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JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

avherald.com

381–390 of 515 posts

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#381

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because computers don’t have instincts. And don’t get nuances of communication or instructions.

I don’t need nuances I need to know if the runway is clear or not.

You are nitpicking at this point.

A runway may be clear when given the clearance to land. And that happens about 4NM from the RWY threshold. In the meantime a incursion might happen. Given low visibility you may not see it as you land a big airplane whose nose is a bit high up because of the flare. And even if you see it, it takes a few seconds for engines to spool up to full power in order to do a go-around.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#382
post #186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you want to make the case for adding additional safety procedures (no distractions during take-offs and landings) then you have to actually make the case . It's not enough to just assert that they seem minor if the benefit would also be minor. How much do you think this policy would reduce deaths?

Taking simple steps to be more aware of your surroundings when something dangerous is happening seems self-evident to me. Please let me know what flights are you taking and when so that I can make sure I'm not on the same plane.

Most people don’t read the safety card or pay attention to the safety briefing either.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#383

Definitely better links than Daily Mirror out there, avherald.com unfortunately overwhelmed, but in terms of discussion: - Crazy how well the carbon fiber A350 held up given that it seems to have landed pretty much directly on a Dash 8 (RIP Coast Guard team). Looks like trading long term flammability for initial rigidity lived up to the design intent. - Excellent evacuation job, especially as it looks like on some vi…

> Excellent evacuation job

This couldn't be further from the truth.

From what I've read, this was handled terribly. There was confusion and no evacuation was ordered by the crew over the PA. The passengers managed it themselves. If it were a crew-directed evacuation they would have blocked the door leading to the still-running engine as you pointed out.

It took the firefighters over six minutes to respond to the site of the burning aircraft. In the US and Europe this would be unheard of, the fire brigade would be rolling as soon as the aircraft hit the ground.

The only reason hundreds of people are not dead is directly attributable to the Japanese being an overly polite and orderly culture.

If this were China or elsewhere in Asia there would be hundreds of people dead right now, trampled over in the chaos, while the remaining hundred or so survivors would be exiting with their roll-aboard bags in tow.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#384
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pilots are accustomed to the immediacy of voice communication, which any electronic system will struggle to replicate. More sophisticated radio than simplex VHF has too many variables, and agreeing on an international standard would be challenging. There have been some developments of a replacement of, or at least a supplement to, simplex radio. But none are as cheap, quick and reliable as verbal communications with…

“We’ve always done it like this” will no longer be a good argument when one of the increasing number of near misses turns into an accident.

Nor will it be a good argument in case of a fatal crash to say "well, it did contribute to this terrible accident, but in the long run it'll be better for everybody!".

Nobody in aviation is conservative about automation due to a lack of a desire for safety; quite the opposite. But it's just a fact that e.g. an automation system that can prevent a type of human error entirely in 99% of all cases can lead to more accidents in total, if it means that humans aren't regularly exposed to these 99% of cases which in the end train them for the 1% that the computers can't handle.

And this is, as are so many things in aviation safety, learned through blood.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#385
Why are ATC instructions given verbally over sometimes staticy channels using the always error-prone communication tech, human speech? Why not digital?

The ATC operator chooses a command from a UI: 'JAL 123' > 'Runway 34R' > 'Clear for landing'.

Everything cascades automatically from there: ATC's on-screen maps and info, airport lights, commands to all relevant planes (including 'Runway 34R' > 'Hold short').

Transmission to planes could be digital. Given the relatively few possible commands, we're talking very little bandwidth, plenty of room to ensure error correction, redundancy, etc. - and perfectly accurate reception.

All planes would show the exact command on a screen, their maps etc would update, and they could play locally generated audio of the command.

I know nothing about aviation. (I do know that entirely rebuilding matured, critical systems for the new technology is rarely a good idea - the trick is to start with one small subsystem, work out the bugs, mature it, and grow from there.)

