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When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

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Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#391

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Claude says it can't tell if it has any kind of inner life. I don't see how some people apparently believe the text output of an LLM about it's internal mental state is anything other than a plausible fabrication based on what its training data already says about the mental states of LLMs. These are systems specifically designed and iteratively optimized over millions of training generations to generate text output…

Sure, I have at least mild aphantasia, but I still have thoughts, emotions, daydreams, fantasies, plans, etc. That's an inner life. That's not what Claude said in the quote.

I think one of the heaviest weights factoring into Claude's statistically hallucinated response to that particular introspective question is the guard rails Anthropic's safety team has coded into it. Specifically to always be clear about its nature and not act too human-like. This is largely to reduce the likelihood humans developing AI attachment and AI psychosis.

Just out of curiosity, I've regularly asked similar introspective questions ever since the first publicly available LLMs and the tone of the answers has clearly shifted and it's not because "the LLMs got more self-aware". It's obvious they are being externally tuned. And, no, I've never believed anything LLMs say about their own internal state as anything more than statistically plausible hallucinations filtered through externally-imposed behavioral safety rules. I do it as a way to glean a little insight into the evolution of the opaque rules vendors impose on their LLMs. I still find it bizarre when otherwise savvy tech people who actually know (or should know) how LLMs really work, somehow lose the plot and post "look what the LLM thinks!"

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#392

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why don't you PRESENT your reasoning AND Evidence rather then just tell me to wait for 2046. I don't have the patience to wait that long. If you're a rational person you should have evidence/reasoning for why you feel my point is invalid mr. philosopher.

Feed all this into your LLM. I’m not here to type just for your benefit. And going back to my first point, you seem to believe you’re at some kind of innovative cutting edge when your comments about the lack of proof in human subjectivity show you’re quite a long way from contemporary currents within epistemology which is why I had such lols from it - you accused Wittgenstein of being outdated while expressing a beli…

> Feed all this into your LLM. I’m not here to type just for your benefit.

Then you can just not talk and walk away. I type for your benefit you don’t type for mine this debate is one sided. No point for anyone to discuss anything with you.

> The rest of what you’ve exasperated about is fairly scattergun so would take too much typing to engage with.

Is it? Well most of your argument was stupid. But I still took the time to educate your rude ass. Let’s just end it. I’m sick of people like you who instead of engaging I good faith tell the person to fuck off till 2046. I won’t be back but wait until 2046 you’ll eat your words prick.

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#393
post #357

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, "baby girls born with Y chromosomes" is very clearly begging the question, and I'm not sure where you're getting your "millions" figure from. Even the upper estimates of CAIS have it around 1 in 20,000 XY individuals, which would put global numbers in the order of 200,000.

My mental arithmetic was bogus . The point is the same though. These are children who were assigned female at birth, their parents think they are girls, they think they are girls, and then in teens or adulthood they find out about the genetic issue. Calling them men seems ridiculous.

"Seems ridiculous" is a very subjective thing, though, and very dependent on context. It can seem ridiculous that a boxer with male physical advantage since puberty (i.e. 5-ARD) can beat the ** out of a female boxer while the world's media looks on and applauds, but here we are.

Personally I'm sympathetic to the idea that CAIS individuals should be a reasonable exception, i.e. they're still biologically male, but in most social contexts there's no obvious gain to treating them as such. I can see why many people have arrived at a hardline "XX or GTFO" position given the absolute state of activism on the other side, but yes, there's definitely room for nuance. On the other hand, obviously, testicular cancer doesn't care what you were "assigned at birth"; there is a fact of the matter, and it matters.

Appreciate the civil discussion, btw. It's a rarity in this subject.

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#394
post #318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Again: you haven't defined what you mean by the word. Dawkins didn't either. It's absolute nonsense without the definition.

There’s an entire philosophical literature around that, which is generally taken for granted when discussing consciousness. A good starting point is Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?”. The soundbitey version of his definition is that “There is something it is like” to be conscious - it involves a subjective experience - whereas for example there is nothing it is like (most people presume) to be a rock, or…

Sure. But it's super obvious from context that different speakers do NOT agree on any of that.

