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Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

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41–50 of 53 posts

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#41
post #14

Well, if there's one piece of (somewhat) good news around this and https://www.krackattacks.com/ , it's that TLS and VPNs will become even more common. Where did WEP and WPA2 come from, anyway? What's the historical reason we aren't all using TLS to connect to our APs?

Because WEP and WPA were designed to provide (just) encryption but to provide access control.

The problem with TLS is that it’s client authentication kinda sucks and isn’t easy to manage.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I expect they could, yes; WPA2 doesn't offer forward secrecy. But WPA2 never offered much anyway. If you're on mall wifi, you can already see unencrypted traffic for everyone else, because the client keys are derivable from the shared passphrase (which presumably everyone at the mall has been told) and overhearing the four-way handshake when someone joins. And! You can even fake a disconnect message that forces the f…

> * If you're on mall wifi, you can already see unencrypted traffic for everyone else* Without contradicting your observation, I want to mention that virtually anything important you do on the Internet these days--from online banking to Google searches to reading Hacker News--is protected by a second independent layer of encryption: HTTPS. I'm not excusing the WPA2 flaws, but I do think that your bank info, web searc…

You're right, though you're being a little rose-tinted about the situation. I think amazon.com shopping turned on redirects from HTTP to HTTPS last year sometime -- before that they would even redirect from HTTPS to HTTP. That means that until last year, in most instances, your coworkers or your fellow coffee shop customers could see which items you were considering buying online on Amazon. That's really, really bad!

Also, HTTPS doesn't protect domain names. If you're making TLS connections to (e.g.) a porn site over WiFi, the other people sharing your connection don't need to decrypt your traffic to know what you're doing.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#43
post #38
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

WPA2 Enterprise use a central RADIUS server for authentication, with separate credentials for each user, and a (separately-distributed) certificate for the server. It's just not practical for consumer and small-business setups.

Somewhat true. Setting up a Freeradius is not hard. Problem is that you need another device that is running 24/7.

The RADIUS server can run on the router/AP without compromising practical security in most cases.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#44
post #37
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And on a device equipped with a radio, it's not very hard to generate entropy.

The radio might not be exposed to the OS. If it's a Fullmac device, you usually don't have access to the radio stuff. Even with Softmac, there's not a guarantee.

I am sure that's a problem on the client, but on the AP, the manufacturer controls both the hardware and the OS.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#45
post #2

WPA2 is toast. Ref to the CVEs that will make a lot of network admins hate Monday: https://twitter.com/nick_lowe/status/919527451570638848 And some background: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf

> WPA2 is toast. No it is not. It is "just" one part of the 4 way handshake.

Source: https://www.krackattacks.com/

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#46
post #44
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The radio might not be exposed to the OS. If it's a Fullmac device, you usually don't have access to the radio stuff. Even with Softmac, there's not a guarantee.

I am sure that's a problem on the client, but on the AP, the manufacturer controls both the hardware and the OS.

Not necessarily. Again with fullmac devices you don't control the complete hardware.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#47
post #46
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am sure that's a problem on the client, but on the AP, the manufacturer controls both the hardware and the OS.

Not necessarily. Again with fullmac devices you don't control the complete hardware.

Yeah but if you are Cisco, Netgear or DLink, and tell your supplier that you want a function to access noise in the signal, or you want to get a true random number based on that noise, I am sure they could accommodate in future generations of their chip at an insignificant cost.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#48
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Spoofed yes but they're hard to guess in advance without prior knowledge of the device's MAC address.

MAC addresses are broadcast in the clear regularly, so any device doing that without some randomization is ripe for the picking.

Worth noting also: You vannot randomize it when connected to a Wi-Fi network.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#49
post #39
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Somewhat true. Setting up a Freeradius is not hard. Problem is that you need another device that is running 24/7.

The bit that's less practical for consumer setup is more the cert distribution and setup of separate credentials for each user. (The RADIUS server could even be built into the router in a consumer product.)

That's not needed, trust on first connect.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#50
post #34
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

WPA2 in general. The 4-way handshake is vulnerable. Might be patchable, but there is a ton of embedded stuff out there that will never get updated...

I guess the question is whether only the AP needs to be patched or the client as well.

In fact it is only clients that need patching. However, sometimes AP's are also clients. Disable any such features if you have them and are not depending on them.
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