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1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

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Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#341
post #64

Reported this exact bug to Zendesk, Apple, and Slack in June 2024, both through HackerOne and by escalating directly to engs or PMs at each company. I doubt we were the first. That is presumably the reason they failed to pay out. The real issue is that non-directory SSO options like Sign in with Apple (SIWA) have been incorrectly implemented almost everywhere, including by Slack and other large companies we alerted i…

I do web app testing and report a similar issue as a risk rather often to my clients. You can replace Google below with many other identity providers. Imagine Bob works at Example Inc. and has email address bob@example.com Bob can get a Google account with primary email address bob@example.com. He can legitimately pass verification. Bob then gets fired for fraud or sexual harassment or something else gross misconduct…

Every time I've left an organization, they have swiftly deleted the company email address/revoked my access to it. I assume every reasonable organization will have processes in place to do this.

I don't see this as a vulnerability: how is Google supposed to know that a person has left the company? You let them know by deleting the account.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#342

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Presumably one of the PMs you’re referring to has posted this article for additional information. Feels like they’re doubling down on their initial position. https://support.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/8187090244506-...

> Although the researcher did initially submit the vulnerability through our established process, they violated key ethical principles by directly contacting third parties about their report prior to remediation. This was in violation of bug bounty terms of service, which are industry standard and intended to protect the white hat community while also supporting responsible disclosure. This breach of trust resulted i…

What a moron

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#343

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do web app testing and report a similar issue as a risk rather often to my clients. You can replace Google below with many other identity providers. Imagine Bob works at Example Inc. and has email address bob@example.com Bob can get a Google account with primary email address bob@example.com. He can legitimately pass verification. Bob then gets fired for fraud or sexual harassment or something else gross misconduct…

Every time I've left an organization, they have swiftly deleted the company email address/revoked my access to it. I assume every reasonable organization will have processes in place to do this. I don't see this as a vulnerability: how is Google supposed to know that a person has left the company? You let them know by deleting the account.

In the above example, the Company doesn't have anything to do with the Google account that the user created themselves.

I don't know if Google is the best example here. Apple might be a better one:

1. User's work email is user@company.com

2. User creates Apple ID using their work email. Their Apple ID is user@example.com

3. User gets fired and their company email is deleted

4. User can still sign in to the SaaS apps using SIWA and their "company" Apple ID

It's worth noting that OAuth providers - like Apple - include information such as if they are authoratitive or not over a particular account.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#344
post #64

Reported this exact bug to Zendesk, Apple, and Slack in June 2024, both through HackerOne and by escalating directly to engs or PMs at each company. I doubt we were the first. That is presumably the reason they failed to pay out. The real issue is that non-directory SSO options like Sign in with Apple (SIWA) have been incorrectly implemented almost everywhere, including by Slack and other large companies we alerted i…

Presumably one of the PMs you’re referring to has posted this article for additional information. Feels like they’re doubling down on their initial position. https://support.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/8187090244506-...

As a former ZD engineer, shame on you Mr Cusick (yes, I know you personally) and shame on my fellow colleagues for not handling this in a more proactive and reasonable way.

Another example of impotent PMs, private equity firms meddling and modern software engineering taking a back seat to business interests. Truly pathetic. Truly truly pathetic.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#345
post #11

A $1.3 billion revenue company being too tight to pay this after all, even on their 2nd chance, is so short-sighted it's absurd. They're putting out a huge sign saying "When you find a vuln, definitely contact all our clients because we won't be giving you a penny!". Incredible. This must be some kind of "damaged ego" or ass-covering, as it's clearly not a rational decision. Edit: Another user here has pointed out th…

> A $1.3 billion revenue company being too tight to pay this after all, even on their 2nd chance, is so short-sighted it's absurd. I'll give an "another side" perspective. My company was much smaller. Out of 10+ "I found a vulnerability" emails I got last year, all were something like mass-produced emails generated based on an automated vulnerability scanning tool. Investigating all of those for "is it really an issu…

