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Why we use our own hardware

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Re: Why we use our own hardware

#341
post #271

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nope. It's literally putting private data in a shared drawer in someone else's desk where you have your area of the drawer.

Literally? I would just like to point out that most of us who have ever had a job at an office, attended an academic institution, or lived in rented accommodation have kept stuff in someone else’s desk drawer from time to time. Often a leased desk in a building rented from a random landlord. Keeping things in someone else’s desk drawer can be convenient and offer a sufficient level of privacy for many purposes. And y…

It doesn’t have to be entirely literal, or not literal at all.

A single point of managed/shared access to a drawer doesn’t fit all levels of data sensitivity and security.

I understand this kind of wording and analogy might be triggering for the drive by down voters.

A comment like the above though allows both people to openly consider viewpoints that may not be theirs.

For me it shed light on something simpler.

Shared access to shared infrastructure is not always secure as we want to tell ourselves. It’s important to be aware when it might be security through abstraction.

The dual security and convenience of self-hosting IaaS and PaaS even at a dev, staging or small scale production has improved dramatically, and allows for things to be built in a cloud agnostic way to allow switching clouds to be much easier. It can also easily build a business case to lower cloud costs. Still, it doesn’t have to be for everyone either, where the cloud turns to be everything.

A small example? For a stable homeland - their a couple of usff small servers running proxmox or something residential fibre behind a tailscale or cloudflare funnel and compare the cost for uptime. It’s surprising how much time servers and apps spend idling.

Life and the real world is more than binary. Be it all cloud or no cloud.

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#342

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> you never hear about security probems (incidents or exposure) in the platforms Except that one time... https://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-city-life/2023/04/how-a-...

If I remember right, the attacker’s AWS employment is irrelevant - no privileged AWS access was used in that case. The attacker working for AWS was a pure coincidence, it could’ve been anyone.

[deleted]

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#343

The whole push to the cloud has always fascinated me. I get it - most people aren't interested in babysitting their own hardware. On the other hand, a business of just about any size that has any reasonable amount of hosting is better off with their own systems when it comes purely to cost. All the pro-cloud talking points are just that - talking points that don't persuade anyone with any real technical understanding…

I hear this debate repeated often, and I think there's another important factor. It took me some time to figure out how to explain it, and the best I came up with was this: It is extremely difficult to bootstrap from zero to baseline competence, in general, and especially in an existing organization.

In particular, there is a limit to paying for competence, and paying more money doesn't automatically get you more competence, which is especially perilous if your organization lacks the competence to judge competence. In the limit case, this gets you the Big N consultancies like PWC or EY. It's entirely reasonable to hire PWC or EY to run your accounting or compliance. Hiring PWC or EY to run your software development lifecycle is almost guaranteed doom, and there is no shortage of stories on this site to support that.

In comparison, if you're one of these organizations, who don't yet have baseline competence in technology, then what the public cloud is selling is nothing short of magical: You pay money, and, in return, you receive a baseline set of tools, which all do more or less what they say they will do. If no amount of money would let you bootstrap this competence internally, you'd be much more willing to pay a premium for it.

As an anecdote, my much younger self worked in mid-sized tech team in a large household brand in a legacy industry. We were building out a web product that, for product reasons, had surprisingly high uptime and scalability requirements, relative to legacy industry standards. We leaned heavily on public cloud and CDNs. We used a lot of S3 and SQS, which allowed us to build systems with strong reliability characteristics, despite none of us having that background at the time.

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#344
The original answer to "why does FastMail use their own hardware" is that when I started the company in 1999 there weren't many options. I actually originally used a single bare metal server at Rackspace, which at that time was a small scrappy startup. IIRC it cost $70/month. There weren't really practical VPS or SaaS alternatives back then for what I needed.

Rob (the author of the linked article) joined a few months later, and when we got too big for our Rackspace server, we looked at the cost of buying something and doing colo instead. The biggest challenge was trying to convince a vendor to let me use my Australian credit card but ship the server to a US address (we decided to use NYI for colo, based in NY). It turned out that IBM were able to do that, so they got our business. Both IBM and NYI were great for handling remote hands and hardware issues, which obviously we couldn't do from Australia.

A little bit later Bron joined us, and he automated absolutely everything, so that we were able to just have NYI plug in a new machine and it would set itself up from scratch. This all just used regular Linux capabilities and simple open source tools, plus of course a whole lot of Perl.

