How would any normal person know that npmjs.help is phising, but npmjs.com is valid?
To state the obvious, one ends with "help" on with "com". It effectively is phishing awareness 101 that domains need to match. You still don't know then of course. When in doubt you shouldn't do the action that is asked through clicking on links in the mail. Instead go to the domain you know to be legit and execute the action there. Having said all that, even the most aware people are only human. So it is always poss…
We all dodged a bullet
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Re: We all dodged a bullet
#372Earlier quoted context omitted.
A few years ago our annual corporate phishing training was initiated by an email sent from a random address asking us to log in with our internal credentials on a random website. A week later some executive pushing the training emailed the entire company saying that it was unacceptable that nobody from engineering had logged into the training site and spun some story about regulatory requirements. After lots of back…
If Kevin mitnick shows up or is referenced then I’m pretty sure it’s performance art
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#373Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fucking this. I have seen so many takes lamenting how this kind of supply chain attack is such a difficult problem to fix. No it really isn't. It's an ecosystem and cultural problem that npm encourages huge dependency trees that make it impractical to review dependency updates so developers just don't.
I would say Javascript's lack of a standard library is at least in part responsible for encouraging npm use, things just spiraled out of control from there.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#374Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you steal the cookies from dev machines or steal ssh keys along with a list of recent ssh connections or do any other credential theft there are going to be lots of people left impacted. Yes, lots of people reading tech news or security bulletins is going to check if they were compromised and preemptively revoke those credentials. But that's work , meaning even among those informed there will be many who just assu…
If a dev doesn't happen to run npm install during the period between when the compromised package gets published and when npm yanks it (which for something this high-profile is generally measured in hours, not days), then they aren't going to be impacted. So an attacker's patience won't be rewarded with many valid credentials.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#375Earlier quoted context omitted.
Manual dependency management without a package manager does not lead people to do more auditing. And at least with a standardized package manager, the packages are in a standard format that makes them easier to analyze, audit, etc.
Well, consider that a lot of these functions that were exploited are simple things. We use a library to spare ourselves the drugdery of rewriting them, but now that we have AI, what's it to me if I end up with my own string-colouring functions for output in some file under my own control, vs. bringing in an external dependency that puts me on a permanent upgrade treadmill and opens the risk to supply chain attacks? L…
Before AI code generation, we would have called that copy-and-paste, and a code smell compared to proper reuse of a library. It's not any better with AI. That's still code you'd have to maintain, and debug. And duplicated effort from all the other code doing the same thing, and not de-duplicated across the numerous libraries in a dependency tree or on a system, and not benefiting from multiple people collaborating on a common API, and not benefiting from skill transfer across projects...
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#376That's why you need vuln scanners and not upgrade to the latest thing as soon as released.
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#377Earlier quoted context omitted.
A few years ago our annual corporate phishing training was initiated by an email sent from a random address asking us to log in with our internal credentials on a random website. A week later some executive pushing the training emailed the entire company saying that it was unacceptable that nobody from engineering had logged into the training site and spun some story about regulatory requirements. After lots of back…
It’s all just box ticking and CYA compliance. “We got pwned but the entire company went through a certified phishing awareness program and we have a DPI firewall. Nothing more we could have done, we’re not liable.”
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#378> This post and its online comment sections are blame-free zones The author is claiming control over other comment sections? Where is this entitlement coming from? They hide that behind some fictional persona, as if that changes anything. The author then proceeds to list several reasons someone would fall for this, carefully ignoring the most important detail of the email, being its address. The absolute very first s…
Re: We all dodged a bullet
#379Besides the ecosystem issues, for the phishing part, I'll repost what I responded somewhere in the other related post, for awareness --- I figure you aren't about to get fooled by phishing anytime soon, but based on some of your remarks and remarks of others, a PSA: TRUSTING YOUR OWN SENSES to "check" that a domain is right, or an email is right, or the wording has some urgency or whatever is BOUND TO FAIL often enou…
If I sell corn syrup for downstream food consumers and dont lock my factory doors and let whoever walk in, isn't it reckless?