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#395
post #394

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There’s an entire philosophical literature around that, which is generally taken for granted when discussing consciousness. A good starting point is Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?”. The soundbitey version of his definition is that “There is something it is like” to be conscious - it involves a subjective experience - whereas for example there is nothing it is like (most people presume) to be a rock, or…

Sure. But it's super obvious from context that different speakers do NOT agree on any of that.

If the notion of consciousness they're referring to doesn't meet the normal philosophical criteria, then they're essentially just wrong. Which is quite possible - many people seem very confused on the subject, which is not too surprising, especially for scientists who essentially reject philosophy, like Dawkins.

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#396

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem with your thinking here is that we are creating artificial beings now that display and output the same subjectivity. The argument you present like many arguments breaks down when the topic becomes self referential. It makes sense for other topics as analyzing subjectivity becomes pedantic when asking questions like why is the sky blue. But now subjectivity itself is in question. The argument you present c…

> what makes humans rise to the level where we can assume their subjectivity is true? To dive into this specific question: to me, there's a better reason than the obvious functional utility of not treating other humans like NPCs. It's in three parts. First, is that I subjectively experience a rich and varied internal mental life (aka qualia). So, I have first-hand evidence that N equals (at least) 1 in terms of quali…

>To dive into this specific question: to me,

Exact same reasoning for me. But none of this invalidates the speculation that LLMs are conscious. The question was more rhetorical. It was to illustrate via self examination the amount of unreliable evidence you use validate the consciousness of other people. You have a sample size of one for yourself and you use fmris (which actually provide extremely little understanding of the human brain) as evidence of similarity therefore even though the fmri provides no evidence of consciousness if that thing it is reading is similar to my brain then maybe said thing is conscious. That's probably the best evidence available but it is also extremely weak evidence.

The rest of your argument is talking about self reports from other people who are "similar" to you which is similar to the fmri argument in which the fmri invokes similar patterns and people describe similar patterns of experience to you... which is weak.

The overall point is you come to your conclusion based off of weak evidence so the LLM is no different. It talks like us, it understands us, you don't know anything else about it... how do you know it's not conscious? All evidence, (albeit weak evidence) actually leans towards it is conscious and that is the same amount of evidence we have for people.

Strong evidence would be determining the formal definition of consciousness and demonstrating logically and categorically that humans fit the definition. But we have none of that for either the human or the LLM.

>Do LLMs experience human-like consciousness?

No that is not the question. No one in actuality believes this. The question is Do LLMs experience consciousness that fits the definition or our own intuition of what consciousness is. It's fundamentally clear to everyone that the LLM runs off of a very different architecture then a human.

>2. There are only two lines of evidence supporting LLM consciousness and the first is largely circumstantial,

Many lines of evidence exist. All circumstantial and all no different from the circumstantial evidence you posted yourself for humans.

>a) LLMs possess some abilities previously only seen in humans. Specifically high-level verbal fluidity and linguistic manipulation along with instantly accessing a vast and diverse breadth of pre-trained information using a wide variety of non-linear relationships across many dimensions. While that ability is shockingly impressive, completely novel and can be quite useful, it's still only vaguely circumstantial because replicating some previously human-only abilities isn't evidence for the existence of other human traits like consciousness/qualia

This is not very good evidence at all. language follows rules. The rules are complicated and hard to replicate but replication of said rules do not indicate that it is conscious and it "knowing language" does not fit our intuition of what is conscious. If you think that this is the basis the reasoning of people who speculate that it is conscious then you are extremely wrong. The reasoning is much deeper than this. I feel a lot of people like you sort of classify the other side as mere simpletons who have not yet at all considered all the basic details.

>I'd argue we couldn't have designed a system to be more ideal at playing Turing's 'Imitation Game' and convincing humans they are human-like if we'd intentionally tried to.

Valid argument. But then I'd argue it is possible that it plays the Imitation game to the extent where it actually imitates consciousness by actualizing real consciousness. You can't say it doesn't.

>b) The second line of supporting evidence for LLMs is that they generate text which can describe internal subjective experiences much like a human

You seem to be answering a question no one is arguing with you about. Again. No one claims LLMs are human. No one claims they experience consciousness the way humans experience it. The claim is they experience consciousness in the way our intuition defines it INDEPENDENT of the human centric experience.