[deleted]

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#346
post #3

It sounds like the author got stiffed by Zendesk on this bug, $0 due to email spoofing being out of scope. The $50k was from other bug bounties he was awarded on hackerone. It's too bad Zendesk basically said "thanks" but then refused to pay anything. That's a good way to get people not to bother with your big bounty program. It is often better to build goodwill than to be a stickler for rules and technicalities. Sid…

If I am not mistaken, it wasn't zendesk that didn't want to recognize the bug, but HackerOne that did not escalate to Zendesk that they should reconsider the exclusion ground in this case. As an aside, I wonder if those bounties in general reflect the real value of those bugs. The economic damage could be way higher, given that people share logins in support tickets. I would have expected that the price on the black…

Hackerone staffs are not that good. They usually mark anything from a non famous person as a duplicate (even if it differs in nuances, which eventually lead to much more impact) or straight out of scope.

I think it's just laziness. Plus they hire previous famous reporter as the people triaging the reports, those famous people know other famous people first hand, they usually think "hmm, unknown guy, must have ran a script and submitted this"

I have stopped reporting stuff since last 5 years due to the frustration. And it seems the situation is still the same even after so many years.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#347

The piece the author is missing, and why zendesk likely ignored this is impact, and it's something I continually see submissions lacking. As a researcher, if you can't demonstrate impact of your vulnerability, then it looks like just another bug. A public program like zendesk is going to be swamped with reports, and they're using hackerone triagers to augment that volume. The triage system reads through a lot of repo…

The dude demonstrated the ability to infiltrate a client’s Slack instance via their vulnerability. If that’s not enough to make the hairs on your neck stand on end as an engineer, go fucking do something else.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#348
post #340

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> A $1.3 billion revenue company being too tight to pay this after all, even on their 2nd chance, is so short-sighted it's absurd. I'll give an "another side" perspective. My company was much smaller. Out of 10+ "I found a vulnerability" emails I got last year, all were something like mass-produced emails generated based on an automated vulnerability scanning tool. Investigating all of those for "is it really an issu…

We also had this problem in my previous company a few years ago, a 20-people company, but somehow we attracted much more attention. In one specific instance, we had 20 emails in a single month about a specific Wordpress PHP endpoint that had a vulnerability, in a separate market site in another domain. The thing is, it had already been replaced by our Wordpress contractor as part of the default install, but it was re…

Keep it as 200, then any reports you get about it can be added to a block list.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#349
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is worse than Docusign. What do 6000 people at Zendesk do? It's a simple ticket management software with maybe 10 features

I am actually seriously interested in what people there do day to day. I’m wondering this about a lot of very large companies, I would definitely watch a documentary about that.

I work at similar size company. Basically they are like most companies building out the next 5 years while also keeping the lights on at four nines. There can be a lot of depth to product that you dont see. Anyone who says "why you need X people" often havn't tried a side hussle where you see 360 all the activities involved.

Building at scale without racking up big bill and hitting SLAs require a decent amount of effort.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#350
post #21

I help corporates evaluate and buy software. Having an ineffective bug bounty program, especially one that rewards black market activity on a terms & conditions technicality like this, is enough for me to put a black mark on your software services. I don’t care if you’re the only company in the market, I’ll still blackball you for this in my recommendations. Zendesk should pay up, apologize and correct their bug boun…

HackerOne’s mediator dropped the ball here They should absolutely inform a client company of a perceived threat, when they agree on the threat Most of the person’s post and responses here are about Zendesk’s issue, but Zendesk was never informed for a better PR response, I think now Zendesk could reward this after realizing it wouldnt have been disclosed first, and admonish HackerOne for not informing them and the cu…

Zendesk was informed. OP specifically said they asked h1 to escalate to the company itself and the second email they present way from someone from Zendesk, who still rejected them, adding that this decision was made “after consulting with the team”.
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