I wish I would have seen a GitHub repo opened by the French government (à la Keybase) instead of an article from Reuters telling me that 20 officials beta-test an app developed by "we don't know who" using the taxes that pay my parents and friends. Show, don't tell.
France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
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Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#42What’s amusing is that foreign secret services are not the only ones snooping on French politicians. French secret services have a whole department (formally called RG) in charge of collecting files on every domestic public figure (own file is a interesting ritual read for a newly promoted minister of interior). The justice dept had also an interesting interpretation of attorney client privilege where it argued recen…
What's the domestic app in France that comes closest to fulfilling that?
Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#43http://www.spiegel.de/international/quaero-qu-est-ce-que-c-e...
Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you're talking about the metadata, yes, probably. It 's the same kind of eavesdropping capability you'd have from Signal servers (i.e: not much). Also: from what we've seen of Macron's team, they've proven that they have good-enough internal technical advisors; so it remains to be seen if they'd use a solution that can be eavesdropped.
Unless you can verify the deployed build against an open source code, whether the code is open source or not is irrelevant, you trust all the intermediaries. Which is ok for a corporate actor but probably not when you are a sovereign actor and know you are dealing with a keen NSA. How could you control that Apple or Google wouldn’t patch the app before it gets deployed or after it has been deployed?
4 paragraph summary: http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/B/back-door.html
Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#45Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#46This isn’t a case of NIH; France has adopted Matrix for the project, which is a lightweight fork of Riot.im combined with a large private federation of Matrix servers. The whole thing is open source (although not public yet, as it is very early days) and open standards based. At Matrix.org we’ve been providing some support to them :) It’s very exciting to see open government projects which actually grok open source a…
Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#47When tax dollars go into open source, it's just an endless chain of win-win-win-win-... News like this is just great. :-)
Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#48This isn’t a case of NIH; France has adopted Matrix for the project, which is a lightweight fork of Riot.im combined with a large private federation of Matrix servers. The whole thing is open source (although not public yet, as it is very early days) and open standards based. At Matrix.org we’ve been providing some support to them :) It’s very exciting to see open government projects which actually grok open source a…
Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#49What about using Signal? Will they do something else then using the Signal protocol? If so, this might be either pretty expensive or could go wrong.
Re: France’s government is building its own encrypted messenger service
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you're talking about the metadata, yes, probably. It 's the same kind of eavesdropping capability you'd have from Signal servers (i.e: not much). Also: from what we've seen of Macron's team, they've proven that they have good-enough internal technical advisors; so it remains to be seen if they'd use a solution that can be eavesdropped.
Unless you can verify the deployed build against an open source code, whether the code is open source or not is irrelevant, you trust all the intermediaries. Which is ok for a corporate actor but probably not when you are a sovereign actor and know you are dealing with a keen NSA. How could you control that Apple or Google wouldn’t patch the app before it gets deployed or after it has been deployed?