Earlier quoted context omitted.
> These engines moving made the plane more vulnerable to a stall situation. I don't think this is correct. A lot is being made about the engine move with regard to aerodynamic behavior, but it doesn't seem at all outside of the bounds of what is considered standard. Pilots report that a similar 'light stick feel' at high AoA is already present in aircraft like the 757. It's not that the aerodynamic change was worse o…
> MCAS was there to satisfy the type rating. MCAS is not anti-stall. MCAS's only observable intervention is to push the nose down to prevent stall, which means it is by definition anti-stall. Boeing says MCAS is an acronym for "Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System", but a better name for MCAS is "Machine Controlled Anti Stall". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au...
Re: Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit limiting ability to shut off MCAS
#341The MCAS may not have been designed as an anti-stall system, but that doesn't necessarily mean it functioned according to design. The possibility for multiple activations integrates the control response, converting feedforward control into a closed loop (it will continue to act on the trim until the AoA decreases). Somewhere a decision has been made about a control system without requisite knowledge or understanding of the consequences, and this made it through design validation, testing and certification. That is highly disturbing, as there is no certainty that MCAS is stable in any circumstances where the pilot is making manual trim adjustment.