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Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

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Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#41

Post by vertex-four »

baby wrote: post #28
CaliforniaKarl wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From a quick check, I'd say the big differences (Yubikey HSM 2 over Nitrokey HSM) are: 4096-bit RSA, curve25519, higher capacity, and smaller form factor. EDIT: On further thought, the small form factor would be good for physical verification. I could get a good, high-quality server, plug this into the front USB port, and then use some sort of transparent epoxy to seal it in. Having it on the front of the server woul…

How is 4k RSA a plus?

Sometimes you're stuck needing RSA for something. When you are, you want 4k RSA.

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#42

Post by wyager »

benevol wrote: post #22

How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If Intel/AMD have a backdoor into every PC and server, then so does the US gov't (NSA, CIA, FBI, etc.) and of course other uninvited hackers from even hostile countries. And how did Western society just accept all of this anti-democratic craziness? [0] https:…

Computer security engineering is a branch of economics. If you try to think of it in all-or-nothing terms, you’re going to come up with silly ideas like “we shouldn’t bother trying to stop malware because the NSA could theoretically spend $1,000,000 and hack my laptop anyway”.

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#43

Post by wav-part »

consp wrote: post #40
wav-part wrote: post #37

How can HSMs be considered MITM-proof if does not have dedicated input system (touchscreen/keyboard) ?

Because it is a clever way of not considering that MITM but man in the machine (which is almost the same in my opinion in the case of possible damage but has more attack vectors). Most companies consider MITM an external compromise since the malicious actor is not on the machine itself or has no-longer access to the machine(s). Even most 'dedicated' systems do NOT have a direct link to the input terminals most of the…

An ideal HSM serve only one purpose: store secrets (privatekeys/passwords) and give specific access (sign/spend/login).

> Most companies consider MITM an external compromise since the malicious actor is not on the machine itself or has no-longer access to the machine(s).

Securing HSM+Laptop is impossible compared to HSM. If laptop is secure, why even need HSM ?

> Even most 'dedicated' systems do NOT have a direct link to the input terminals most of the times since they are simple usb keypads. Some smartcard readers for PC have pin-pads but this is rarely the case and they are way more expensive than a keyboard and a regular reader.

If usbkeypad is not connected to a network and not attacked by evil maid, HSM+usbkeypad is still secure. But laptop is complex system, always connected to internet and has loosly regulated physical access.

> HSMs are not "MITM proof", the system at-large has to be.

Again if whole system is secure why need HSM ?

If user satisfy few conditions of using HSM, such as being rubberhose attack proof, the secrets MUST be secure irregardless of how insecure the larger system is.

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#45

Post by j_s »

benevol wrote: post #22

How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If Intel/AMD have a backdoor into every PC and server, then so does the US gov't (NSA, CIA, FBI, etc.) and of course other uninvited hackers from even hostile countries. And how did Western society just accept all of this anti-democratic craziness? [0] https:…

> How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)?

If you trust this YubiHSM but not Intel CPUs, then it is very useful since encryption/decryption occurs on the YubiHSM, not the connected CPU. Just plug it into a computer with a CPU you do trust first to get the official public key(s) for future verifications!

If you don't trust this YubiHSM because of the example of Intel CPUs, then please share at what point you do trust third party hardware, so we can discuss how to get to useful encryption from there.

Would you only trust RAM you wire-wrapped yourself?

Would you only trust a motherboard you built from 7400 series logic gates, each of which you personally verified using X-rays?

The line has to be drawn somewhere, but without knowing where you want to do so your comment serves mostly to hijack discussion (which is fine).

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#46

Post by j_s »

pault wrote: post #44
vertex-four wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sometimes you're stuck needing RSA for something. When you are, you want 4k RSA.

Is 2048 RSA broken? I think that's what ssh-keygen creates by default, right?

> Is 2048 RSA broken?

Today(-ish)? HN's anointed crypto expert says no.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14317331

>tptacek(2017May): The point of modern RSA is that we use a modulus that can't be factored by any conceivable computer, with limits derived from the physics of computation and projected far out into the future. We aren't a supercomputer advance away from factoring 2048 bit moduli.

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#47

Post by j_s »

wav-part wrote: post #37

How can HSMs be considered MITM-proof if does not have dedicated input system (touchscreen/keyboard) ?

They only have to be accessed using a secure computer once to get the public keys for verification, right? Isn't that the whole point of public key crypto?

This can be done using some ultra-slow homebrew whatever-level-you're-willing-to-trust custom hardware is necessary to satisfy the associated degree of paranoia.

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#48

Post by Cyph0n »

j_s wrote: post #45
benevol wrote: post #22

How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If Intel/AMD have a backdoor into every PC and server, then so does the US gov't (NSA, CIA, FBI, etc.) and of course other uninvited hackers from even hostile countries. And how did Western society just accept all of this anti-democratic craziness? [0] https:…

> How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If you trust this YubiHSM but not Intel CPUs, then it is very useful since encryption/decryption occurs on the YubiHSM, not the connected CPU. Just plug it into a computer with a CPU you do trust first to get the official public key(s) for future verificati…

If an attacker controls your computer, there is always the possibility of a man in the middle, even if you use a Yubikey. The attacker could simply wait for a request to the HSM and intercept the response.

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#49

Post by yosito »

I bought a Yubico key once. The thing was so cheap that between the time I set it up and the first time I actually had to use it, it had disintegrated just from sitting in my pocket every day on my keychain. The plastic was brittle and fell apart piece by piece until eventually the electronics fell apart too.

Re: Yubico announces tiny, cheap YubiHSM 2

#50

Post by j_s »

Cyph0n wrote: post #48
j_s wrote: post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> How useful are such measures when Intel has backdoored each and everyone of their CPUs with its "Intel Management Engine" [0] (and AMD has a similar mechanism)? If you trust this YubiHSM but not Intel CPUs, then it is very useful since encryption/decryption occurs on the YubiHSM, not the connected CPU. Just plug it into a computer with a CPU you do trust first to get the official public key(s) for future verificati…

If an attacker controls your computer, there is always the possibility of a man in the middle, even if you use a Yubikey. The attacker could simply wait for a request to the HSM and intercept the response.

But they don't have the private key, that's the whole point of the hardware device! They can't MITM the encrypted data without it.

  plaintext  crypto  blob  *compromised server/anything but quantum computing*  blob  crypto / YubiHSM
Edit: I'm not talking about this:

  *my compromised PC*  plaintext  crypto  blob  crypto / Yubikey
In practice, getting anything done involves some CPU doing something useful with plaintext, if that's what you're getting at. As I said, you have to draw the line somewhere. Without sharing where you do this there is little point in talking about it. Personally, I can't see any problem with an Intel CPU (or any other hardware) acquired with cash in person, then never networked and if I wanted to go ultra paranoid: a chain of custody from the time of my acquisition demonstrating continuous physical surveillance.

My point is that I could securely "crypto" from my academic-dreamland/whatever secure computer through any transport to a YubiHSM connected to a compromised PC, if I trust Yubico (and the supply chain delivering their hardware) and the YubiHSM's initial/one-time setup.

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