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Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

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351–360 of 367 posts

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#351
post #266

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Complain to who exactly? > people taking what devices could already do and standardizing it so that anyone can use it in a more uniform way. In this case, standardization makes a huge difference. Before DoH, this was theoretically possible, but needed enormous effort to pull off: The simplest thing a device could do was to hardcode custom DNS servers - but the network admin could easily bypass that by redirecting the…

> With DoH, there are publicly accessible servers that accept requests over plain HTTPS Which is a good thing for end users on balance. The Internet is going 100% encrypted and that's a good thing. This helps towards that goal. Relying on unencrypted traffic will no longer work. Networks must not have the ability to intercept device traffic unless the device administrator ( not the network administrator) configures i…

I’m not held hostage by my ISP - I choose one that doesn’t do that. Even if I didn’t trust the last mile, that’s why I can choose to implement a vpn for some or all of my devices on my network so I can bypass a hostile isp.

It might be good for the average technophobic end user to trust google instead of their ISP, but it’s not good for me to trust google over my ISP.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#353

Until we get rid of SNI[1] in HTTPS for good there will still be providers (like my ISP) that do deep packet inspection on SNI and kill the connection right away if you happen to visit a forbidden site (and this was western Europe, yesterday, on a site behind CloudFlare) [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication

Use a VPN then.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#354

Why encrypt the first hop? Why isn't this just plain DoH with a simple CONNECT forward proxy to 1.1.1.1, like Signal's Giphy proxy [1]? [1] https://signal.org/blog/signal-and-giphy-update/

Totally agree. Just posted my own question here: https://www.pcwrt.com/2020/12/oblivious-dns-over-https-vs-do...

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#355
post #351

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> With DoH, there are publicly accessible servers that accept requests over plain HTTPS Which is a good thing for end users on balance. The Internet is going 100% encrypted and that's a good thing. This helps towards that goal. Relying on unencrypted traffic will no longer work. Networks must not have the ability to intercept device traffic unless the device administrator ( not the network administrator) configures i…

I’m not held hostage by my ISP - I choose one that doesn’t do that. Even if I didn’t trust the last mile, that’s why I can choose to implement a vpn for some or all of my devices on my network so I can bypass a hostile isp. It might be good for the average technophobic end user to trust google instead of their ISP, but it’s not good for me to trust google over my ISP.

Most users do not have a meaningful choice of ISPs. That was true back in the days of modems, and somewhat true in the days of DSL. It is not true at all in the days of fiber and cable.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#356
post #317

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> With DoH, there are publicly accessible servers that accept requests over plain HTTPS Which is a good thing for end users on balance. The Internet is going 100% encrypted and that's a good thing. This helps towards that goal. Relying on unencrypted traffic will no longer work. Networks must not have the ability to intercept device traffic unless the device administrator ( not the network administrator) configures i…

> there continue to be threads full of arguments that amount to "It should be possible for 'good' network admins to intercept traffic from devices that don't trust them, but 'bad' network admins shouldn't be able to intercept traffic from devices that don't trust them" That's not what I see at all. I see people pointing out that DoH hurts privacy and reduces control for end users by providing a convenient turnkey sol…

> I also see it pointed out that DoH could have been specified in a way that facilitated filtering for the local network. Given that it's so obviously possible

No, it couldn't have been, and this is exactly what I was referring to in my comment. Any mechanism that allows the local network to intercept the traffic of a device that doesn't trust the network can and will be abused. The entire point of DoH was to make DNS clients secure, by preventing ISPs and other network providers from monitoring, intercepting, or tampering with DNS results.

You're asking for DNS to be left insecure, so that you can tamper with it. You're asking for the security of clients that actually give users control (laptops, phones, etc) to be sacrificed so that you can continue to tamper with DNS results for clients that don't give users control.

> On top of all that, DNSSEC already exists which allows you to verify the authenticity of the query result.

DNSSEC isn't nearly widespread enough to expect to find it everywhere. Only very specialized clients could make it a requirement; most clients cannot. DNSSEC requires upgrading most of the world before people can rely on it; DoH is an incremental solution.

> As such, the argument in favor of DoH would seem to be limited to preventing your DNS resolver (but not your ISP or VPN!) from tracking which sites you visit.

SNI is being fixed. Once SNI is fixed, DNS is one of the last holes that allows your ISP or other network provider to track you.

And as mentioned above, since DNSSEC is not a viable solution anytime soon, DoH is also critically important to prevent ISPs and other network providers to tamper with your DNS results.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#357

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> With DoH, there are publicly accessible servers that accept requests over plain HTTPS Which is a good thing for end users on balance. The Internet is going 100% encrypted and that's a good thing. This helps towards that goal. Relying on unencrypted traffic will no longer work. Networks must not have the ability to intercept device traffic unless the device administrator ( not the network administrator) configures i…

I am cynical and maybe paranoid. Be careful what you wish for What I think will end up happening, most of the devices will go encrypted route [1]. Most things will run over https, and with encrypted sni, you won't even be able to block domains. Encryption will be backdoored by governments (and of course other people that will reverse those backdoors or have friends in LEA ). End result is encryption that people are c…

People advocating a 100% encrypted Internet are also many of the same people fighting tooth and nail against backdoored or otherwise broken encryption.

It doesn't make sense to say that encryption will be backdoored so we should use plaintext. We should fight for security across the board, and fight against any threat to that security.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#358
post #350

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This isn't new to DoH. Malware has used alternatives to DNS for getting command & control server IPs for decades. IRC used to be common, for example.

IRC easilly slotted and controlled.

Yes. Which is why it's no longer as popular. The point is that malicious actors have never followed the system's preferences on how to look up server IPs, so why the hell should they start now? DNS blocking hasn't worked up to now, why complain that it's suddenly broken?

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#359
post #317

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> there continue to be threads full of arguments that amount to "It should be possible for 'good' network admins to intercept traffic from devices that don't trust them, but 'bad' network admins shouldn't be able to intercept traffic from devices that don't trust them" That's not what I see at all. I see people pointing out that DoH hurts privacy and reduces control for end users by providing a convenient turnkey sol…

> I also see it pointed out that DoH could have been specified in a way that facilitated filtering for the local network. Given that it's so obviously possible No, it couldn't have been, and this is exactly what I was referring to in my comment. Any mechanism that allows the local network to intercept the traffic of a device that doesn't trust the network can and will be abused. The entire point of DoH was to make DN…

Some color to this: it's less than 2% of North American domains, the number of signed zones has actually dropped in some intervals, and it's practically nonexistent among big companies with security teams. Google isn't DNSSEC-signed. Neither is Microsoft. Or Facebook. Or Amazon (whose DNS service, Route53, doesn't implement DNSSEC). Or, last I checked, any US bank.

You can check this for yourself: make a list of domains, and then write a trivial script:

    #!/bin/sh
    while read domain
    do 
      ds=$(dig ds $domain +short)
      echo "$domain $ds"
    done

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#360

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would like someone to correct me if I am wrong, but I think we can never have 100% privacy because the destination IPs cannot be encrypted or hidden, so as long as the destination IP can be observed, the server that you are connecting at can be obtained (I know a server can host many web pages, but this requires the port, which cannot be encrypted either). So I don't know to what extent this protocol can be useful.

This is "fixed" in DoH the same way it's "fixed" for encrypted SNI: by having a small number of superproviders servicing millions of domains. With current encrypted SNI proposal, your privacy (between you and the superprovider) is /improved/ by talking to a site behind a large aggregating provider. It sucks (since the superprovider still sees everything), but that's how it is. edit: added clarifications in (parens)

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