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A world of hurt after GoDaddy, Apple, and Google misissue 1M certificates

arstechnica.com

41–50 of 143 posts

Re: A world of hurt after GoDaddy, Apple, and Google misissue 1M certificates

#41
post #36
post #30

The interesting aspect that a lot of people are overlooking is that, for a theoretical attack within certain timeframes, this difference can be make-it or break it! Imagine a collision attack that takes about a 1 year with 64bit serial numbers, so with 63bit serial number it should take about half, at 6 months. The average certificate is issued for about 1 year, so being able to mount a collision attack that took 1 y…

Why do you assume that an attack would take 1 year, and not (e.g.) a billion years? A factor of two is only interesting if the number you're dividing was interesting in the first place.

imagine is hardly assuming. But it doesn't have to be exactly 1 year, any attack that takes longer but less than 2x average certificate lifetime with 64bit serial numbers (useless) becomes practical on 63bit serial numbers (useful, for a strange meaning of useful).

Re: A world of hurt after GoDaddy, Apple, and Google misissue 1M certificates

#42
post #9

> Adam Caudill, the security researcher who blogged about the mass misissuance last weekend, pointed out that it’s easy to think that a difference of 1 single bit would be largely inconsequential when considering numbers this big. In fact, he said, the difference between 2^63 and 2^64 is more than 9 quintillion. Okay, but, that's because 2^63 itself is more than 9 quintillion. Where the search space was previously 18…

It seems unlikely that there was process that determined that 2^63 was an insufficient number of outputs, but 2^64 was just right. The choice was somewhat arbitrary in the first place.

Re: A world of hurt after GoDaddy, Apple, and Google misissue 1M certificates

#43
post #30

The interesting aspect that a lot of people are overlooking is that, for a theoretical attack within certain timeframes, this difference can be make-it or break it! Imagine a collision attack that takes about a 1 year with 64bit serial numbers, so with 63bit serial number it should take about half, at 6 months. The average certificate is issued for about 1 year, so being able to mount a collision attack that took 1 y…

In your scenario half of the 64 bit certificates could be brute forced in 6 months anyway.

Re: A world of hurt after GoDaddy, Apple, and Google misissue 1M certificates

#46
post #20

Presumably 64 bits were originally chosen because it still permitted simple or naive ASN.1 decoders to return the parsed value as a native 64-bit type. But ASN.1 INTEGERs are always signed, so theses serials would now have to be 65 bits. But any ASN.1 decoder interface that permitted directly storing a 65-bit value into a 64-bit type--even an unsigned type--is dangerous if not broken. I'm guessing that most X.509 man…

Yes, now certificates are about half as hard to hack as they were supposed to be.

Does that mean that twice as many will be cracked?/s

Re: A world of hurt after GoDaddy, Apple, and Google misissue 1M certificates

#49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"50% easier than theoretically impossible" means it's now 50% possible, doesn't it?

No more than "half of infinity" is half finite.

Nassim Taleb would probably disagree. ;)

Re: A world of hurt after GoDaddy, Apple, and Google misissue 1M certificates

#50
post #47

The true cost of Java not supporting unsigned integers

In an X.509 certificate, the serial number is encoded as the ASN.1 integer type, which is arbitrary length. So that can't map to a native integer type on any platform.

I'd chalk this up to the author of the relevant module not really grokking the two's complement behavior in java.math.BigInteger.

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