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UtahFS: Encrypted File Storage

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Re: UtahFS: Encrypted File Storage

#41

mtgx - you are dead. I haven't looked at native OpenZFS encryption... The method I used for a while was having a Veracrypt volume locally of all my files, and zfs-sending it to a remote location. It is a large file, several gigabytes. However, any updates made locally would get synced remotely at a block level vs. a file level, so the whole encrypted file didn't need synced. Much better than rsync, for example. I did…

I don't know about the crypto design of OpenZFS, but I have been running Ubuntu 20.04 with root pool using OpenZFS crypto since it's release. You have to make a small hack to the installer to do it, but otherwise it seems to be working great.

I documented the installer hack at: https://linsomniac.gitlab.io/post/2020-04-09-ubuntu-2004-enc...

Before that I was running my storage server using LUKS on the raw devices and ZFS on top of that, since 2008, and that worked well.

Re: UtahFS: Encrypted File Storage

#42
post #19
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes you can pay to have someone pin it--there are pinning services--but you can also just replicate it among your own nodes. It would be comparable to Dropbox plus encryption. Another thought less well explored would be to swap space with friends such that you hold each others pins but you can't read your friends' encrypted blocks. This is kind of the premise behind filecoin, which lets you buy space (ie if you want…

I would point out that IPFS provides no encryption out of the box, you're just layering this below something that encrypts that could equally well work on Dropbox. Filecoin atleast has a integrated payment structure but modern storage providers are pretty damn cheap (I pay ~10$ for 3TB of data including ingress/egress) When I last checked by filecoin they could only barely compete with AWS storage options (which quic…

For clarification: IPFS has transport encryption by default. IPFS does not encrypt content itself for you.

Re: UtahFS: Encrypted File Storage

#43
post #3

Love the idea of this. I've tried to use something similar (at least in function), called Cryptomator. However, Cryptomator would always choke on larger files or directories with thousands of items (e.g. my Google Photos gallery). Will be interested to see if this or another solution is what I'm looking for.

How do you have it setup? I had similar issues when I was trying to access my WebDAV vault directly from Cryptomator on Ubuntu. I setup Nextcloud to sync directly with my local Ubuntu install and pointed Cryptomator at the vault in the synced directory and it works great! It opens all the files in the vault almost instantly and they’re navigable as if they're local files.

Mobile is still a problem though. A gallery system would be a big help but you’re always stuck with a bandwidth limit unless you cache the vault locally which for my vault isn’t feasible and also undesirable as I don’t want the files on my device.

Re: UtahFS: Encrypted File Storage

#44
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would point out that IPFS provides no encryption out of the box, you're just layering this below something that encrypts that could equally well work on Dropbox. Filecoin atleast has a integrated payment structure but modern storage providers are pretty damn cheap (I pay ~10$ for 3TB of data including ingress/egress) When I last checked by filecoin they could only barely compete with AWS storage options (which quic…

For clarification: IPFS has transport encryption by default. IPFS does not encrypt content itself for you.

Transport encryption isn't something I'd mention when talking about "Encrypted File Storage", I'd assume that to either don't matter or be the default.

Re: UtahFS: Encrypted File Storage

#45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What’s wrong with LUKS / tomb?

It's one big container. A small change means the whole file has to be uploaded again. If you are lucky for Dropbox blocks are synced only. Also it lacks authentication. The snapshots of the XTS mode are prone to certain attacks.

Regarding your first paragraph, that’s always going to be a tradeoff that has to be assessed based on threat model and resource budget, since doing it differently will inherently leak sidechannel information, right?

The second one, TIL and good points!

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