As the fortunes of AWS et al rose and rose and rose, I kept looking at their pricing at features and kept wondering what I was missing. They seemed orders of magnitude more expensive for something that was more complex to manage and would have locked us into a specific vendor's tooling. But everyone seemed to be flocking to them.

To this day I still use bare metal servers for pretty much everything, and still love having the ability to use simple universally-applicable tools like plain Linux, Bash, Perl, Python, and SSH, to handle everything cheaply and reliably.

I've been doing some planning over the last couple of years on teaching a course on how to do all this, although I was worried that folks are too locked in to SaaS stuff -- but perhaps things are changing and there might be interest in that after all?...

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#345

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The other part is that when us-east-1 goes down, you can blame AWS, and a third of your customer's vendors will be doing the same. When you unplug the power to your colo rack while installing a new server, that's on you.

OTOH, when your company's web site is down you can do something about it. When the CEO asks about it, you can explain why its offline and more importantly what is being done to bring it back. The equivalent situation for those who took a cloud based approach is often... ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

The more relevant question is whether my efforts to do something lead to a better and faster result than my cloud providers efforts to do something. I get it - it feels powerless to do nothing, but for a lot of organizations I’ve seen the average downtime would still be higher.

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#346

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Encrypting data is easy, securely managing keys is the hard part. KMS is the Key Management Service. And AWS put a lot of thought and work into it. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details...

KMS access is granted by either environment variables or by authorizing the instance itself. Either way, if the instance is compromised, then so is access to KMS. So unless your threat model involves preventing the government from looking at your data through some theoretical sophisticated physical attack, then your primary concerns are likely the same as running a box in another physically secure location. So the sa…

An attacker gaining temporary capability to encrypt/decrypt data through a compromised instance is painful. An attacker gaining a copy of a private key is still an entirely different world of pain.

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#347

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"All the pro-cloud talking points are just that - talking points that don't persuade anyone with any real technical understanding," This is false. AWS infrastructure is vastly more secure than almost all company data centers. AWS has a rule that the same person cannot have logical access and physical access to the same storage device. Very few companies have enough IT people to have this rule. The AWS KMS is vastly m…

> AWS infrastructure is vastly more secure than almost all company data centers Secure in what terms? Security is always about a threat model and trade-offs. There's no absolute, objective term of "security". > AWS has a rule that the same person cannot have logical access and physical access to the same storage device. Any promises they make aren't worth anything unless there's contractually-stipulated damages that…

Physical access is pretty relevant if you could bribe an engineer to locate some valuable data's physical location, then go service the particular machine, copy the disk (during servicing "degraded hardware"), and thus exflitrate the data without any traces of a breach.

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#348

Earlier quoted context omitted.

KMS access is granted by either environment variables or by authorizing the instance itself. Either way, if the instance is compromised, then so is access to KMS. So unless your threat model involves preventing the government from looking at your data through some theoretical sophisticated physical attack, then your primary concerns are likely the same as running a box in another physically secure location. So the sa…

An attacker gaining temporary capability to encrypt/decrypt data through a compromised instance is painful. An attacker gaining a copy of a private key is still an entirely different world of pain.

Painful is an understatement. Keys for sensitive customer data should be derived from customer secrets either way. Almost nobody does that though, because it requires actual forethought. Instead they just slap secrets in KMS and pretend it's better than encrypted environment variables or other secrets services. If an attacker can read your secrets with the same level of penetration into your system, then it's all the same security wise.

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#349
post #316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Cloud providers are very big targets but have enormous economic incentive to be secure and thus have very large teams of very competent security experts.

You can have full security competence but be a rogue actor at the same time.

You can also have rogue actors in your company, you don’t need 3rd parties for that

Re: Why we use our own hardware

#350
post #344

The original answer to "why does FastMail use their own hardware" is that when I started the company in 1999 there weren't many options. I actually originally used a single bare metal server at Rackspace, which at that time was a small scrappy startup. IIRC it cost $70/month. There weren't really practical VPS or SaaS alternatives back then for what I needed. Rob (the author of the linked article) joined a few months…

Please do this course. It's still needed and a lot of people would benefit from it. It's just that the loudest voices are all in on Cloud that it seems otherwise.
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