Agree with the article. People have been misinterpreting "security by obscurity is bad" to mean any obscurity and obfuscation is bad. Instead it was originally meant as "if your only security is obscurity, it's bad". Many serious real-world scenarios do use obscurity as an additional layer. If only because sometimes, you know that a dedicated attacker will be able to breach, what you are looking for is to delay them…
Security by obscurity is underrated
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Re: Security by obscurity is underrated
#42Security by obscurity alone is bad, but as another layer, it can be great.
Re: Security by obscurity is underrated
#43This came up in the stackoverflow podcast where Reddit founders were the guest. They mentioned that they stored plain text passwords initially which is fundamentally a bad design but at the same time it helps to block spam. If a user starts to create a lot of accounts programmatically they generally use the same password thus much easier to filter. Security via Obscurity, if you can do it, can be very very effective.
Re: Security by obscurity is underrated
#44Agree with the article. People have been misinterpreting "security by obscurity is bad" to mean any obscurity and obfuscation is bad. Instead it was originally meant as "if your only security is obscurity, it's bad". Many serious real-world scenarios do use obscurity as an additional layer. If only because sometimes, you know that a dedicated attacker will be able to breach, what you are looking for is to delay them…
- Assume for every code obfuscator there's a deobfuscator or at least someone as clever as you out there.
- Randomizing variable names it just a nuisance, it won't stop any competent pen tester or attacker.
- Encrypting the database is an odd one. Your program will also have to decrypt the data to use it. Where do you store the encryption keys? In your code? Don't assume obfuscating your code and/or randomizing variables will protect your encryption keys.
Re: Security by obscurity is underrated
#45Typically you want to know who is connecting to what server via what service and log these connections. If something is off, an alert can be generated. If ssh isn't served on a standardized port, logging and alerting becomes more complicated - albeit not impossible.
There is more housekeeping to do. In case of a handoff, things like this need to be documented. If all services work on their default port, there is no need for documenting them.
In the case of compromise, it becomes very hard to identify how a machine got compromised.
Yes, a lot of people do not do a full port scan. But those are not the people exploiting risky vulnerabilities. Security by obscurity reduces your risk, but only to a certain extent. Having a proper patch management or firewall management in place reduces your risk a lot more.
A lot of owls do get killed by humans, despite their camouflage.
Re: Security by obscurity is underrated
#46Re: Security by obscurity is underrated
#47You can technically compute the private key for someone's Bitcoin wallet for example. It's just you'd hit the end of the heat death of the universe by then.
Re: Security by obscurity is underrated
#48There's something to the idea of rehabilitating "obscurity", or at least recognizing that "cost" is part of threat models, and you can raise costs for particular attack vectors by degrees instead of "to infinity". But SSH is a terrible example, because the cost to the defender of simply not having SSH vulnerabilities is the same, or even less, than the cost of obfuscating it with nonstandard ports, "port knocking", o…