to do X, just because they e.g. are incapable of doing it.

Conversely, if you believe _both_ in magical free will, and have also thought about the material conditions for free will (e.g. they must be informed, and understand the consequences, and not be coerced etc.), then you already have a completely coherent materialistic belief about free will, and have just awkwardly bolted supernaturalness to its side, completely unnecessarily.

Re: The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?

#50

Post by croon » Tue, Apr 27, 2021, 9:55 AM UTC

danbruc wrote: post #27

jakobnissen wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The debate between "no free will" and "magical supernatural free will" is silly and pointless, and yes, it should have been settled long time ago. But it bugs me that so many people are eager so claim that because magical free will doesn't exist, that means no free will can exist. Compatibilism is not a new idea either. The usual argument is that compatibilists are moving the goal posts, but I simply don't understand…

The usual argument is that compatibilists are moving the goal posts, but I simply don't understand that argument. It is moving the goal post because it just changes the definition of free will into some triviality. I had a choice between apples and oranges and I picked the apple because I like apples more. Sure, you can call this free will if you want to but what is the point? The max function had a choice between 1…

I don't know where I myself land, but free will gets more interesting in situations like:

* I see a piece of litter on the sidewalk and a garbage can on the other side of the road. Do I pick it up or not. Why/why not?

* I never feel like working out. Sometimes I do it, sometimes I don't. Why?

Sure, you can reduce these down to apples v oranges and just claim they have more variables to check first, but there's a lot of things we "decide" to do outside of preference.