https://github.com/Nayjest/lm-proxy
``` pip install lm-proxy ```
Guys, sorry, as the author of a competing opensource product, I couldn’t resist
351–360 of 569 posts
https://github.com/Nayjest/lm-proxy
``` pip install lm-proxy ```
Guys, sorry, as the author of a competing opensource product, I couldn’t resist
Besides main issue here, and the owners account being possibly compromised as well, there's like 170+ low quality spam comments in there. I would expect better spam detection system from GitHub. This is hardly acceptable.
are there any timestamps available when the malicious versions were published on pypi? I can't find anything but that now the last "good" version was published on march 22.
Their previous release would be easily caught by static analysis. PTH is a novel technique. Run all your new dependencies through static analysis and don't install the latest versions. I implemented static analysis for Python that detects close to 90% of such injections. https://github.com/rushter/hexora
And easily bypassed by an attacker who knows about your static analysis tool who can iterate on their exploit until it no longer gets flagged.
1. pin dependencies with sha signatures 2. mirror your dependencies 3. only update when truly necessary 4. at first, run everything in a sandbox.
We just can't trust dependencies and dev setups. I wanted to say "anymore" but we never could. Dev containers were never good enough, too clumsy and too little isolation. We need to start working in full sandboxes with defence in depth that have real guardrails and UIs like vm isolation + container primitives and allow lists, egress filters, seccomp, gvisor and more but with much better usability. Its the same requir…
We need programming languages where every imported module is in its own sandbox by default.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
So... I'm working on an open source technology to make a literal virtual machine shippable i.e. freezing everything inside it, isolated due to vm/hypervisor for sandboxing, with support for containers too since it's a real linux vm. The problems you mentioned resonated a lot with me and why I'm building it, any interest in working to solve that together?: https://github.com/smol-machines/smolvm
It looks like you may be interested in Qubes OS, https://qubes-os.org .
More details here: https://futuresearch.ai/blog/litellm-pypi-supply-chain-attac...
One thing not in that writeup is that very little action was needed for my engineer to get pwnd. uvx automatically pulled latest litellm (version unpinned) and built the environment. Then Cursor started up the local MCP server automatically on load.
LiteLLM maintainer here, this is still an evolving situation, but here's what we know so far: 1. Looks like this originated from the trivvy used in our ci/cd - https://github.com/search?q=repo%3ABerriAI%2Flitellm%20trivy... https://ramimac.me/trivy-teampcp/#phase-09 2. If you're on the proxy docker, you were not impacted. We pin our versions in the requirements.txt 3. The package is in quarantine on pypi - this block…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've been thinking the same thing. And it's somewhat parallel to what happened to meditation vs. drugs. In the old world the dangerous insights required so many years of discipline that you could sort of trust that the person getting the insight would be ok. But then any idiot can get the insight by just eating some shrooms and oops, that's a problem. Mostly self-harm problem in that case. But the dynamic is somewhat…
What in the world are “the dangerous insights”?