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Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

github.com

351–360 of 460 posts

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#351
I hate to say it, but if you used Chrome to read this, then you're part of the problem.

Awful stuff like this wouldn't stand a chance if Google didn't have such a monopoly position.

For the sake of the open internet, please switch to a different browser. IMO, Firefox is best, but even something chromium based is probably fine. Just not Google Chrome.

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#352
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I doubt Apple will be our savior here. Apple is in a great position to implement this spec: their secure enclave and the systems they've developed around it are practically the state of the art. Also Apple is in bed w/ traditional media. (Apple News, Apple TV, iTunes, etc.) Microsoft has been doing the same[1] for years w/ Pluton on the Xbox to protect their IP. Google has been doing this on Android using, dm-verity,…

Apple is really the only party in a position to be a savior. For example, they threaten to remove FaceTime and iMessage from UK iPhones if the government there changes the law on encryption [1]. [1]: https://www.macrumors.com/2023/07/20/apple-threatens-to-pull...

Yet they removed apps from the taiwanese app store in Chinas interest

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#353
post #94
post #83

There is one thing I'm not quite clear on here: >The attestation is a low entropy description of the device the web page is running on. >The attester will then sign a token containing the attestation and content binding (referred to as the payload) with a private key. >The attester then returns the token and signature to the web page. >The attester’s public key is available to everyone to request. I'm assuming "attes…

> I'm assuming "attester" here means "hardware authenticator." How is the attestation low entropy if it's presumably signed by a key that is unique & resident to my device? From what I understood, the "attester" is a remote server, which signs the attestation with its own key, after somehow verifying that the browser and operating system and drivers and machine is not running any code that this remote server does not…

The WEI spec talks at length about how ads provide revenue for the web publisher. In that context, I'm pretty sure that the 'environment' they're talking about must ensure that the ads are shown. This would mean that the attester has to invasively check the browser/app to ensure that no ad blocker is running. That would mean that the attester is most likely a proprietary application running on the user's device.

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#354

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I avoid giving a password to random sites online for a reason: I trust Google's password databases to be a lot more airtight than joerandomsite.tld. That includes password databases.

What's the harm in giving some sketchy site a unique, random password only used with that site? (In contrast to letting them have your Google profile and all that comes with it)

The need to retain one unique random password per site (as opposed to having one extremely secure Gmail password with two factor authentication attached to it).

It's the old twin airplane principal from the hacker's dictionary: the virtue of putting all your eggs in one basket if the basket is built very well.

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#355
The idea behind this proposal is what I feared the moment remote attestation(-ability) started to gain traction on clients.

Google will arguably kill legacy SafetyNet (which is circumventable, as it's not rooted in hardware) soon. Microsoft pushes extremly hard for remote attestation-ability by requiring TPMs. Very soon only an insignificant number of client devices will not be able to perform remote attestation by the major vendors based on hardware trust modules.

Hard to stay optimistic for the open web. :/

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#356
post #5

This is pretty much the inevitable end-game of the web, in no small part funded by ad-based business models (as the analog gap pretty much destroys most attempts to use this stuff to do copy protection) and enabled by developers who have insisted we shove as much difficult-to-implement functionality (by which I am talking about CSS complex stuff, not powerful-but-easy-to-code APIs for OS-level access) into the browse…

> who is finally putting their foot down and deciding that we are all going to be forced to either used fully-locked down devices The person who wrote the proposal[0] is from Google. All the authors of the proposal are from Google[1]. I've been thinking carefully about this comment, but I really don't know what to say. It's absolutely heartbreaking watching something I really care about die by a thousand cuts; how do…

It was just one example, but Netflix is trash in web browsers anyway. Firefox should say no to all of this - it doesn't feel like it now, but saying no could birth alternative services that don't operate in such a manner.

Not technology related exactly, but until recent events I thought Reddit would survive and be untouchable. Now I'm wondering why I didn't join the fediverse sooner. There are rough spots but it will surpass centralized solutions.

We are at a turning point and should say no to all garbage. They need us more than we need them.

