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Link which doesn't directly support website owned by unscrupulous trillionaire: https://xcancel.com/runasand/status/2017659019251343763?s=20
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It seems unfortunate that enhanced protection against physically attached devices requires enabling a mode that is much broader, and sounds like it has a noticeable impact on device functionality. I never attach my iPhone to anything that's not a power source. I would totally enable an "enhanced protection for external accessories" mode. But I'm not going to enable a general "Lockdown mode" that Apple tells me means…
The lack of optional granularity on security settings is super frustrating because it leads to many users just opting out of any heightened security.
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Absolutely every aspect of it? What’s so hard about adding a feature that effectively makes a single-user device multi-user? Which needs the ability to have plausible deniability for the existence of those other users? Which means that significant amounts of otherwise usable space needs to be inaccessibly set aside for those others users on every device—to retain plausible deniability—despite an insignificant fractio…
Android phones are multi-user, so if they can do it then Apple should be able to.
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> Still go to prison for not showing. So until devices have multiple pins for plausible deniability we are still screwed. > What’s so hard to make 2-3 pins and each to access different logged in apps and files. Besides the technical challenges, I think there's a pretty killer human challenge: it's going to be really hard for the user to create an alternate account that looks real to someone who's paying attention. Su…
Background agent in the decoy identity that periodically browses the web, retrieves email from a banal account etc.?
Remember...they can make you use touch id...they can't make you give them your password. https://x.com/runasand/status/2017659019251343763?s=20 The FBI was able to access Washington Post reporter Hannah Natanson's Signal messages because she used Signal on her work laptop. The laptop accepted Touch ID for authentication, meaning the agents were allowed to require her to unlock it.
Sadly, they still got to her Signal on her Desktop – her sources might still be compromised. It's sadly inherent to desktop applications, but I'm sad that a lot more people don't know that Signal for Desktop is much, much less secure against adversaries with your laptop.
Educate us. What makes it less secure?
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Both of your comments here, posted just one minute apart yet with completely different content, reek of LLM output.
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Reminder that you can press the iPhone power button five times to require passcode for the next unlock.
Or squeeze the power and volume buttons for a couple of seconds. It’s good to practice both these gestures so that they become reflex, rather than trying to remember them when they’re needed.
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Is the knowledge of which finger to use protected as much as a passcode? Law enforcement might have the authority to physically hold the owner's finger to the device, but it seems that the owner has the right to refuse to disclose which finger is the right one. If law enforcement doesn't guess correctly in a few tries, the device could lock itself and require the passcode. Another reason to use my dog's nose instead…
I really wish Apple would offer a pin option on macos. For this reason, precisely. Either that, or an option to automatically disable touchid after a short amount of time (eg an hour or if my phone doesn't connect to the laptop)