This is a surprisingly vague postmortem. No timeline, no specific identification of affected regions. And no explanation of why a configuration change that was (apparently) made with a single command required so much effort to undo, or why repair efforts were hampered when (again, apparently) the network was successfully prioritizing high-priority traffic. Even for a public postmortem, this seems pretty weak.
> With all services restored to normal operation, Google’s engineering teams are now conducting a thorough post-mortem ... This is not the post-mortem, that is still to come.
An update on Sunday’s service disruption
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Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#42> In essence, the root cause of Sunday’s disruption was a configuration change I feel like I hear about config changes breaking these cloud hosts so often it might as well be a meme. Is there a reason why it's usually configurations to blame vs code, hardware, etc?
Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#43Still there are great lessons in this incident for them as much as for all SREs around the world who struggled during the incident. I for one wouldn't want to rely on a global load balancer which I know now that can not survive a regional outage.
Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#44> Google’s engineering teams detected the issue within seconds, but diagnosis and correction took far longer than our target of a few minutes. Once alerted, engineering teams quickly identified the cause of the network congestion, but the same network congestion which was creating service degradation also slowed the engineering teams’ ability to restore the correct configurations, prolonging the outage.
Someone forgot to classify management traffic as high-priority? Oops.
The description is vague about what devices ("servers") were misconfigured. Did someone tell all google service pods in the affected regions to restrict bandwidth by over 50%? Mentioning "server" and then talking about network congestion is confusing. How would restricted bandwidth utilization on servers cause network congestion, unless load balancers saturated the network by re-sending requests to servers because none of them were responding?
Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#45Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#46> In essence, the root cause of Sunday’s disruption was a configuration change I feel like I hear about config changes breaking these cloud hosts so often it might as well be a meme. Is there a reason why it's usually configurations to blame vs code, hardware, etc?
Well you can't just change code, it has to get reviewed, it has to go to QA, it has to go to UAT, it has to get signed off in triplicate by all the major stake holders. Configuration changes are easy though, they don't have to go through all these error prevention steps, we can just have our less technical support staff make configuration changes live in production. In fact we'll build them a DSL so we never have to…
Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#47> For most Google users there was little or no visible change to their services—search queries might have been a fraction of a second slower than usual for a few minutes but soon returned to normal, their Gmail continued to operate without a hiccup, and so on. Google probably forgot that some of their own brands are also hosted on their cloud. Like Nest. Basically Nest was down entirely.
Most importantly, commerical gsuite was down. Its paid service(with bad, but still a SLA), and some companies worked on sunday. Pretty bad when both corp email and hangouts dont work - no way to communicate remediation steps.
However figuring out, for example, whether Slack has a critical dependency on your provider may not be trivial.
Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
Code is reviewed, but I'm not aware of any companies where terminal commands are reviewed before each execution (though maybe they should be - it seems like every major cloud outage is config related). It sounds like the change was reviewed and approved but incorrectly pushed.
We do at AWS. Not all commands though, but most commands that we audit and find are dangerous. See a similar outage in S3 from 2 years ago - https://aws.amazon.com/message/41926/
That above seems pretty clunky, so it's very likely not what happens.
Re: An update on Sunday’s service disruption
#49> For most Google users there was little or no visible change to their services—search queries might have been a fraction of a second slower than usual for a few minutes but soon returned to normal, their Gmail continued to operate without a hiccup, and so on. Google probably forgot that some of their own brands are also hosted on their cloud. Like Nest. Basically Nest was down entirely.
I get that outages happen. But having a dishonest status page just plain sucks.