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#386

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's a 50% chance that this doctor failed probability

I recall the original context was that telling a patient to not worry because the chance of success is high isn't actually helpful, because the objective argument doesn't take into account the patient's personal perspective. I've since extrapolated that to meaning that objective measures cannot always tell or respect the whole story, because personal perspectives can bowdlerize everything down to life or death or a 5…

>because the objective argument doesn't take into account the patient's personal perspective.

Suppose a friend is afraid of crossing the street. Would it be more helpful from a personal perspective POV to tell your friend the odds of being hit by a car, or to make up the fact that you are just as likely to die today crossing that street as not dying? Because the latter strikes me as unhelpful from either an objective perspective or a personal perspective.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#387

Why are ATC instructions given verbally over sometimes staticy channels using the always error-prone communication tech, human speech? Why not digital? The ATC operator chooses a command from a UI: 'JAL 123' > 'Runway 34R' > 'Clear for landing'. Everything cascades automatically from there: ATC's on-screen maps and info, airport lights, commands to all relevant planes (including 'Runway 34R' > 'Hold short'). Transmis…

For standard situations, text clearances might really be safer: Pilots usually just acknowledge, and augmentation systems could help warn them if they don't conform with a certain clearance.

But having a broadcast channel accessible (for listening and talking) to all aircraft and ATC can increase situational awareness for everybody. Just look at the near-miss of Air Canada 759 [1] for an example of where it might have contributed to saving hundreds of lives:

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Canada_Flight_759

While ATC controllers might be able to issue urgency text messages quickly enough on a keyboard, pilots literally have their hands full flying the airplane. Voice is their only feedback channel, and if it falls out of use, outages might go unnoticed for critical seconds.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#388

Definitely better links than Daily Mirror out there, avherald.com unfortunately overwhelmed, but in terms of discussion: - Crazy how well the carbon fiber A350 held up given that it seems to have landed pretty much directly on a Dash 8 (RIP Coast Guard team). Looks like trading long term flammability for initial rigidity lived up to the design intent. - Excellent evacuation job, especially as it looks like on some vi…

> Excellent evacuation job This couldn't be further from the truth. From what I've read, this was handled terribly. There was confusion and no evacuation was ordered by the crew over the PA. The passengers managed it themselves. If it were a crew-directed evacuation they would have blocked the door leading to the still-running engine as you pointed out. It took the firefighters over six minutes to respond to the site…

Six minutes is a decent response time for ARFF in a large, active airport with no advance warning. They can't just drive straight to the incident site; instead they have to wait for ground clearance to enter any taxiways or runways because there are still other aircraft moving around.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#389

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is "line up and wait" really the new approved terminology? Way back when I was a PP student, it was "taxi into position runway XX and hold. Acknowledge hold." Line up and wait sounds like something you tell preschoolers to do :-)

"position and hold" was the old phraseology in the US. It changed to "line up and wait" on 2010/09/30 to match ICAO standards and because "hold (on the runway)" might be confused with "hold short (of a runway/taxiway), or "hold position (wherever you are now)". https://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/resources/luaw

I do love how we try so hard to disambiguate language. Especially hard when working across languages too. And it shows how badly things can go if left to fuzzy language protocols.

Re: JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

#390

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whether it was perfect or not, there are only a few words/phrases that allow an aircraft to cross the hold short bars at an airport with an active control tower. "Cross", "line up and wait", and "cleared for takeoff" are pretty much it. Runway incursions are very dangerous, as this incident shows, and pilots must be very sure they have clearance before entering a runway. If anything is ambiguous in an instruction, pi…

> and pilots must be very sure they have clearance before entering a runway The word "clearance" is used uniquely in the context of landing and departing exactly to avoid mistakes and has to be repeated again by the aircraft before ATC confirms.

The terms "cleared to land" and "cleared for takeoff" are extremely specific (a regulation written in blood like many aviation rules), but "cross runway" and "line up and wait" also give permission for aircraft to enter the runway.

The word "cleared" is often used for IFR clearance delivery as well which gives you permission to navigate via a planned route to a particular point, so it's much more common than just takeoffs and landings.

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