Live data from Hacker News

Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

yubico.com

41–50 of 114 posts

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#41
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oh. Now I'm reading davideous' comment much differently. But the title of the blog post (ie "vs") makes it seem like they aren't making it open source so that the hardware is secure.

Yes, pritambaral described what I'm trying to point-out. In think the "vs" in the title is saying this: they had to choose between open source (that is functional meaning you can really use the code and re-flash the device) and the secure hardware. It was a trade off of one "vs" the other, and this is their reasoning behind that trade-off.

Open source doesn't necessarily mean that you can put it on the device. I'm sure a lot of Yubico's critics would be happy with seeing the code even if it can't be flashed.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's an accusation and implication. The Chinese strategy, which isn't entirely secret, is to use their hackers to get trade secrets out of firms in all kinds of sectors to hand to their own firms. Each time, their firms leverage those as a head start on their own products which combine their own innovations, labor advantage, and money from vast market in China. It's a proven model. Far as Cisco and Samsung, it's be…

The NSA does the same thing for American business. http://www.economist.com/node/1842124 http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/30/news/airbus-germany-nsa-spyi...

Name five, foreign companies off the top of your head who have US products that cloned... with source and such... their product line. Which also became huge players in market taking huge sums from original. I'm interested in seeing them as I blast NSA for what tiny, industrial espionage I find.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#43
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, pritambaral described what I'm trying to point-out. In think the "vs" in the title is saying this: they had to choose between open source (that is functional meaning you can really use the code and re-flash the device) and the secure hardware. It was a trade off of one "vs" the other, and this is their reasoning behind that trade-off.

Open source doesn't necessarily mean that you can put it on the device. I'm sure a lot of Yubico's critics would be happy with seeing the code even if it can't be flashed.

Yes, it would technically meet the Open Source Initiative's definition (https://opensource.org/osd), but if there was no way to re-flash the device, no way to verify the binary on the device, or possibly even no way build a binary (which may require proprietary tools under NDA from the chip manufacturer) -- I think a lot of critics would still be critics, but I could be wrong.

If Yubico did this it would be very interesting to see the reaction.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#44
post #8
post #2

This reads more like an excuse then a reason. Nothing of what he says is a reason that prevents them from being more open. All that he says is summarized in "it was too hard to think of a solution, so we didn't do it."

That's a very disingenuous summary. It seems impossible to make the device open due to the NDAs. Can you explain how they would get around these? With regards to the applet manager, that seems to be an issue with customer friction less so than being too hard. While "crypto nerds" would be fine, business applications could be affected.

Not using hardware components that would require NDAs would be the obvious alternative.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#45
post #31

well, it's a shame that poor arguments get recycled like this, but it does make for easy dismissal - cryptography is based off of the idea that the methods used totally transparent, the power to decrypt comes from possession of the appropriate keys. by closing a design, hiding it from scrutiny from the majority of hackers like ourselves, helps no one other than the individuals who wish to gain unauthorised/unwanted a…

So that's why the NSA has a whole suite of confidential ciphers?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_Suite_A_Cryptography

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#46

In discussions like this the phrase "security by obscurity" gets used as an accusation. We all agree "security by obscurity" does not work. But that's not what is happening here. Wikipedia's definition: "the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main method of providing security for a system or component of a system." Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keepin…

This isnt about security. Its about its was open source before and user modifiable and it no longer is. You can force wipe on flash for example.

They clearly changed stance to ensure users cannot play with the hardware and competitors cannot copy the code. Which is fine. But its always weird when the argument of security is used instead of being genuine.

You can copy the freaking key by removing the plastic of the yubikey4. you dont need a jtag port. you just connect to the pins. And guess what. its no big deal. You can't do that remotely and its not a device for 007 spies.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#47

In discussions like this the phrase "security by obscurity" gets used as an accusation. We all agree "security by obscurity" does not work. But that's not what is happening here. Wikipedia's definition: "the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main method of providing security for a system or component of a system." Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keepin…

To take an alternate approach...

Could this be a sly attempt to close-up the source (and hardware) before they have a Tangibot[1] situation?

That scenario played out poorly for MakerBot, and perhaps YubiCo learned the wrong lessons from the entire ordeal.

[1] http://www.cnet.com/news/pulling-back-from-open-source-hardw...

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#48

In discussions like this the phrase "security by obscurity" gets used as an accusation. We all agree "security by obscurity" does not work. But that's not what is happening here. Wikipedia's definition: "the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main method of providing security for a system or component of a system." Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keepin…

None of which precludes the implementation from being open source. In fact, it just means that even if the software were open source, it would be near-meaningless since I can't verify the code running on the device and can't reflash it myself. "Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keeping the source code secret." Yeah, they're not really saying anything other than trying to provide an…

[deleted]

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#49
The argument for disabling loading new firmware on your own device is valid. It prevents an outside actor loading malicious firmware. But it's a tradeoff: it means that if a vulnerability is found, the device has to be replaced, and users can't customize their firmware. That's a good tradeoff; I'd rather risk paying for a new Yubikey than risk a security compromise, and most users are unqualified to verify the security of firmware being loaded onto the device.

The problem is, it's not a tradeoff Yubico have to make. They can allow users to achieve the same goals by distributing the device un-flashed, with the source code to the firmware. Upon flashing, the firmware would disable further flashing. If the user doesn't like this tradeoff, the user can choose to change the code. As a courtesy to more trusting users they could provide the service of optionally flashing devices for you. And qualified users can verify the security of the firmware before loading it.

But by flashing the devices themselves, Yubico has chosen the worst of both worlds. Now an outside actor can once again add malicious firmware: Yubico is an outside actor. AND nobody can verify the security of the firmware. This isn't even a tradeoff, it's just a loss.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> disabling user-loading of new firmware Am I understanding correctly that these devices can never have their firmware updated? That there is no update mechanism seems insane. They could prevent bad firmware updates by wiping keys on upgrade. The risk now is that some firmware version is discovered to have flaws, and that device is vulnerable forever.

> They could prevent bad firmware updates by wiping keys on upgrade This does not close the attack vector of someone intercepting the device before you get it and surreptitiously installing firmware with a backdoor.

How do they do that to begin with?
Post reply on HN