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Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

hardenedlinux.org

41–50 of 81 posts

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#41
post #3

The ridiculous shit that needs to be done just to rid of some blob. RISC-V can't take the market over fast enough.

RISC-V is Open Source.

Will the RISC-V based CPU in your computer be Open Source?

A parallel example is while WebKit is Open Source Chrome isn't

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#43
post #4

This appears to be a legitimate ME neutralization. The ME is purportedly placed in "recovery" mode: According to Nicola Corna, the current ME state should have been changed from “normal” to “recovery”. Since the MEI interface is disabled (not visible from a PCI bus scan), there is no way to activate the ME at runtime, even after a full system compromise. It would still be possible to rewrite the BIOS flash chip with…

ME isn't the last obstacle though, is it? Looking at the purism/librem pages, there are still various other subsystems like FSP/EC/SMC.

https://puri.sm/posts/bios-freedom-status-nov2014/

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#44
post #3

The ridiculous shit that needs to be done just to rid of some blob. RISC-V can't take the market over fast enough.

A rootkit can be anywhere on the PCIe bus.

Just for example, you are using OpenBSD and full disk encryption and you think you are safe? What if the firmware on your NIC can be altered to scan your RAM (using DMA) and send the interesting data (big prime numbers, passwords, etc.) home? What if firmware on your keyboard can be modified (or pre-programmed in factory) to record the last x thousands of keypresses (which will include your boot disk password) on its own flash memory which can be later extracted? There are so many attack vectors.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#46
post #4

This appears to be a legitimate ME neutralization. The ME is purportedly placed in "recovery" mode: According to Nicola Corna, the current ME state should have been changed from “normal” to “recovery”. Since the MEI interface is disabled (not visible from a PCI bus scan), there is no way to activate the ME at runtime, even after a full system compromise. It would still be possible to rewrite the BIOS flash chip with…

I worked with Nicola at the script. Apparently the same firmware modification can be done up to Skylake CPUs, but it is to be checked if ME firmware modification triggers Boot Guard BIOS signature verification. We don't know yet because the only person who tried this on Skylake seems to have Boot Guard not enabled on his board. More info: https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/issues/1

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#47
post #14
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just reboot after neutralization. "With ME neutralized, the MEI interface disappears from the PCI bus, and the integrated NIC ceases to work, but will resume to work after a reboot."

The phrasing there is confusing. Does the NIC break because the ME is neutralized? Then rebooting again with the ME neutralized will break the NIC again. Why would the NIC only break once after the ME is neutralized? The system is started from a fully powered-off state after the ME firmware is updated. Maybe the NIC has some sort of non-volatile state that gets updated when the ME fails to initialize, and then the NI…

Check Federico's reply here https://www.coreboot.org/pipermail/coreboot/2016-November/08... tl;dr: power cycle (power off and then turn on, not just reboot) your PC after the ME neutralization.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#48
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Their discussion may have consisted of "too bad these extremists don't realize that the ME is harmless if you don't have an Intel NIC".

There is a device visible on the PCI bus. How hard is it to imagine that userland programs could somehow pass requests to that device, and have the ME do bad things to the CPU or the RAM? How hard is it to imagine some special string in RAM could trigger the ME in a similar way? (so many CPU instructions - I would be surprised if there wasn't one to talk to the ME) Exploits and vulnerability are mitigated by proper a…

If userland processes are passing unauthorized commands to PCI devices, you have bigger problems.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#49
post #3

The ridiculous shit that needs to be done just to rid of some blob. RISC-V can't take the market over fast enough.

A rootkit can be anywhere on the PCIe bus. Just for example, you are using OpenBSD and full disk encryption and you think you are safe? What if the firmware on your NIC can be altered to scan your RAM (using DMA) and send the interesting data (big prime numbers, passwords, etc.) home? What if firmware on your keyboard can be modified (or pre-programmed in factory) to record the last x thousands of keypresses (which w…

This is one reason I do like the features of newer CPUs like amds Zen line with memory encryption. Combined with the iommu/vt-d features it should be possible to isolate a hardware device from reading all ram, just the buffers that it should be able to access. Thatll come with a performance hit (based on current hardware being used for VM gaming, maybe about 10%ish at worst) but it would be acceptable for security if that level of attack is something you want to guard against.

Re: Neutralize ME Firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge Platforms

#50
post #3

The ridiculous shit that needs to be done just to rid of some blob. RISC-V can't take the market over fast enough.

RISC-V is Open Source. Will the RISC-V based CPU in your computer be Open Source? A parallel example is while WebKit is Open Source Chrome isn't

Correction: RISC-V is an Open Standard.

Of course there will be both proprietary and open implementations of RISC-V.

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