41–50 of 78 posts
I am surprised the petition has yet to reach 100k signatures. Is it optimistic to think that most of the tech community at least should recognize the significance of this? Even if you doubt its effect on real policy.
You want transparency? Lead by example.
Deceptive title, unintentionally. FTA: "Instead, the Post reports, the “administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.” While eschewing attempts to legislatively mandate that tech companies build backdoors into their services, the preside…
I don't understand why respect would be part of this, or loyalty, patriotism, or whatever. Do you really think the best strategy to defend against an adversary is to shame them into behaving? This is about what's cryptographically possible and what isn't. I don't frankly care if anyone respects my privacy, what I want is the ability to shut adversaries out, period, using math. This decision means companies can say 'n…
1. Political (use money, shame, votes, and threats, praying that these things still work to effect change)
2. Technological (use encryption, praying technological solutions are implemented evenly and properly and that there are no back doors)
3. Violence
1 and 2 are the workable strategies, and they only work when practiced together. Currently we are seeing the government's #1 try to trample on #2, frequently using #3. If we can whittle a bit more respect for #2 using #1, it'll make the rest of the journey back to liberal democracy easier. Political changes happen through shifted mindsets.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
We've agreed as a country that the ability to get a warrant in the case of probable cause is a good thing. How is this not just maintaining that? I find it hilarious how often privacy advocates manage to forget that we've had this conversation before, and while the government can and has overstepped in many ways, lets not throw out the ability to investigate at all along the way.
Crypto is all or nothing. You can't have "backdoors" into crypto algorithms that are secret only to the government. It is literally impossible. Someone will find those backdoors, and now all information that has been encrypted is wide open. So you are either advocating for the complete destruction of ecommerce and online privacy, or you are advocating for unfettered access to cryptography software. Which do you choos…
You don't backdoor the algorithm. You backdoor the use of the algorithm--except it is more of a front door than a back door. For instance, when the device encrypts data with a symmetric cipher, encrypt a copy of the symmetric key via a public key cipher using the FBI's public key.
Variant: split the symmetric cipher key into N shares using a secret sharing algorithm, and save each share encrypted with a different public key. Include public keys from major law enforcement agencies (FBI, Interpol), and major civil rights or human rights organizations (ACLU, EFF). Design the secret sharing so that to recover the symmetric key, you need key shares from two major law enforcement agencies and from two of the civil rights organizations.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Crypto is all or nothing. You can't have "backdoors" into crypto algorithms that are secret only to the government. It is literally impossible. Someone will find those backdoors, and now all information that has been encrypted is wide open. So you are either advocating for the complete destruction of ecommerce and online privacy, or you are advocating for unfettered access to cryptography software. Which do you choos…
> Crypto is all or nothing. You can't have "backdoors" into crypto algorithms that are secret only to the government. It is literally impossible. You don't backdoor the algorithm. You backdoor the use of the algorithm--except it is more of a front door than a back door. For instance, when the device encrypts data with a symmetric cipher, encrypt a copy of the symmetric key via a public key cipher using the FBI's publ…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Wouldn't it be good to have hope, and expect change? Our government, our country, our people can change, for the better, or for the worse. I'm sad that you think the status quo can't be changed. It can and should be.
And it is. How is it in the interest of TPTB to have weed legalized? Yet it is happening.
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I'm not. Who has time to fully comprehend (and act upon) this? Especially when we're already working >50h a week to maintain household status quo. It's hard to focus on the state of society's infrastructure when I'm spending every waking moment working to maintain my own. Yes, I know what is at stake, but one avenue is a long burn and the other is a short fuse. I'll tackle the more pressing issue first. Disclosure: I…
This is my reaction whenever I hear someone suggest that "we should be rioting in the streets." I have daily personal struggles and work that I'm trying to pin down every day with all my energy. And my remaining time/energy go into finding a mate if I even have any at all.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Crypto is all or nothing. You can't have "backdoors" into crypto algorithms that are secret only to the government. It is literally impossible. You don't backdoor the algorithm. You backdoor the use of the algorithm--except it is more of a front door than a back door. For instance, when the device encrypts data with a symmetric cipher, encrypt a copy of the symmetric key via a public key cipher using the FBI's publ…
What happens when (not if) the FBI/Interpol/whoever private keys leak?
If we are using the secret sharing variant, then it means that during the time between the leak and the time the device manufacturers push out an update to replace that key and re-encrypt the appropriate shares with the new key someone who seizes a phone and wants to decrypt it only needs the approval of one major police agency and two civil rights organizations instead of two major police agencies and two civil rights organizations.
If we are not using that variation, then it means that until a new key goes out in an update anyone who seizes your phone (and who has the leaked key) can decrypt it. One way to protect against this would be for the device to have a command that erases the saved encrypted symmetric keys. This command would require that you show it that you have a copy of the corresponding private key before it erases the encrypted keys.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
We've agreed as a country that the ability to get a warrant in the case of probable cause is a good thing. How is this not just maintaining that? I find it hilarious how often privacy advocates manage to forget that we've had this conversation before, and while the government can and has overstepped in many ways, lets not throw out the ability to investigate at all along the way.
I'd say: first throw out the ability for NSA to spy without letting the persons concerned speak about it. Then we can talk about 'warrants in the case of probable cause'. US as a country has lost a lot of goodwill and trust. And don't forget: - number of deaths from acts of domestic terrorism: 36 - number of deaths–homicide, suicide, and accidental–caused by firearms: 316,545 (in a decade, link: http://magazine.good.…