Earlier quoted context omitted.
> What would you have the people who are using LastPass do, stop using it? Yes. After their last major breach I exported all my data and deleted all my credentials and account with LastPass. Seeing the details of this breach, I'm super happy I did.
But you don't know if they deleted all the backups. You'll never be sure you are safe.
The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
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Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#392Being completely ignorant about how this works, why would a LastPass compromise result in passwords being exposed? Surely they themselves don't store unencrypted passwords, but instead the passwords are encrypted by the user's key? Or is this a compromise of the locally installed software?
The passwords are encrypted by a per-user key. That per-user key is derived from a password through a password based key derivation function (PBKDF). In essence, an iterative hashing function. Many users don't use "good" passwords, so you use a high number of iterations on the KDF, to make it harder to brute-force an account's password. Lastpass initially used 5000 rounds of KDF for old accounts. That's not a lot, es…
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#393Is there any reason to use these cloud based solutions when open source alternatives like KeepassXC is available?
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#394Earlier quoted context omitted.
But you do not have the keys and passwords on that server. Only their encrypted forms. And the master password never leaves your machine(s), the sensitive bits are only decrypted locally. This is reasonably safe, as long as you're careful with your master password, no different form GPG.
I'd still rather not let anyone have the encrypted versions of my keys/passwords. If the software is compromised then it's reasonable to consider the encrypted data can be brute forced with some time. I'm not here to argue the merits of encryption. I understand it very well. I'm only considering my own levels of comfort and need to trust a 3rd party as well as pay a recurring fee to store my keys/passwords.
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#395Earlier quoted context omitted.
I eh.. was not up to date, I blame our office Christmas party. I guess I'm moving our organization over next year..
I meant the major breach before this one, I believe that was the one that gave attackers access to their dev environment, which they used to steal the developer credentials they used to make this attack.
The thing that's bad, is that apparently their developers have access to (backups off) production data. That implies that their security infrastructure is not different from regular startups at all so all of their marketing is just bullshit. They didn't sacrifice developer productivity for security on this point, so they can't be trusted to have sacrificed anything for security at any point.
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#396Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is a really good browser extension for pass, called BrowserPass. It has auto fill with phishing protection. There is also a good Android app, called Android Password Store, which does the same for all of my apps. Both use GPG keys stored on my Yubikey.
how do you use yubikey with android?
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#397Earlier quoted context omitted.
I can read the sentence with both versions and it still makes sense…
It should be “weary of” not “weary about”
But “wary of” and “weary of” both work. :-)
English is my third or fourth language, so I guess I’m less sensitive to mistakes like that.
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#398Earlier quoted context omitted.
The passwords are encrypted by a per-user key. That per-user key is derived from a password through a password based key derivation function (PBKDF). In essence, an iterative hashing function. Many users don't use "good" passwords, so you use a high number of iterations on the KDF, to make it harder to brute-force an account's password. Lastpass initially used 5000 rounds of KDF for old accounts. That's not a lot, es…
Just checked on my own account, which I set up in 2012. Mine was configured with only 500 rounds of KDF - eep.
Edit:
https://web.archive.org/web/20120320015133/https://helpdesk.... confirms that the default was indeed 500.
According to https://www.infosecblog.org/2012/06/lastpass-and-pbkdf2/, there are even some old accounts with a single round of sha256 (!)
Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#399Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on
#400Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you expose your server to the internet or is it ok to sync devices only when you’re at home? Is every device a replica, if you lose your server can you redeploy it from the data on your device?
Not the parent, but I have been hosting a Vaultwarden instance on the public internet for about two years now. After learning about certificate transparency logs, I moved the app from a raw subdomain behind a secret URL path. Think “hello.domain.com/correcthorsebatterystaple”. Is it security by obscurity? You bet. Does it work? Yes. I regularly evaluate the JSON logs emitted by Caddy in a pandas script and so far, no…
I’d recommend ensuring you have some sort of VPN solution so that you can access your vault away from home, too.
Personally, I just decided to use the 1st party server. I realized that reliable access to my vault is a service I really don’t want to be without due to technical issues in my setup.