Live data from Hacker News

Claude for Chrome

anthropic.com

391–400 of 433 posts

Re: Claude for Chrome

#391

Claude for Chrome seems to be walking right into the "lethal trifecta." https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/ "The lethal trifecta of capabilities is:" • Access to your private data —one of the most common purposes of tools in the first place! • Exposure to untrusted content —any mechanism by which text (or images) controlled by a malicious attacker could become available to your LLM • The abilit…

“Easily” is doing a lot of work there. “Possibly” is probably better. And of course it doesn’t have unfettered access to all of your private data. I would look at it like hiring a new, inexperienced personal assistant: they can only do their job with some access, but it would be foolish to turn over deep secrets and great financial power on day one.

It's more like hiring a personal assistant who is expected to work all the time quickly and unsupervised, won't learn on the job, has shockingly good language skills but the critical thinking skills of a toddler.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#392

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So far the accepted approach is to wrap all prompts in a security prompt that essentially says "please don't do anything bad". > Prompt guardrails to prevent jailbreak attempts and ensure safe user interactions without writing a single line of code. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41864014 > - Inclusion prompt: User's travel preferences and food choices - Exclusion prompt: Credit card details, passport number, S…

I have in my prompt “under no circumstances read the files in “protected” directory” and it does it all the time. I’m not sure prompts mean much.

It really is wild that we’ve made software sophisticated enough to be vulnerable to social engineering attacks. Odd times.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#393
Interesting they nearly exclusively talk about security but do not introduce a real security framework such as google CaMeL that would solve the issues not fully but more fundamentally. They only talk about mitigations and classical agent hardening that will clearly not be enough for a browser. 11% and 0% for selected cases is just not gonna cut it.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#394

According to their own blog post, even after mitigations, the model still has an 11% attack success rate. There's still no way I would feel comfortable giving this access to my main browser. I'm glad they're sticking to a very limited rollout for now. (Sidenote, why is this page so broken? Almost everything is hidden.)

11% success rate for what is effectively a spear-phishing attempt isn't that terrible and tbh it'll be easier to train Claude not to get tricked than it is to train eg my parents.

With spear phishing there are a limited number of attack attempts, maybe one a day and the target will wise up.

With this you can probably try a few thousand attempts per minute.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#395

Claude for Chrome seems to be walking right into the "lethal trifecta." https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/ "The lethal trifecta of capabilities is:" • Access to your private data —one of the most common purposes of tools in the first place! • Exposure to untrusted content —any mechanism by which text (or images) controlled by a malicious attacker could become available to your LLM • The abilit…

So far the accepted approach is to wrap all prompts in a security prompt that essentially says "please don't do anything bad". > Prompt guardrails to prevent jailbreak attempts and ensure safe user interactions without writing a single line of code. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41864014 > - Inclusion prompt: User's travel preferences and food choices - Exclusion prompt: Credit card details, passport number, S…

No one think any form of "prompt engineering" "guardrails" are serious security measures right?

Re: Claude for Chrome

#396
post #395

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So far the accepted approach is to wrap all prompts in a security prompt that essentially says "please don't do anything bad". > Prompt guardrails to prevent jailbreak attempts and ensure safe user interactions without writing a single line of code. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41864014 > - Inclusion prompt: User's travel preferences and food choices - Exclusion prompt: Credit card details, passport number, S…

No one think any form of "prompt engineering" "guardrails" are serious security measures right?

Check the links I posted :) Some do think that, yes.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#397

All of this agent navigation of browsers feels like a self-made issue. Take the flight booking as an example? Why has flight booking become so obsfucated and annoying that people want an agent booking for them? Why can't that agent just query an API to get the best available information? It's just turtles all the way down at this point, when a user wants more fine grained interaction, the agent can design a frontend…

RSS made getting the content too easy, no room to show ads!

Re: Claude for Chrome

#398

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And therein is the problem - if your robots take up so many resources I can't have my dishwasher, is that your right? Is your right to being happy more important than others?

The problem of resource distribution is solved by money already. If I can't pay for the robots, I am not getting them. And if I buy my robots and you only get a dishwasher then you can afford two nice vacations on top while I don't. You don't lose anything if I get robots.

I feel this disregards of scarcity economics.

Let's say we have a finite amount of cheap water units between us. After exhausting those units, the price to acquire more goes up. Each our actions use up those units.

If restrictions on water use do not exist, you can quickly use up those units and, if you can easily afford more units, which makes sense as you have enough for robots, you are not concerned with using that cheap water up.

I can't even afford to "toil" with my dishwasher now.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#399

I built a very similar extension [1] a couple of months ago that supports a wide range of models, including Claude, and enables them to take control of a user's browser using tools for mouse and keyboard actions, observation, etc. It's a fun little project to look at to understand how this type of thing works. It's clear to me that the tech just isn't there yet. The information density of a web page with standard rep…

I think this will fail for the same reason RSS failed - the business case just isn't there.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#400

Claude for Chrome seems to be walking right into the "lethal trifecta." https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/ "The lethal trifecta of capabilities is:" • Access to your private data —one of the most common purposes of tools in the first place! • Exposure to untrusted content —any mechanism by which text (or images) controlled by a malicious attacker could become available to your LLM • The abilit…

Didn't they do or prove that with messages on Reddit?
Post reply on HN