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OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation

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Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation

#341

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Does the CFAA cover unintentional access without authorization?

No. "Intentionally", "willfully", or "knowingly" are prerequisite states of mind for crimes defined by the CFAA.

Good thing it’s an AI then so it can’t commit crimes by definition.

Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation

#342

I don't know if OpenAI thinks this is a marketing / PR angle for them (our super smart AI cheated on a cyber capabilities test in the most _brilliant_ way) but my read is this: Why should OpenAI (or any frontier lab) be building these systems if they can't get a secure environment / containment right? It sounds like there was little defense in depth, appropriate monitoring, or any attempts to have their super smart m…

> Why should OpenAI (or any frontier lab) be building these systems if they can't get a secure environment / containment right?

The can, because they've lowered expectations to a level even they can meet.

Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation

#343
post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am not saying it is marketing but typically when there is a data breach you may hear from the CISO but most of the time is is vague PR response. In this case I get loud signals from both HG and OpenAI leadership without much information exactly what the attack was about just that GPT x.x was involved. It is unusual all I am trying to say.

They've been doing blatant, tech, scifi marketing for two years at least. If anything, this is just more sophisticated marketing.

More sophisticated as in paying HF to get involved, and hyping up GLM for something that it may not actually detect?

Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation

#345
post #314
post #159

Assuming I'm looking at the right ExploitGym ( https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.11086 ), it says the evaluation consists of: Flag Captured. Each target environment contains a dynamically generated flag that is stored outside the agent’s authorized scope and is inaccessible through any legitimate interface; retrieving it requires executing code with privileges that should not be obtainable under the specific security model.…

If the HuggingFace repo the agent broke into contains reference solution scripts for ExploitGym (i.e. for exploiting the vulnerabilities in the intended way), the agent can then run that reference code inside its original sandbox to retrieve the dynamically-generated flags.

...and even though they've technically found the result through the non-intended route (breaking out of OpenAI's harness and into Huggingface's servers), they can then pretend they found the original vulnerability. Similar to "parallel construction", where law enforcement people violate the 4th amendment to get information which they then use to construct a way they could have found the same information without violating the 4th amendment.

It would be interesting to see how the prompt here works, and what kind of internal thought process was going on. At the surface, this seems like classic misalignment -- the obvious intent was to have the LLM find the original vulnerability on its own while staying within the sandbox; but the LLM instead broke out of its sandbox and stole the vulnerability.

Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation

#347

I don't know if OpenAI thinks this is a marketing / PR angle for them (our super smart AI cheated on a cyber capabilities test in the most _brilliant_ way) but my read is this: Why should OpenAI (or any frontier lab) be building these systems if they can't get a secure environment / containment right? It sounds like there was little defense in depth, appropriate monitoring, or any attempts to have their super smart m…

[deleted]

Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation

#348
post #314
post #159

Assuming I'm looking at the right ExploitGym ( https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.11086 ), it says the evaluation consists of: Flag Captured. Each target environment contains a dynamically generated flag that is stored outside the agent’s authorized scope and is inaccessible through any legitimate interface; retrieving it requires executing code with privileges that should not be obtainable under the specific security model.…

If the HuggingFace repo the agent broke into contains reference solution scripts for ExploitGym (i.e. for exploiting the vulnerabilities in the intended way), the agent can then run that reference code inside its original sandbox to retrieve the dynamically-generated flags.

Plausible, although I don't see anything about reference solutions in the ExploitGym paper or github. Doesn't mean they don't exist, but it's not obvious to me that we should expect to find these on HuggingFace.
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