Live data from Hacker News

Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

blog.cryptographyengineering.com

381–390 of 492 posts

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#381
post #248

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In the U.S., many contracts (but not all) can in principle by default be oral and still be enforceable by law. https://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-contracts-forms/w...

So... no need for DKIM

But you need to be able to prove the existence of the contract. Which DKIM would help with.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#382

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But emails are meant to be accountable. They are the digital equivalent to sending letters. They should leave paper trails. Just like you have written before, secure messaging should be left to secure messaging apps, not email.

Woh, the idea that private letters shouldn't be private is WAY far away from the privacy standards that have been around in liberal democracies for centuries. Mail being secure from surveillance is a foundational freedom. I have no idea where you are getting the idea that we all should have to answer for what we send in private correspondence.

Letters and emails are private. DKIM does not change that.

This discussion about DKIM is about non-repudiation and the ability to prove that a certain person sent the email.

If you send me a letter, I (or someone else who gains possession of that letter) should be able to prove that you sent the letter and hold you accountable for the contents. DKIM does that for emails.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#383

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So your argument is that private citizens' desire for privacy is subordinate to your desire to be able to blackmail "public officials"?

No. Private citizens are entitled to privacy and their rights to such should be guarded by both law and responsible security practices at the companies they entrust with their information. Private citizens shouldn’t be shielded from privacy violation by hiding behind the plausible deniability of no DKIM verification. The communications of public officials should be subject to traceability and authentication as having…

Yes, there it is a valid objective in ensuring that elected officials' conduct is above board. However, abusing a spam-mitigation system for this purpose, drawing in every private individual with the dragnet, is the wrong way to go about it.

One key flaw in your argument is that you seek a system that works, "even if they have gone rogue and used non-government-approved communication channels", which, it should be plain to see, absolutely does not apply to DKIM.

I perhaps read a bit too much into your statement, "Blackmail related to embarrassing sexual proclivities or anything like that is unfortunate, but kindly asking politicians to be transparent isn’t a realistic answer."

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#384
post #370

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So your argument is that private citizens' desire for privacy is subordinate to your desire to be able to blackmail "public officials"?

You're advocating a standard that hurts innocent people in favor of the provably guilty.

I have sympathy for the "provably guilty", as I've seen plenty of places and times where that group includes many noble and good individuals.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#385

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The point is that DKIM can be abused to lend undue credibility to falsified data... not that it can credibly attest true data. So can deep fakes. What makes deep fakes explainable and DKIM unexplainable? If the journalists interests do not align about DKIM, how come they align about deepfakes? I'm not saying journalists have any integrity. I'm just wondering why specifically for DKIM a "throw the baby out with the…

EDIT: Apologies probably wrong name of the phallacy, so I removed that. Regardless, the fact that deep-fakes exist has absolutely no impact on whether DKIM has problems or not.

FYI the word is spelled fallacy. I wouldn't have bothered with the correction were it not for the unfortunate similarity to a very different word.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#386
post #361

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Speech has consequences. Given the good done in holding rogue "politicians" accountable, not seeing that as axiomatically desirable is at least a little bit suspicious...

Private emails are not speech. Are you suggesting all private conversations should be public? That seems absurd to me. Do you subscribe to the "surveillance isn't bad if you have nothing to hide" concept?

Sending death threats or racial invectives by private message is as much speech as sending them by Twitter post.

All private conversations shouldn't be published. That isn't necessary to hold people accountable for dangerous or violent speech.

Publication and repudiation aren't the same thing.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#387

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I propose gouging out everyone's eyes, that way they can't see you do anything potentially embarrassing - thus making blackmail harder.

This is a helpful comment because not having DKIM is in the same range of bad outcomes as having your eyes gouged out.

Except the proposal weakens legitimate use of DKIM not one whit.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#388

Earlier quoted context omitted.

PDFs with e-signatures are very common place now. Have you heard of DocuSign or other similar services?

And so it is the e-signature, not the DKIM that matters.

A signed and scanned PDF is also commonly used, same as an old-school fax-based contract where you sign and send it back. But, yes, the DKIM definitely does not matter for contract purposes.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#389
post #376

I've responded to a subcomment below explaining why "emails from politicians must be leakable" is not a good argument against the author's case. That said, I think this would be problematic on some levels not being considered. A good part of the world's email infrastructure is decentralized, and doesn't run on providers who update software well and often. If Google were to publish their keys after rotation, a new cla…

Can you point to any specific examples of systems that report DKIM signing status but fail to check the validity state of a DKIM signing key? That seems like an extraordinarily unlikely set of circumstances.

Re: Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

#390

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Woh, the idea that private letters shouldn't be private is WAY far away from the privacy standards that have been around in liberal democracies for centuries. Mail being secure from surveillance is a foundational freedom. I have no idea where you are getting the idea that we all should have to answer for what we send in private correspondence.

Letters and emails are private. DKIM does not change that. This discussion about DKIM is about non-repudiation and the ability to prove that a certain person sent the email. If you send me a letter, I (or someone else who gains possession of that letter) should be able to prove that you sent the letter and hold you accountable for the contents. DKIM does that for emails.

If you want to transfer assurance of the authenticity of an email to someone else, you can do so without DKIM; just sign a timestamp or something. The problem with current DKIM configurations is that it provides that assurance to everybody, including strangers who have no business having it. Which is why the ask here is for Google to do with DKIM what OTR does with MAC keys: burn them periodically, so that only people who have explicitly arranged to share authentication do so.
Post reply on HN