Another interesting data point: about 2 years ago there was a clear pressure campaign to name a new maintainer: https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00566.h... At the time I thought it was just rude, but maybe this is when it all started.
Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
391–400 of 1001 posts
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#392Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#393Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thanks to autoconf, we're now used to build scripts looking like gibberish. A perfect place to hide a backdoor.
This is my main take-away from this. We must stop using upstream configure and other "binary" scripts. Delete them all and run "autoreconf -fi" to recreate them. (Debian already does something like this I think.)
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#394https://github.com/tukaani-project/tukaani-project.github.io... > Note: GitHub automatically includes two archives Source code (zip) and Source code (tar.gz) in the releases. These archives cannot be disabled and should be ignored. The author was thinking ahead! Latest commit hash for this repo: 8a3b5f28d00ebc2c1619c87a8c8975718f12e271
For a long time, there was one legitimately annoying disadvantage to the git-generated tarballs though - they lost tagging information. However, since git 2.32 (released June 2021; presumably available on GitHub by August 2021 when they blogged about it) you can use `$Format:%(describe)$` ... limited to once per repository for performance reasons.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#395Yikes! Do you have any info on the individual's background or possible motivations?
I would presume it's a state actor. Generally in the blackhat world, attackers have very precise targets. They want to attack this company or this group of individuals. But someone who backdoors such a core piece of open source infrastructure wants to cast a wide net to attack as many as possible. So that fits the profile of a government intelligence agency who is interested in surveilling, well, everything. Or it co…
The stuxnet malware, which compromised Siemens industrial controls to attack specific centrifuges in uranium enrichment plants in Iran, is a counterexample to that.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#396Yikes! Do you have any info on the individual's background or possible motivations?
I would presume it's a state actor. Generally in the blackhat world, attackers have very precise targets. They want to attack this company or this group of individuals. But someone who backdoors such a core piece of open source infrastructure wants to cast a wide net to attack as many as possible. So that fits the profile of a government intelligence agency who is interested in surveilling, well, everything. Or it co…
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#397Very annoying - the apparent author of the backdoor was in communication with me over several weeks trying to get xz 5.6.x added to Fedora 40 & 41 because of it's "great new features". We even worked with him to fix the valgrind issue (which it turns out now was caused by the backdoor he had added). We had to race last night to fix the problem after an inadvertent break of the embargo. He has been part of the xz proj…
"great" for whom? I've seen enough of the industry to immediately feel suspicious when someone uses that sort of phrasing in an attempt to persuade me. It's no different from claiming a "better experience" or similar.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#398It's something always in the back of our minds as developers using public libraries, but when something like this happens, non-developers that hear about it start to associate it with the rest of the open-source community.
It's essentially a terrorist attack on developer experience. Thankfully, management doesn't follow the same approach as the TSA.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#399I'm really curious about if the act of injecting a backdoor into OSS software is legal/illegal ? Are they somehow in the clear unless we can show they actively exploited it?
> Section 231 Obtaining and Possession of Access Device and Computer System Passwords and other such Data
> (1) Whoever with the intent to commit a criminal offence of Breach of secrecy of correspondence [...] or a criminal offence of Unauthorised access to computer systems and information media [...] produces, puts into circulation, imports, exports, transits, offers, provides, sells, or otherwise makes available, obtains for him/herself or for another, or handles
> a) a device or its component, process, instrument or any other means, including a computer programme designed or adapted for unauthorised access to electronic communications networks, computer system or a part thereof, or
> b) a computer password, access code, data, process or any other similar means by which it is possible to gain access to a computer system or a part thereof,
shall be sentenced .. (1 year as an individual, 3 years as a member of a organized group)