Encrypted dns might be already in use by government or military agencies, but they know too well the effects of cascading this tech down to the masses. They will never let this reach the public.
Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
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Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#42I’m good with the Apple’s privacy-oriented stance. But I can’t stop to think what will happen when advertisers knock on Apple’s door trying to get their hands on the users’ data that one else can access. Is Apple going to sell it out for more profits?
What data can apple give them?
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#43Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#44I urge people to stop repeating Apple Advertising. Claims of privacy and security are debunked weekly. You put yourself at risk if you believe it.
https://nibblestew.blogspot.com/2020/04/your-statement-is-10...
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#45Preventing the target resolver from seeing client's IP address breaks GeoDNS. This is already a problem with 1.1.1.1 which doesn't honour the EDNS client subnet extension. Given generally DNS is just the start of an intereaction, usually followed by the connection directly between the client and intended destination, I don't see what kind of snooping these privacy measures are there to prevent.
It's intentional to force websites to move to their CDN or atleast use a CDN with anycast and prevent you from making your own CDN like you could cheaply before (spinning up DO droplets and doing loadbalancing with geo DNS).
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#46Key bits from the Cloudflare blog https://blog.cloudflare.com/oblivious-dns/ > The target [resolver] sees only the [DNS] query and the proxy’s IP address. The proxy has no visibility into the DNS messages, with no ability to identify, read, or modify either the query being sent by the client or the answer being returned by the target. Only the intended target [resolver] can read the content of the [DNS] query and pro…
DNSCrypt needs meaningful industry support otherwise it's sadly irrelevant. I think by now we can all agree "industry support" basically means the 3 browser vendors. DoH has at least Mozilla and Google on board, and presumably Microsoft are tailing along.
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#47Until we get rid of SNI[1] in HTTPS for good there will still be providers (like my ISP) that do deep packet inspection on SNI and kill the connection right away if you happen to visit a forbidden site (and this was western Europe, yesterday, on a site behind CloudFlare) [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#48Preventing the target resolver from seeing client's IP address breaks GeoDNS. This is already a problem with 1.1.1.1 which doesn't honour the EDNS client subnet extension. Given generally DNS is just the start of an intereaction, usually followed by the connection directly between the client and intended destination, I don't see what kind of snooping these privacy measures are there to prevent.
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#49Preventing the target resolver from seeing client's IP address breaks GeoDNS. This is already a problem with 1.1.1.1 which doesn't honour the EDNS client subnet extension. Given generally DNS is just the start of an intereaction, usually followed by the connection directly between the client and intended destination, I don't see what kind of snooping these privacy measures are there to prevent.
Valid points, but... > Preventing the target resolver from seeing client's IP address breaks GeoDNS. If the proxy and the target are in the same metro as the user, it shouldn't really matter. > This is already a problem with 1.1.1.1 which doesn't honour the EDNS client subnet extension. 1.1.1.1 runs at Cloudflare's edge. Most likely it is recursing DNS from more or less the same location as the user and so ECS isn't…
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#50Preventing the target resolver from seeing client's IP address breaks GeoDNS. This is already a problem with 1.1.1.1 which doesn't honour the EDNS client subnet extension. Given generally DNS is just the start of an intereaction, usually followed by the connection directly between the client and intended destination, I don't see what kind of snooping these privacy measures are there to prevent.
As I see this, this is a very clever move by Cloudflare. It's intentional to force websites to move to their CDN or atleast use a CDN with anycast and prevent you from making your own CDN like you could cheaply before (spinning up DO droplets and doing loadbalancing with geo DNS).