> To think that with enough compute we can code consciousness is like thinking that with enough rainbows one of them will have a pot of gold at its end. What does consciousness have to do with AGI or the point(s) the article is trying to make? This is a distraction imo.
Consciousness is a physical phenomenon; rainbows, their ends, and pots of gold at them are not.
> It's an analogy.
And I pointed out why it's an invalid one -- that was the whole point of my comment.
> But just like the pot of gold, that might be a false assumption.
But it's not at all "just like the pot of gold". Rainbows are perceptual phenomena, their perceived location changes when the observer moves, they don't have "ends", and there certainly aren't any pots of gold associated with them--we know for a fact that these are "false assumptions"--assumptions that no one makes except perhaps young children. This is radically different from consciousness and computation, even if it were the case that somehow one could not get consciousness from computation. Equating or analogizing them this way is grossly intellectually dishonest.
> Someone sees computing, assuming consciousness is at the end of it, so they think fi there were more computing, there would be more likelihood of consciousness.
Utter nonsense.