” In Canada and the US, refusing to provide a PIN/password is protected as part of the right to avoid incriminating yourself. In France, they've criminalized this part of the right to remain silent.”
France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
391–399 of 399 posts
Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#392Americans do not understand the fact that their own government rates the top four intelligence threats as French, Israeli, Chinese, and Russian.
Is the "fact" in the room with you right now?
Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#393Earlier quoted context omitted.
You use the signing keys for GrapheneOS to push an update to a single user.
That doesn't offer a way to bypass disk encryption for data protected by the per-profile lock method. GrapheneOS cannot bypass the brute force protection implemented by the secure element. Google cannot bypass the brute force protection either because they designed the Titan M2 to require the Owner user successfully unlocks in order to update it. Weaver + insider attack protection for the secure element are among our…
You cannot bypass the disk encryption until the user signs into their phone. After that they are toast.
Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#394Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#395Earlier quoted context omitted.
You use the signing keys for GrapheneOS to push an update to a single user.
How is this different from a backdoor in every phone? Some authority compels me to give them signing keys so now they can push anything they want, to any device they want?
Functionally, there is very little difference. This is why, I imagine, GrapheneOS is pushing back.
Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#396Earlier quoted context omitted.
How is this different from a backdoor in every phone? Some authority compels me to give them signing keys so now they can push anything they want, to any device they want?
They can't bypass disk encryption that way: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46038241 It does appear to be what they want from us, but it's not possible to bypass the Weaver disk encryption throttling via compromised OS updates or even secure element updates. It's fully not possible to bypass the security of a strong passphrase, which we encourage via optional 2-factor authentication support for fingerprint+PIN a…
Is this rate limiting on the number of data key decryption calls by the HSM to prevent full data exfiltration? Or, is it rate limiting PIN attempts?
Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#397Earlier quoted context omitted.
France has made it clear they expect to have a backdoor in end-to-end encryption apps and disk encryption. They've been saying that it's unacceptable not to have a backdoor in a bunch of these news stories they've gotten published by contacting the media. They've said if we don't cooperate with that, they'll take similar actions against us as they did SkyECC and Encrochat meaning hijacking our servers and trying to h…
> They've said if we don't cooperate with that, they'll take similar actions against us as they did SkyECC and Encrochat meaning hijacking our servers and trying to have us arrested. No, they haven’t. You are letting your paranoia talk by widely amplifying the content of two newspapers articles in media affiliated with the far right. I’m quite surprised by your reactions to be fair because both SkyECC and Encrochat w…
French law enforcement chose to do interviews with those newspapers and nearly all of the content of those articles is paraphrasing or directly quoting what they said. There's very little input from the journalists into those articles. They treated the claims from the state as facts and conveyed them as such, then posted our responses to vague queries not giving us the details of what was being claimed about us so we could properly respond to it.
Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#398Earlier quoted context omitted.
They can't bypass disk encryption that way: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46038241 It does appear to be what they want from us, but it's not possible to bypass the Weaver disk encryption throttling via compromised OS updates or even secure element updates. It's fully not possible to bypass the security of a strong passphrase, which we encourage via optional 2-factor authentication support for fingerprint+PIN a…
Is this rate limiting on the number of data key decryption calls by the HSM to prevent full data exfiltration? Or, is it rate limiting PIN attempts?
It's rate limiting on key derivation attempts. A key is made via scrypt from the passphrase. A hash of this key is used as an authentication token to obtain a random token from the secure element for the final hardware-bound key derivation to use as an additional input. Passing the wrong authentication token results in rapidly increasingly throttling. We documented the previous less aggressive ramp up at https://grapheneos.org/faq#encryption but it actually ramps up a lot faster now to make 4 digit PINs less horrible, although we still strongly recommend 6 random digits as the minimum.
Secure element updates don't only need to have a valid signature and greater version. They also require the Owner user to authenticate successfully after booting in order for it to be accepted. This is what they refer to as insider attack resistance, since it protects against them being coerced by a government into removing the brute force protection for a locked device via an update.
Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors
#399Earlier quoted context omitted.
They can't bypass disk encryption that way: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46038241 It does appear to be what they want from us, but it's not possible to bypass the Weaver disk encryption throttling via compromised OS updates or even secure element updates. It's fully not possible to bypass the security of a strong passphrase, which we encourage via optional 2-factor authentication support for fingerprint+PIN a…
Once they've established a rule that you have to help them in all cases, what stops them from forcing you to push an update to a phone while the user still has it , to collect information from the phone while actually unlocked and in use?
We won't comply with illegal demands, so how would they force us to do it?
GrapheneOS System Updater doesn't identify the device or user to the server. A massive portion of GrapheneOS users are using a VPN and some are using Tor so many of the IP addressed are VPN/Tor exit IPs shared between people. How would an update be targeted to a specific phone?