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#357
post #325

Oh by "Web Environment" you mean "my machine" lol! I already got caught by this kind of thing - a https://github.com/nativefier/nativefier app wrapping Youtube Music doesn't work, because Google detects somehow that you are not using a trusted browser and refuses to serve. This is sort of moving in the "zero trust" (as in let's use ML etc. to detect if we trust something. username/password is not enough), which I fea…

Did you mirror Chrome's useragent?

The workaround was pretend to be Firefox, which didn't work. Gave up after that as this was a passing curiosity.

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#358

Proposal author here I’m hoping to get back to everyone as soon as possible. I hope you can all appreciate that I’m a human being and this has been a lot! In the mean time, I wanted to repost my last comment on the GitHub issue thread [1]: Hey all, we plan to respond to your feedback but I want to be thorough which will take time and it’s the end of a Friday for me. We wanted to give a quick TL;DR: - This is an early…

> This is not DRM - WEI does not lock down content

Right, but there is a severe risk that you give the means to block non-mainstream clients, be it browsers, operating systems or devices, correct?

Yes, it's nice to know you may want to allow user agents to browse the web without WEI and I'm sure you have best intentions, but we are already in a world where banks and even stuff like Zoom just look at the user agent string and say "Ah, I don't know this browser, please install Chrome or Edge!". Why shouldn't they just similarly halt in the future if the WEI API does not exist? I (and the browser vendor) can spoof a user agent, but you can't spoof attestation, i.e. cannot fix it if websites don't allow my browser based on the (missing) WEI API. So, how will you prevent this?

How can you make sure that users of e.g. Asahi Linux will be able to use the web in the future? Who will attestate their browser based on what? How will e.g. Gentoo users use the web with their build-from-source browser and OS? Will e.g. Netflix continue to work reliably on a user agent without WEI (but with Widevine) - and will the holdback population (if holdback is implemented at all - no offense intended, but you didn't sound too confident about this on the blink-dev mailing list, tbh) be large and significant enough for them to not just say "eh, can't verify, use the app please or wait a bit"?

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#359

I am not a hopeful romantic, but the EU has been investing on vendor neutral web-browsers like Nyxt [0] and the UR Browser [1] through the Horizon Europe program. I doubt that legislators (at least in the EU) will view this as a positive development, assuming EU legislators know what they are doing. On the other hand, lobbying by big tech is still very much a threat. [0] https://nyxt.atlas.engineer/ [1] https://www.u…

The big problem with many of the alternative browsers like the ones you mentioned is that they are powered by the Blink engine (it's one of the 2 options for nyxt). The overwhelming market-share of Blink and the institutional monopoly on its development is the biggest driver for introduction of anti-features like these. WEI for example, is being prototyped in it [1]. These anti-features make it into every browser that uses Blink. While some browsers like UR-browser and Brave disable many of these features, they still lend credibility to the blink engine.

We need to promote alternative web engines like Servo and libweb and browsers based on them. Many of these engines need a major push to be competent enough for daily use. Gecko is also fine - but building a new browser with it is said to be hard.

[1] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/refs/he...

Re: Web Environment Integrity API Proposal

#360
post #336

I am not a hopeful romantic, but the EU has been investing on vendor neutral web-browsers like Nyxt [0] and the UR Browser [1] through the Horizon Europe program. I doubt that legislators (at least in the EU) will view this as a positive development, assuming EU legislators know what they are doing. On the other hand, lobbying by big tech is still very much a threat. [0] https://nyxt.atlas.engineer/ [1] https://www.u…

The first one is close-sourced. Why should I choose it over a open-core alternative (Chrome).

I assume you are referring to the UR-browser. Despite being closed source, it seems to have better privacy policy compared to Chromium. By using chromium or many of its derivatives, you are automatically lending credibility and subjecting yourself to anti-user features like these. Chromium is one of those software that I consider as open source, but not free/libre. It absolutely doesn't respect users' interests. The usual argument of "but it's open source, modify it" isn't practical either, because the code base is too massive and complicated.

Despite all that, I would recommend only FOSS browsers with good privacy policy - because they exist.

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