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They’re made out of weights

maxleiter.com

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Re: They’re made out of weights

#381

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When we say "it rains", do we consider that "it" has any intention of agentivity? Some questions are just ill formed. Plus even if "LLMs are alive and conscious", this still would scratch the surface of the morale/ethical/societal considerations that people really care about. Because even with other humans, we can argue if they exist or if they are mere npc in a solipsist world view.

I don't think we say "it rains", do we? We say "it's raining" but that doesn't imply agency to whatever is causing it to rain. Also, please don't invoke solipsism, if you want to debate that, you're by definition obligated to do it with yourself.

Good catch. For my defense not an English native speaker here, plus apparently it’s not completely agrammatical¹, though I’ll admit indeed "it’s raining" would have been a far more idiomatic example. Thanks for pointing.

About solipsism, yes sure.

I didn’t had time to add it at the moment, but I initially also wanted to discuss more on the prosaic points. So here we go:

Recognizing sentience/consciousness to something actually is not that a big factor in defining behavioral response. Let’s just look at how humans are treating other humans, other mammals, other animals, other life forms. Or taken the other cultural scheme around, in some animist folk one can perfectly consider that any rock on the ground have really an inner soul life just as much as oneself, it doesn’t mean it will consider possible interactions with the rock as equivalent. And, wink to the Overton window, practicing institutional cannibalism doesn’t imply that eaten people are disrespected in their dignity, quite the contrary.

All that to say that "are LLMs conscious" is not even a moral important point. Paperclip maximizer² and can the famous Dijksta’s quote "The question whether computers can think is not more interesting than the question whether submarines can swim." already show how pointless morale debate on LLM and consciousness are, even when one consider potential logistical threats/opportunities they could represent.

¹ https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/123739/its-raini...

² https://www.lesswrong.com/w/squiggle-maximizer-formerly-pape...

Re: They’re made out of weights

#382
post #161

After reading Being and Time from Martin Heidegger, What Computers can't still do by Hubert Dreyfus, and some authors in cognitive linguistics (Langacker and Lakoff mainly), I strongly tend to disagree with any theory about emergent consciousness in modern or future AI systems, any theory proposing a similarity between AI systems and the human brain/mind, or any theory about the computational mind. What all these the…

It is also a story as old as time. We have been comparing our brains to our most recent information/communication technology since the invention of the telephone. After the telephone our brain was like computers, and when I did my bachelors in Psychology in 2009, we were comparing our brains to the internet. AI is simply the latest iteration of these comparison, just as wrong and unhelpful as when we compared it to the telephone.

Re: They’re made out of weights

#383

>Weights helped me draft and proof this story. I'm suprised no one talks about this. AI Art isn't Art. AI Poetry isn't Art. And I'm tired of it. I know hacker news isn't the best place to complain about that but still... I'm not gonna read something somebody didn't put in the effort to write on their own. Especially not Poetry.

"Loaded dice, rolled one word at a time" is when I twigged it.

Re: They’re made out of weights

#384
post #363

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Is the same underlying assumptions that treats cells as machines, our body as a complex machine. These theories are flawed in the sense that they cannot account for subjective experience and agency, amongst other things Do you disagree with the assumption that cells are machines? They seem pretty machine-like to me. I certainly don’t think individual cells have any subjective experience or sense of agency. I would b…

> Do you disagree with the assumption that cells are machines? Yes? Literally no machine ever built by humans is capable of (or even hinting at beginnings of capability for) replication or novel synthesis like cells are, let alone autonomously, it’s quite unconceivable that anyone would take this to be a reasonable assumption in the first place.

What exactly is there about cells that's inconceivable to replicate or synthetize? "I cannot conceive it" is a fallacy, an argument from incredulity. Trying to disguise it by draping it in the passive voice does not change that fact.

Re: They’re made out of weights

#385
post #161

After reading Being and Time from Martin Heidegger, What Computers can't still do by Hubert Dreyfus, and some authors in cognitive linguistics (Langacker and Lakoff mainly), I strongly tend to disagree with any theory about emergent consciousness in modern or future AI systems, any theory proposing a similarity between AI systems and the human brain/mind, or any theory about the computational mind. What all these the…

This reminds of this article which contends that this mistake has carried across time, in every era people described the workings of the brain similar to the machines they knew how to build, which is why we have "ridiculous" descriptions that changed over time.

https://aeon.co/essays/your-brain-does-not-process-informati...

