Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not necessarily. Just fix the algorithm. Showing all submissions by time should be ok, showing all submissions by number of upvotes should be ok if the user chooses that.
The platform can also add ghost upvotes and downvotes and censor upvotes and downvotes.
What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
371–380 of 520 posts
Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#372Ok, we are an international collective of wealthy nerds obsessed with privacy:
How much money do we need to collect to get /e/OS to be suitable?
A few million? I’d pledge 500€.
Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#373Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#374Earlier quoted context omitted.
Where are these mythical sweet-spot solutions? Concretely, half the websites I visit from the UK want me to either scan my face or upload ID documents to access their full featureset. Now that users have been conditioned to accept this, nobody seems very interested in figuring out how to collect less PII - only insulating themselves from liability by having the data processed by a third party.
Government builds a website where you can log in using any government issued ID or using one of the many many many available services that hold your details already(at least in the UK nearly everyone will have a DLVA account, HMRC account, HMPO account, NHS account.....all of these are government services which we can only assume hold our data securely already). On that website, you can click "give me a verification…
If you do your cryptography right, the government will not know that you've authenticated with pornhub. That's the whole goddamn point of privacy-preserving age verification.
Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#375Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The website only sees the ‘over_18’ attribute, which is backed by the government signature Not true. The device's public key is also sent, which functions as a stable device identifier. We've spent years trying to get away from stable tracking IDs and fingerprinting. Returning to a system where devices are sending a stable ID to a website to prove ownership is a step backward. There are proposed mitigations like is…
> Not true. The device's public key is also sent, which functions as a stable device identifier. This is covered by allowing for single-use credentials. IIRC the EU personal IDs will use this. Basically, the wallet requests a batch of single-use eIDs that all use different device key-pairs. Each credential is only used for one request and then deleted. The wallet will automatically request new credentials in batches…
But this then means that the issuers and the verifiers can trivially collude to deanonymize holders/users.
Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#376Earlier quoted context omitted.
...and? Just like a child can "trivially" ask an adult to buy them a beer. Who are these adults giving children their verification codes for adult websites?
Asking adults for beer doesn't scale, code sharing can. If you want to crack down on code sharing, you'd have to start surveilling who is signing up to what.
Not at all. If you want to find who shares codes at scale, you just track that person. If someone sells hundreds of thousands of codes online, you can just buy one from them and you have proven that they do it.
Again, if age verification is honestly about helping the kids, I don't think it has to be 100% efficient.
Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#377The slippery slope argument is hugely valid, but having kids not have access to alcohol, porn and guns is very normal. We don't even discuss it in the 'physical world' because it's absolutely normative. Even in 'Europe' kids aren't going into the liquor store stocking up obviously - there are always age and responsibility-related conventions. The 'online' nature of this piques our anti-authoritarian triggers and tend…
Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#378Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#379Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Could you be more specific as to what you're imagining? sure, i'll put my favorite two. though you'll find much more detailed and thought-out versions of these (and others) in the dozens of other giant threads on the same topic. - buy a card with a UUID from anywhere that sells alcohol/tobacco that is valid for some period of time. most people are comfortable with flashing their ID at the clerk. the UUID card is no…
And honestly, all these should ultimately just be done client side in the browser. After the browser has verified "User is x or user is over 21" there's no reason to then send that information to the website. Let websites issue a "window.isUserOver(16)" call once and then move forward based on the response to that query.
Age restrictions are different across countries and cultures. Parents disagree on age ratings given by boards all the time.
Have apps and websites declare the objectionable content they have, and let the device decide if it will show it or not according to parental controls.
If you’re a parent that pays attention to age ratings, you know exactly what I’m talking about. The age is meaningless. It’s the type of content next to the rating that’s important.
Your only option as a parent now to let your 14 year old play a violent game rated M that you specifically allowed is to give them a fully unrestricted device. They can now use that device to access gore, porn and gambling as well. How does this make any sense?
Re: What we call "age verification" is actually mass surveillance
#380I see that one point of criticism of the EUId is that people think it will lead to bad things because people will need iOS or android. Ok, we are an international collective of wealthy nerds obsessed with privacy: How much money do we need to collect to get /e/OS to be suitable? A few million? I’d pledge 500€.