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There are numerous incorrect statements in your comment. First: Apple has disclosed who gets to curate the hash list. The answer is NCMEC and other child safety organizations. https://twitter.com/AlexMartin/status/1424703642913935374/ph... Apple states point-blank that they will refuse any demands to add non-CSAM content to the lists. Second: Why can't the FBI / CCCP inject a hash into the list. Here's a tweet thread…
How do you know there aren’t bad actors working at the NCMEC? If I know that adding a hash to a list will get it flagged, and I could conveniently arrest or discredit anyone I wanted, I would certainly send people to work there. How will Apple know whether a hash is for non-CSAM content? Spoiler alert: they won’t. And Apple claims it will be reviewed by a human. Sure, just like YouTube copyright claims? Or will it ge…
As I said, the flagged content is reviewed by an Apple employee before it actually triggers an external report. If the flagged material is not in fact CSAM, it will not be reported.
> And Apple claims it will be reviewed by a human. Sure, just like YouTube copyright claims? Or will it get automated in the near future? And what about in China? Or Saudi Arabia or other countries with less human rights?
First of all, the volume of flagged CSAM content is much, much smaller than the volume of YouTube copyright claims. It's entirely plausible to ensure that a human reviews all flags. Second, Apple is actually constitutionally-barred from automating this step entirely. You can thank Neil Gorsuch's decision in United States v. Ackerman for this. [1] The crux is that since NCMEC is a qausi-governmental entity, automatically sending CSAM-matched content to NCMEC without an Apple employee first inspecting the content would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure and would violate the 4th amendment.
[1] https://library.law.virginia.edu/gorsuchproject/united-state...