Re: They’re made out of weights

#386

Earlier quoted context omitted.

oh yeah! i recall a paper linked here not so long ago, where it was shown that the dendrites of a neuron do computations themselves. The "weight per neuron" is very simplistic then. At the very least, each actual neuron is a network of weights. https://www.quantamagazine.org/neural-dendrites-reveal-their...

I'm partial to "modern ML weights are much closer to 1:1 capacity mapping to synapse count than to neuron count". A single biological neuron is closer to 100 or even 1000 weights worth of ANN than to 1 weight worth of ANN. In which case: modern LLMs are still running in a capacity-starved regime! Even Mythos 5, the 10-trillion monster LLM, the scaling law boogeyman, the harbinger of Vera Rubin NVL72, doesn't quite ri…

10T is about a crows worth. The mythos count doesn't include any diffusion model. But the crows count includes all its visual processing. And tactile. Touch uses up enough that they use skin surface area to normalize across animals when doing comparisons. It is one of the reasons suggested to explain how crows exhibit tool use and language with only 10T. We have a lot more skin than crows, and indeed far more than mythos.

Re: They’re made out of weights

#388
post #161

After reading Being and Time from Martin Heidegger, What Computers can't still do by Hubert Dreyfus, and some authors in cognitive linguistics (Langacker and Lakoff mainly), I strongly tend to disagree with any theory about emergent consciousness in modern or future AI systems, any theory proposing a similarity between AI systems and the human brain/mind, or any theory about the computational mind. What all these the…

> subjective experience and agency, amongst other things In other words, souls? I'm sorry if that sounds accusing, but to me it sounds like you're talking about souls that are independent to the physical world, just with more 'scientific-y' wording. (I fully understand that some people believe souls exist.)

I don’t think the OP is discussing mind-body dualism. There are many materialists who believe that consciousness maybe a non-computational process.

But it is worth pointing out that something like 80% of the world (it fluctuates depending on the survey but its around that) believes in some non-physical spirit, life force, or soul.

It’s a very HN bubble thing to start a discussion with the assumption that everyone must be a materialist.

Re: They’re made out of weights

#389
post #363

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Do you disagree with the assumption that cells are machines? Yes? Literally no machine ever built by humans is capable of (or even hinting at beginnings of capability for) replication or novel synthesis like cells are, let alone autonomously, it’s quite unconceivable that anyone would take this to be a reasonable assumption in the first place.

Hmmm, well let’s take it one step lower. What do you think of organelles such as ribosomes? Do you disagree with the assumption that those are machines? They seem directly analogous to the jacquard loom or a CNC machine to me.

Yes again, ribosomes have nothing in common with machines, that are built and designed by humans.

The ball is in your camp to provide solid reasons to believe why they should be grouped together, when one is a deeply complex interrelated dynamic system (in fact, arguably the most complex system we know of) evolved bottom up over billions of years that we only very partially understand and cannot fully explain or document, and the other something entirely planned, designed, and produced by humans in which every component is finite and accounted for.

The argument boils down to “well the vibes kind of match to my taste, and it’s the best analogy I have in my analogy toolkit”, which is just not serious reasoning.

Re: They’re made out of weights

#390
post #161

After reading Being and Time from Martin Heidegger, What Computers can't still do by Hubert Dreyfus, and some authors in cognitive linguistics (Langacker and Lakoff mainly), I strongly tend to disagree with any theory about emergent consciousness in modern or future AI systems, any theory proposing a similarity between AI systems and the human brain/mind, or any theory about the computational mind. What all these the…

This reminds of this article which contends that this mistake has carried across time, in every era people described the workings of the brain similar to the machines they knew how to build, which is why we have "ridiculous" descriptions that changed over time. https://aeon.co/essays/your-brain-does-not-process-informati...

I like Leibniz's comparison of the brain to a mill, which he invokes in an argument[1] that seems to be the predecessor of the modern "hard problem:"

> supposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we might enter it as into a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visiting it, pieces which push one against another, but never anything by which to explain a perception.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leibniz%27s_gap

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