I apologize for an off-topic request, but if it's not past the edit window could you go over your comment and clean up the references/formatting? I think you may have had some errors copying and pasting quotes from my comment to reply and may have pasted more of my comment than you intended; this is very difficult to follow.
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> But, it's true. Since LineageOS doesn't break Android's security model they could work with phone manufacters / Google to allow LineageOS to be trusted.
There is no evidence that Google would do this. And you're talking about a hypothetical; the fact is that LineageOS is currently blocked. That is what is factually true right now. Saying that it could theoretically be trusted in the future doesn't mean that the Integrity API doesn't block it today.
It doesn't mean that attestation won't block OSes right now. You can't deny that currently the Play Integrity API blocks Android ROMs.
> This API is not about blocking headless chromium. [...] Protecting against that [(password theft)] is unrelated to this proposal.
So first off, this is opinion you, there is nothing in the proposal that indicates that scriptable browsers would be allowed and nothing that references Headless Chromium. You are assuming that Headless Chromium wouldn't be blocked, but I would love to see any statement from Google supporting that assumption.
But more importantly, you're basically saying this proposal blocks nothing at all. Think about what you're saying, this is a proposal that supposedly prevents bots and ad fraud and you're going to allow Headless Chromium? You're like one comment away from telling me, "well, the proposal isn't about guaranteeing OS integrity."
> Considering most Linux users are 1 curl | bash away from installing malware that can easily pivot to root and install a kernel module to hide itself. It's related.
No, this is very transparently an excuse. Out of the reasons for this proposal (as specified in the proposal), kernel level malware is relevant to basically zero of them. Kernel level malware is not the reason why Netflix doesn't run on a rooted Android device. Kernel level malware is not something that matters for blocking web scrapers or bots. Kernel level malware is not the vector through which ad fraud happens. Quite frankly, kernel level malware is not the biggest concern when thinking about bank account theft of phishing attacks.
The reason Linux is blocked is because Linux does not impose computing restrictions on the user.
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> Can you quote that section. I don't see it.
See https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/..., specifically the bullet-point list under the introduction:
> [...] This creates a need for human users to prove to websites that they're human, sometimes through tasks like challenges or logins. [...] Websites can only show users what content is popular with real people if websites are able to know the difference between a trusted and untrusted environment. [...] Users playing a game on a website want to know whether other players are using software that enforces the game's rules. [...] Users sometimes get tricked into installing malicious software that imitates software like their banking apps, to steal from those users.
Of those 4 proposals, only the last one (banking security) is directly related to user security, the other 3 are site policies (ad fraud/scraping, blocking bots, blocking game modifications).
> Except this proposal doesn't block any user capabilities. It simply adds a way for sites to check if the user has a secure environment.
This is borderline disingenuous. Giving website authors the ability to arbitrarily block "untrusted" environments (and specifically telling them that the purpose is to allow blocking capabilities in untrusted environments) is the same as blocking user capabilities.
It's especially absurd to deny given that mainline companies like Google will be in charge of determining what environments count as "secure" and what environments will be supported for attestation, so not only is it an API that is designed to allow websites to block clients, it is also very much going to be Google's decision whether or not a given user capability is compatible with a "trusted" environment.
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> Arch could simply have in their settings app a toggle that allows you to disable trusted mode to allow you to install kernels or whatever you built yourself. Similar to how motherboards let you disable secure boot.
At which point it would be blocked from attestation, hence blocking user freedoms.
Also, custom-built kernels and custom user software are not side-things I can toggle on and off, my setup depends on those things. You can't go into user settings from the desktop in Arch and just turn off the kernel; if I'm using custom drivers for a monitor or input device, I can't just turn those off.
What you are saying is "your OS won't be blocked, you'll just boot into a different OS or different OS-mode without any of your custom kernels or drivers." But take a step back and think about that: the OS is blocked. And the solution you're giving me is to boot into a different OS based on a different kernel that I don't control that doesn't have my custom-compiled drivers and that might not even support my hardware. This is really silly, it's like saying that Apple Pay is fully supported on Android, you just have to boot into an iPhone.
> Rooting breaks the android security model and provides by definition an untrusted environment. Android apps may not want to deal with supporting devices that don't support the security features an Android operating system is supposed to provide.
Like I said, this is about blocking my ability to root my device. It is a reduction in user autonomy under the excuse that user autonomy to root my device makes my device untrusted.
Quite frankly, it should not be an app's choice to decide whether or not to run on a rooted device. It's none of their business whether or not my phone is rooted.
> The Play Integrity API works with apps not from the store.
Technically true in the sense that I believe Aurora spoofs Play Integrity APIs and device checks, but I'm not sure of the full details there, and in any case that's a circumvention of Google's policies, not something that Google explicitly allows. I'm not sure I understand what you mean here?
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> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118065...
The currently inactive issue that hasn't been updated for over a year? That's not exactly strong evidence. Let me know when the Chromium team starts working on it and merges it.
In the meantime, it is objectively true that Chrome currently has worse adblocking capabilities (particularly around CNAME cloaking) than Firefox and that it has had worse adblocking capabilities for multiple years. This is not an API that is available for extensions to use.
And the way that CNAME cloaking has played out in Chrome -- given that they are trailing behind other browsers by years does not suggest that any of the other issues with Manifest V3 are going to be better handled. The overwhelming trend here (and what this issue shows) is that Chrome is going to lag behind other browsers on adblocking.
I'm having a hard time figuring out how you're looking at an arguably orphaned issue and seeing that as evidence that the Chromium team cares about adblocking APIs or that they can be trusted to make sure that adblocking capabilities aren't broken.
> Yes, but the plan was that after FLOC cross site cookies would not be sent. The whole point is to provide an alternative to people using cross site cookies before it gets removed.
Right, that's what I said. It was for advertisers, not for users.
Firefox and Safari removed cross site cookies without supplying an alternative just fine, that was a user-focused change. Chrome refused to make a user-focused change until after it introduced a spec (FLOC, later Topics) purely for the benefit of advertisers. In addition, it introduced other specs (Same Site Sets) that weakened those same protections.