Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens • Hacker News Board

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#41

Post by petermcneeley » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:54 PM UTC

MaupitiBlue wrote: post #22

philshem wrote: post #9

November 2019 New Yorker piece about what went wrong at Boeing https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-again... tl;dr engineers vs. accountants

BS! Which of these was done by the accountants? 1. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor. 2. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA disagreements. 3. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree warning lights. 4. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all. 5. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data. 6. Give MCAS a ridicu…

I would agree. Also this CEO of 34 years is an engineer.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#42

Post by lotsofpulp » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:54 PM UTC

elthran wrote: post #14

philshem wrote: post #9

November 2019 New Yorker piece about what went wrong at Boeing https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-again... tl;dr engineers vs. accountants

Replaced on an interim basis by the CFO, and permanently by the chairman, who runs private equity at Blackstone with a background in accounting. Not convinced Boeing have learnt their lesson.

I assume, due to their connections, they are best positioned to “win” more lucrative orders from government.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#43

Post by petilon » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:54 PM UTC

devit wrote: post #11

Why isn't it enough to retrofit all past and future models with enough hardware redundancy and create a properly written MCAS software? Wasn't the design sound, except for the lack of hardware sensor redundancy and naively written software? Why do they need to stop production and so on?

If that was all that's needed 737 Max's would all be back in the air by now. There is a fundamental problem in the design. The plane tends to pitch up when accelerating. Under certain circumstances this can cause the plane to stall and fall out of the sky. This was fixed using software.

Most planes have airframes that are aerodynamically stable in and of itself. The 737 Max requires software assistance to be at the same level of stability.

That, to me, is a fundamental flaw. In a multilayer system each layer needs to be safe in and of itself. The purpose of higher layers is to add functionality not to fix flaws in lower layers.

Given the fundamental flaws in design it was obvious there was a cultural problem at Boeing and the CEO needed to go. "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them." -- Einstein.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#44

Post by Marsymars » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:55 PM UTC

> Chairman David Calhoun will take over as CEO and president, effective Jan. 13, the company said, adding that a change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the company.

If they wanted to restore my confidence, they’d have picked an engineer, not an accountant.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#45

Post by taneq » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:55 PM UTC

devit wrote: post #11

Why isn't it enough to retrofit all past and future models with enough hardware redundancy and create a properly written MCAS software? Wasn't the design sound, except for the lack of hardware sensor redundancy and naively written software? Why do they need to stop production and so on?

The problem with Boeing isn’t MCAS. The problem is that the company was capable of shipping such a flawed design and then pretending it was OK even in the face of hundreds of deaths. How could you ever trust the output of such a company, especially with your life?

Just firing the CEO isn’t enough, they need to root out everyone complicit in this crime.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#46

Post by gpm » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:55 PM UTC

pastor_elm wrote: post #20

devit wrote: post #11

Why isn't it enough to retrofit all past and future models with enough hardware redundancy and create a properly written MCAS software? Wasn't the design sound, except for the lack of hardware sensor redundancy and naively written software? Why do they need to stop production and so on?

>"Wasn't the design sound" What's so sound about a plane that stalls by default?

Flip that around, what's unsound with such a design?

There are lots of things on planes where "if you don't do this" then "the plane crashes and burns". Having to adjust horizontal stabilizer trim as you gain speed is a minor addition.

MCAS was problematic because of how it went about doing so, and how pilots weren't properly trained on the change in how the trim needs to be adjusted. The idea of adjusting the trim doesn't seem fundamentally flawed to me.

(Not that I think the design is necessarily sound, see my direct reply to gp for why).

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#47

Post by dclowd9901 » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:56 PM UTC

MaupitiBlue wrote: post #22

philshem wrote: post #9

November 2019 New Yorker piece about what went wrong at Boeing https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-again... tl;dr engineers vs. accountants

BS! Which of these was done by the accountants? 1. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor. 2. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA disagreements. 3. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree warning lights. 4. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all. 5. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data. 6. Give MCAS a ridicu…

I can easily see how any of these items could be explained by "pressure to deliver" and "reduction of costs".

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#48

Post by _ph_ » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:56 PM UTC

devit wrote: post #11

Why isn't it enough to retrofit all past and future models with enough hardware redundancy and create a properly written MCAS software? Wasn't the design sound, except for the lack of hardware sensor redundancy and naively written software? Why do they need to stop production and so on?

Yes, fixing the MCAS software should solve the problem of the 737 MAX. But with all what happened, authorities are extra thorough before allowing the 737 MAX to fly again. Probably all what is needed is a few more months of patience.

On the grand scale of things, the bigger issues with Boeing are how they do business and all the problems with their facturies that have surfaced recently. Beyond getting the 737 MAX to flight status, they have to resolve all the issues and the management problems which lead to them.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#49

Post by Sharlin » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:56 PM UTC

Ill_ban_myself wrote: post #7

Started as an intern at Boeing in 1985. 34 year career down in flames. Ouch.

Somehow I can’t find in myself one single bit of sympathy for him. As opposed to the people who, you know, literally went down with the planes. What’s the value of one rich man’s career in the face of that? Exactly zero.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#50

Post by slimed » Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:57 PM UTC

CydeWeys wrote: post #28

Maybe the next CEO will actually try to fix things, seeing as how his job will likely depend on it. Fuck up like Muilenburg did and you're out too. It seems like the incentives may be correct now to focus on the right things rather than just cut costs as much as possible. Hopefully!

I hope you're right but this reminds me of the very sad saying, "Bike lanes are painted in blood". Why can't we properly value safety over convenience and profits before there is a huge accident?