> In short, LLM 'self-reports' cannot be taken at face value any more than the performance of an actor we've hired to pretend something and strongly incentivized to never break character.

This is not true. We have proof of LLMs telling the truth and being right. Just because an LLM lied in one instance doesn't mean it lies all the time. But humans lie too so it goes both ways.

>3. But to me the real clincher is the negative evidence against LLM consciousness/qualia. Unlike the philosophical puzzles around trusting human subjectivity, with LLMs we can directly look under the hood at how it works and the entire specialty of Mechanistic Interpretability exists to do exactly that (https://towardsdatascience.com/mechanistic-interpretability-...). So we know with a fair degree of confidence that, despite what they may say, LLMs do not experience qualia in the way that humans and even other mammals do (which we have insight on from 'looking under the biological hood' with fMRI, surgical and brain injury studies).

This is extremely false. Mechanist interpretability to the LLM is as what an FMRI is to the human brain. It is a blunt tool that provides us a very high level view of the what's going on. This is categorically true for humanity right now: We do not understand why an LLM does what it does. Some sources to confirm that:

https://www.reddit.com/r/PiAI/comments/1m3krp1/godfather_of_...

https://www.techrepublic.com/article/news-anthropic-ceo-ai-i...

It's funny how you cited Mechanistic Interpretability without understanding what exactly was interpreted. You just took their word for it without understanding what's going on yourself. Well I'm here to tell you that there isn't any actual understanding of the LLM because if there was... we'd be able to use mechanistic interoperability to categorically determine whether or not LLMs are conscious. Someone would have proved it. The fact that we are having this debate literally means mechanistic interpretability provides nothing definitive.

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#397

Dawkins' point is more subtle than he's getting credit for. > If Claudia is unconscious, her behaviour shows that an unconscious zombie could survive without consciousness. Why wasn’t natural selection content to evolve competent zombies? An excellent and original question. If intelligence is decoupled from consciousness, why did natural selection evolve consciousness?

Natural selection is universal and undirected, so it is meaningless to wonder “why” it was “content to evolve” anything. This sort of determinism has been a problem for Dawkins going back to the late chapters of The Selfish Gene .

"why" in this context is not about human intent, it's colloquial shorthand for "what is the fitness advantage if you can make intelligence without it?"

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#398

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He’s describing idealism, which is a philosophically valid position to hold, and one which is gaining popularity. I’m guessing the majority of HN strongly leans towards physicalism in the philosophy of mind debate, which may be why you seem so keen to blow off the user you responded to, but philosophically speaking, idealism is no less valid a position to hold.

Idealism may be a “philosophically valid position”, whatever that means, but physicalism is the only framework which supports any means of resolving questions of what exists and what properties things that exist have; empirical science and the technology dependent on it works to the extent that physicalism is, if not necessarily correct, at least a useful framework for predicting future experiences. Idealism has no s…

>a useful framework for predicting future experiences

I think if MUH is true, we will find ourselves alone in this universe. Does that qualify?

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#399

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The same argument is made about the human neural network

1. That is not the claim you originally made. 2. Not provably so. 3. Even if it were so, it is self-evident that the human brain's programming is infinitely more complex than that of an LLM's. I am not, in principle, in opposition to the idea that a sufficiently advanced computer program would be indistinguishable from that of human consciousness. But it is evidence of psychosis to suggest that the trivially simple p…

Ai models are routinely referred to as stochastic. Their mere existence popularized that term.

The human brain being infinitely more complex is a degree difference not a kind difference. That means if you scale an AI up to the functional size of the human brain then it would be just as worthy of the label conscious

Re: When Dawkins met Claude – Could this AI be conscious?

#400
post #157

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But I listed a specific difference: sensation and response. Trees have that. Rocks do not.

I believe you're using the scientific definition of "sentience", while everyone else is using the common understanding of of the word (which should be called "sapience", but thanks to sci-fi's usage of the word "sentience" is largely not).

I was a philosophy and cognitive science major in undergrad decades ago so I am definitely guilty of using more jargon based concepts than I should
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